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A remark fits into a discourse if it can be interpreted as a plan- 
advancing act given the world around the speakers. their intentions. 
and the Drior discourse. Teleological auestions about discourse such 
as "Why did X make this utterance here? " must have answers such as 
"Because X wanted to do so-and-so". When there is no surh answer. the 
discourse will be inCOMDrehensible. 
The proper sort of explanation to give is to talk about the speaker's 
plans and the alterations he intends in his interlocutor's plans. To 
do this one must have an account of what a plan is. how it can be 
changed by changes in its maker's beliefs and values. how utterances 
can make such changes. and when such changes count as benefits for 
the speaker. Such an account is offered. 
The interlocutors must have recursive beliefs (beliefs about each 
others' beliefs). But often a special simple case of recursive belief 
can be used. Then recursive belief can be factored out of the problem 
of explaining how utterances change plans. A proof of sufficient 
condition for this special case to arise is given. 
Indirect communication can occur if a speaker forces his hearer to 
change the plans the hearer supposes the speaker to have. This 
happens because being known to have a plan entails being known to 
have certain beliefs. 
Some discourse events are constituted bV changes that occur to the 
plans of Speakers in the discourse as a result of what is said. 
Examples are given. 
Some process accounts of the recognition of utterances as goal- 
directed attempts to change plans are considered. 
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The story of this thesis is that if you look at language use as 
purposive action, you have an interesting way of eXDlaining meaning 
and discourse. If you take a discourse, and point to some utterance 
in it, you can ask "Why is this remark here? What does it mean here? 
Why this one and not another-one? Why any remark at all? ". I suggest 
that Ahis is. the same as asking "Why did, the speaker say this here 
rather than that?. What-did, he mean by saying this here? Why did he 
say. anything at all? " and that the proper sort of explanation to give 
is. to -talk about the speaker's intentions. in terms of his plans and 
their intended effect on his interlocutor's plans. 
I suggest that a remark fits into a discourse if it can be 
interpreted as a rational plan-advancing act given the world around 
the speakers. their intentions, and the prior discourse. Teleological 
questions about discourse such as "Why did X make-this utterance 
here? " must have answers such as "Because X wanted to do so-and-so". 
When there is no such answer, the discourse will be incomprehensible. 
The, structure: of the thesis-isýthis: 
Chapter 1 states what-I am trying to argue, which is that discourse 
must, be seen as planned action. It lists some aspects of discourse 
that seem inexplicable without doing. -this: for- instance, some 
exchanges in which the parties must have inferred each others' plans; 
or -the -occurrence of eventsin discourse-which are not definable in 
terms of -the literal content-of. what was said. It argues that it is 
imoossible to imagine methods of communication that could be used by 
independent agents which are not based on seeing utterances as 
actions. Any other method seems to have to rely on speakers being 
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able to force beliefs and values (albeit very abstract ones) on their 
listeners. and would apparently let speakers make listeners into mere 
tools of their interlocutors. Lastly it briefly discusses the 
relation of the function-type of sentences and the use to which they 
are out. 
Chapter '2 "is on , related work. 'It considers the work of SDeech act 
theorists such as Austin. Searle and Grice. Much of this is accepted. 
but not'ý their emphasis on"Ithe 'iMDortance of illocution. Then it 
covers'l-ýthe process accounts of Allen. and contrasts what I propose 
with what he'offers. -Lastly-'it denies'the possibility of giving any 
deep explanation of'discourse'by mapping it onto'scripts of the sort 
that Schank, proposes. 
Chapter 3 gives-a model of rational action. It de5cribes actions in a 
way 'that lets them be used-in proofs in the same way as sentences 
describing states of affairs can be. It argues that rational action 
can be seen as action that isýpart of a plan to a desired goal, and 
that'-Ia''plan can (for my purposes) be equated with a particular sort 
of proof. Finally it briefly considers and rejects a representation 
of plans that emphasizes proving the desirability'of means (actions). 
over, proving the possibility-of ends. 
Chapter 4 links action and utterance. It, arques that utterances can 
forceilla rational planner to remake his plans in the light of the 
changes ý--in his -beliefs and values'that the"utterances provoke. It 
shows how plans seen as Proofs are vulnerable to new information. 
Lastly 'it shows when-changes in intended plan are good for the 
planner'. , even wh6n, -- as sometimes happens. the information destroys 
the P . ossibility of a good plan being devised. 
Chapter 5 'is-- about' indirect communication,., It'arques that knowing 
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that a planner has a plan entails certain, things about the planner's 
beliefs and values. Changes in what someone takes his plans therefore 
entail, changes in what that someone must take his beliefs and values 
must beý So a planner can change what is known about his plans as a 
way, of, compelling others to change their beliefs about him. The 
planner. can. use these changes to do exactly the same thing as he 
might with overt statements of what he wants and believes. 
Chapter 6 discusses, belief about,, other peoples' beliefs. Clearly this 
is vital-to-indirect 
_communication. and. 
indeed to practically 
everything else in discourse-Fully general recursive belief, where 
for instance A thinks F while A thinks B thinks A thinks -F is in 
fact necessary. But in a large range of situations, a simpler special 
case of recursive belief, mutual belief, can be used instead. When 
this is possible, the recursiveness of recursive belief can 
essentially be ignored. A proof is given of a sufficient condition 
for this. It is shown that much discourse fulfills this condition, 
and so plan manipulation can be discussed without reference to 
recursive belief. 
Chapter 7 considers series of utterances that affect plans. and 
suggests that certain speech acts and discourse events are 
constituted by series of certain sorts of changes in interlocutors, 
plans. Therefore recognition of these is only possible if the series 
of changes made to a plan can be recognized. Two sets of examples are 
given: offers, requests and responses to these; and explanations. 
which are construed as changes of plans such that the explicandum is 
included in the changed plan in such a way that it is a reasonable 
event or state to have expected. 
Chapter 8 is a sketch of two processes that could detect the changes 
being attempted by the maker of an utterance. One uses a fixed case 
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analysis of all the changes that could be made by an utterance. and 
suggests that understanding an utterance is finding a path through 
the analysis compatible with the utterance and the currently extant 
plans. The other 
-uses 
chains of inferences built from rules whose 
antecedents are,. purposely, not checked. If the chains that can be 
built starting from the utterance and an extant plan run to a Common 
"interesting" fact, it may. be, wise to see if these chains can be made 
into proofs, If they can. a wise planner will make certain changes to 
his plans. These changes may be credible purposes of the utterance. 
These approaches-, are both rejected, but only as means of realizing 
the theory, not in a way that impugns the theory itself. 
F, -'- ', - . 
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Chapter 1. Some problýms in discourse 
Let me ask some questions about language, and then give some answers 
that. make me think one needs to think about the speaker's intentions. 
Be warned: this is an explanation of why I think intentions matter. I 
am not going to give processes, for answering all these questions if 





1.1.1, What is it that matters in what is said? 
Even for simple statements of fact that seem only to have the purpose 
of giving information, the important information that one gets from 
them is not the information borne in their truth conditions. Here is 
an example: 
A and B always make tea-in a teapot with water boiled in a 
kettle, and always make coffee in a percolator. 
A: Do you want coffee or tea? 
B: I've put, the kettle on. 
B means all sorts of things by his reply. One of the things he means 
is that he wants tea. -This is not of course-any part of the 
truth 
conditions of what he said. Is it fair to say that the knowledge that 
B wants tea is part of the meaning of what he said?. I think, so. 
Imagine asking A whether B wants tea or coffee after this exchange. A 
I 
will say "tea". A moment before he didn't know that, or he, wouldn't 
have asked his question. The only place his information can have come 
from is. from what B said. So it, is a piece of information A had to 
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know before he could be said to have understood what B said, and 
should therefore count as part of its meaning. 
So more ingredients than just truth conditions are involved in fixing 
the meaning of an utterance. What are they? 
And of course questions and commands don't have truth conditions. 
Even though they may involve pictures of the world, they don't 
preseni it as a picture of how the world is. Questions and commands 
are intended to provoke some sort of response from the hearer. 
Statements are supposed to provoke belief; questions. a reply; 
commands, obedience - at least in some sort of ideally simple 
discourse. The remark is supposed to tell you its intended response 
by its mood. But of course overt mood doesn't really tell you that. 
"Can you shut the door? " is often a (polite) command posing as a 
question. In 
A: Where is the key? 
B: Isn't it on the mantelpiece? 
B's remark is a (hesitant) statement posing as a question. 
One hasn't understood what is said until one has found the intended 
1, (, 
response. How is it created by a speaker or detected by a hearer? 
1.1.2. What use is language? 
Why should we talk at all? We have got the ability, so presumably it 
does something for us as a species. What? One answer might be that it 
gives us remote perception. Other people see things, and then they 
tell us that they have seen them. I could now tell a story about how 
useful this sort of warning of predators and advice about food would 
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be to a tribe of aues. 
The story could be, true, but is it relevant? Suppose language were 
primarily for--finding food and avoiding tigers. All one would need 
would- be -a table saying "If you see honey then make the honey call, 
If you see'tiger, make the tiger alarm call". This would achieve the 
speciesl'', simpler-- aims, without all the effort involved in being able 
to describe-arbitrary situations. -But if the species does (to speak 
loosely)'decide to'go for general descriptive ability, so that it can 
talk about , anything it perceives, this approach wouldn't work. A 
speaker will have an effectively infinite number of things that he 
can'say about,,, any situation. 
The ape'needs notýonly a code-for describing whatever it is that its 
hearer can't see. but also a method of deciding what parts of what it 
can see to relay to its hearer. What method? 
1.1-3. What makes discourse cohere? 
The -order of--remarks, in, a conversation matters. One can't scramble 
them-,, and --'leave their! value'the same, as-one can with apocketful of 
change. This discourseýdoesnlt, ýmake-sense: 
B: Isn't it shut? 
A: 'ý,, Waverley. 
B: I thought it was a holiday today. 
, A. The, strike's over'. 
B: LeVsýgo then,. 
A: Not for", the; trains. 
B* Which one? 
A: Can you give me a lift to the station? 
even though it just a scrambling of: 
A: Can you give me a lift to the station? 
B: Aich one? 
A: Waverley. 
B: Isn't it shut? 
A: The strike's over. 
B: I thought it was a holiday today. 
A: Not for the trains. 
B: Let's go then. 
What is it that makes one acceptable and the other incoherent? What 
sort of rules tell you that one remark will fit into the next turn in 
a conversation while some other won't? What leads one to say 
something rather than stay silent? 
1.1.4. How do we define and apply words that describe discourse? 
There are all sorts of words that we use to describe events that 
occur in discourse: rebuke, threaten, promise, convince. These are 
actions; we speak of people doing them. What sort of definitions 
should these words have? And once they have definitions, what part of 
the world should one look at to see whether the definitions apply? 
1.1.5. Why can non-linguistic actions behave like utterances? 
Suppose I cut my finger at some moment when I can't speak. (Perhaps a 
tape-recording is being made. ) You know where the sticking plaster 
is. I wave my bleeding finger at you. You go and get the plaster and 
give me a bit. 
In that scene I have got you to do exactly what you would have done 
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if I had told you I had cut myself. In some sense I have done the 
same thing as if I had asked you outright for the plaster. But I 
didn't use language. What is it that linguistic and non-linguistic 
actions have in common that lets both affect other peoples' actions? 
1.2. Some answers 
1.2.1. What is it that matters in what is said? 
The example was: 
A and B always make tea in a teapot with water boiled in a 
kettle, 
and always make coffee in a percolator. 
A: Do you want coffee or tea? 
B: I've put the kettle on. 
What B means is "I want I tea". The knowledge that B prefers tea is 
deducible from A and B's shared assumptions about how they make tea 
and coffee and B's remark, taken with some axioms about rational 
behaviour. (Expanding that clause is the difficulty). One can argue 
that a person only does intentionally those things that he thinks 
will benefit him. Putting on the kettle will only benefit B if he 
wants tea. So one can deduce 
ý 
wants tea. 
That is indeed the intuitive meýning of B's remark. and it is a 
deduction from what B said. But why is that deduction the one that 
matters? Should one say that the meaning of a remark is all that can 
be deduced from it ,?. Surely not. For instance, from "F" on e can deduce 
"F or G". But "B prefers tea or the moon is made of green cheese" is 
no part of the meaning of what B said. 
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"B wants tea" is the deduction that matters because it is the one 
that can be seen to have aýpurposeý it answers A's question. 
(There is a possibility of confusion here. I am not saying that this 
deduction is the-right one because it TALKS ABOUT B's intentions (to 
make tea). - It is the right one because it ACHIEVES one of B's 
intentions (to answer A's question). 'An'example such as 
A: -Is Dumfriesýlin England'orýScotland? 
B: It has a'-team'in the Scottish football league. 
has -exactly, the same structure as the previous one, but makes no 
reference''to anyone's intentions. The added information allows A to 
deduce an answer to his question. ) 
What does thisýhave to say about meaning? If the story I am telling 
is true, then perhaps' meaning adheres to utterances, not sentences 
(not-'a novel claim), and perhaps meaning can be identified with the 
change of belief that the-SD. eaker intends to take place. 
But there are of course utterances that aren't intended to change the 
hearer's beliefs. The 'standard sort of question, where the speaker 
hopes only for the answer and nothing else, or the standard command, 
where he hopes for obedience and nothing else, are like this. Do 
questions and commands then 'not have meaning. or have a radically 
different'sort to'statements' meaning? 
I suggest that'the-central task'of-extracting what we feel to be the 
content of an 'utterance is not- finding out how it changes our 
beliefs, or indeed -even *how the speaker intended it to change our 
beliefs, but finding out' what effect' the speaker intended his 
utterance to have. ' What he intended mav involve the hearer, changing, 
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his -beliefs. It may be sensible to identify utterance meaning with 
the set of all the changes in belief that utterance causes. But this 
set of changes is the means, -not the end, of the utterance. 
Of course in many cases the intended effect of an utterance is the 
change of belief it causes. If I am teaching someone about spherical 
harmonics -what I-. care about is the new beliefs that he entertains 
about-them. - What he then does as a result of this information may 
well, be oft not theislightest interest toýme. Even when I make some 
statement because of the effect I-hope itýwill have on my hearer's 
actions, I will haveý a subsidiary intention that he believe that 
statement. Without that change of belief, there will be none of the 
other. more important, effects. 
(To be a little polemical. perhaps this is why naive semantics 
sometimes concentrates too much on trying to relate sentences to the 
pictures, of the world that they express. often the change that 
happens if the hearer believes what he is told IS the change that the 
speaker intended. --If you make the mistake of thinking that they are 
always the -. same, and that therefore-bending-the hearer's picture of 
the -world so- that it-is- the same, as the picture expressed in a 
sentence is -the-central task of language, you will think that truth 
conditions are meaning. ) 
Questions and, commands clearly are used by speakers for their 
effects. Nevertheless, one can ask a question such as "What did Smith 
mean when ýhe asked "Aýe'there any matches-left? "? ", or "... when he 
said "Bring me the matches! "? ",. If the answerer can overcome his urge 
to say -"What do you mean "What did he mean? "? ", you may well get an 
answer such as "He meant he wanted to, know if there-were any matches 
left" or-. "He meant-he-wanted me to bring him, the matches". I can 
explain -this. by saying that- if the, hearer has explained Smith's 
I Sý- 
question- by assuming that Smith hopes to get an answer or the 
matches, the hearer must believe that Smith wants an answer or the 
matches. These are new beliefs to the hearer, and so part of the 
meaning of Smith's demands. 
There are of course already accounts of how utterances are like acts. 
for -instance_fromýSearle and Austin. These are discussed in chapter 
2, and I give reasons there against adopting them. Briefly, it is 
because they adopt a. specialkind-of, action., illocutionary acts. as 
explanatory ofýthe-effect that utterances have on their hearers. Then 
theý! issue Is how, utterances can realize illocutions and how language 
users can detect, such, actions in discourse. I would rather drOD 
illocution in favour, -of claiming that utterances have their force 
because of the, effect that- their, propositional content has on 
mutually known plans. Such effect should be predictable just from 
considering the nature of plans and how they should be rationally 
altered-when the context in, which-they were made alters. 
The existing approach most similar--to this is that of Ellman (1983). 
who, proposes. to deprive utterances of all special force except that 
of, making their -content- mutually known. -After this, an agent will 
infer the indirect goals of the: speaker using rules, that-are Just 
about planning and which make no reference to speech act force. 
"As. -hearers may choose not to accede to REQUESTs, or decide 
to cooperate in other ways, it would seem that REQUESTS only 
suggest, or INFORM, theýhearer-as to the speaker's desires. 
[.,, ] That is, from the point, of-view of an understander of, 
speech acts it may not be relevant that utterances are 
REQUESTs, 
_ , as ., 
long as the hearer can detect from them the 
speaker's superordinate goal(s). It therefore seems that the 
notion of-different speech act types is not necessary for 
natural language understanding. " (Ellman 1983). 
I think he and I would differ in principle only on the primitive 
status of' mutual 'belief, and the machinery by which speakers' 
intentions are recognized. 
1.2.2. What use is language? 
Things are useful to us if they achieve our goals or prevent our 
fears. If yoý think''of ut I terances as actions capable of affecting'the 
world, albeit just that small part of the world that is other people. 
then one can explain the fact that we'say'some things and not others 
by saying that we say' only those' things that advance our ends, 
because we want to'change either others' belief, or others' actions 
based on their beliefs. 
The ape's problem about'what it should say in given circumstances is 
solved 'if''it can guess b'oih*what i ts fellows are likely to want and 
to fear, and what pieces of information are likely to matter to them 
because of their wants- ahd fears. It can then restrict"itself to 
offering only' information that it knows its fellows will be glad to 
have because it helps them obtain their ends. or which will make them 
help him. IIII 
1.2.3. What makes discourse cohere? 
The answer to this'is 
the introduction, I sugj 
can be interpreted as 
around the speakers, 1. 
Teleological questions 
utterance here? " must 
rýlated to the'last. To repeat what I said in 
lest that a remark fits into a discourse if it 
a rational*'Plan-advancing act'given the world 
their intentions. and' the prior discourse. 
about discourse such as "Why did X make this 
have answers such as "Because X wanted to do 
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so-and-so".! When there is no such answer. the discourse will be 
incomprehensible. 
(Let me put in a disclaimer. 'There are lots of things one can say 
about, discourse. I-am not claiming that ALL-discussions-of it have to 
be teleological. )-, 
I. ý.. 41 -1 
1.2.4.. How do weTapply words that, describe, discourse? - 
It seems thatýat least, some. of the words that we-use to, describe what 
happened-in-discourse are defined, in terms of plans to change 
people's beliefs and actions via what has been said. For instance, 
consider the word -, -"rebuke". Suppose B parks his car in front of a 
fire. -exit, with possible evil consequences. What has, to happen for B 
to have been rebuked by A? 
. We can't establish that- a rebuke has occurred just by 
,.; --looking at'B at two moments, -and finding that in the first B 
approved ý. his. -action, but later didnltý. B might-have parked 
his car. -, and -later have discovered from C that it was in 
front of a fire exit-., 
Nor by finding a chain of events such that an action of A's 
-led to-B disapproving of, his own action. B, could have parked 
his -new -car that A has never yet seen. and then hear A say 
at the car some fool has-parked in front of-a fire 
-exiV. and so come, toAisapprove his own action. 
by finding a chain of-events such that an action, of A's 
that A intended to lead to B disapproving of his own action 
succeeded. A ýcould , have advised--a fire officer to 
ýremonstratetwith B, with the, intended effect. This would not 
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be a rebukeýby A. 
one has to see a series of, actions as the execution of a 
plan of Als, by which A says something to B in order to 
change B's. beliefs, so that B come to believe that B's 
action X was an action with foreseeable bad effects. For 
instance., if A says.. "If-there's a fire they. won't be able to 
get out of that door", that remark then counts as a rebuke. 
-ý . 1.1-1, ,. II, ý" 1" 
Notice that, A's1success is irrelevant. If B replies, "Tough" 
to the rebuke. it-is still a rebuke, 
Why does knowing how to. apply such, terms matter? Since we are social 
beings, to whom being approved is almost as important, though not as 
tangible, a goal as being fed, we. will act so as to end up approved. 
I may, forego my own convenience to, give your friend a lift, in order 
to-getýyour. goodwill. This is an example of us acting in a world that 
contains socially as---well as physically real objects. But socially 
real-. -, states of, affairs, are emergent on what people do and say and 
believe, -, not, events inýnature like its starting, to rain.. We can alter 
social reality by what we say-7- as for instance in rebuking people. 
Such social states may condition our future actions, ýboth within, and 
outside discourse. If I know I have been rebuked, I may attempt, to 
defend myself; I may, apologize. We must be able, to spot such events 
to either participate in or understand later discourse. But (as with 
rebuking) we can only spot these events if we see actions and 
utterancesýas, parts of plans. 
1.2.5. Why can, non-linguistic actions behave like utterance? 
suggest that-an, action. is, an attempt at,, communicatiqn-if it,. As. part 
of the, execution-of, a plan intended to influence your actions by 
Iq 
trying to change your belief and values. If this is so, the means 
employed in the-plan are irrelevant. Changes in your belief brought 
about by showing, you bits of the world (say a bleeding finger), and 
by telling you that that is how the world is, will be 
indistinguishable. 
1.3. The effect on communication oflooking for speaker's purpose 
Givený, that utterances, are-going to be explained as goal directed, how 
will language accommodate this? To explain an act or an utterance as 
rational means to see it as part of the execution of a plan. To 
suppose that a person is following a, plan-involves supposing that he 
holds the-beliefs that would make such a plan likely, to succeed, and 
the values that would make it worthwhile. 
But explaining ýan utterance' isn't just a matter of seeing an 
utterance 'as part -of a plan already known about in detail. One may 
have to ascribe new plans to a speaker.,, If, these new plans are to be 
explanatory, 'one has to,. stick with the new commitments about the 
agent's beliefs and values that they force on you. For instance, if I 
explain A! s question '"Are- the-banks--open? " as'part of A's plan to 
cash a cheque, I must-suppose that A wants to cash a cheque, believes 
he has an'account and so on. The change in-my beliefs and values that 
occurs when I accept that A has this plan is exactly the same as if A 
had told me about them explicitly. 
Now a cunning speaker may take the opportunities this this offers 
him. He may make remarks'whose purpose is not the change that'the 
sentence might-be expected to make, but the changes, that follow from 
the assumptions that its- explanation require., As a ýresult, -no 
understanding directed to seeing what changes the speaker intended to 
make in -you can be, complete until you'veýlooked for changes-of this 
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sort too. But of course the speaker will not always be doing this. 
One can't tell prima facie whether he is or not. so one has to look 
for. the utterancq's purpose every time, 
1,4. Utterances are like actions 
These answers are by no means complete answers. But I believe they 
show an. interesting common, element-, the importance of seeing 
utterances-as rational action. lUtterances are 
like actions in these 
ways: II 
Actions- change_ the world. There are some sorts of changes, 
changes in another person's mind, that utterances are 
particularly useful for bringing about. 
Actions change the world. Usually you have to, make changes 
in,. the, physical world yourself. But sometimes you can make 
changes in another person's mind so that, he will act so, as 
to, 
lmake 
the changes that you want in the physical world. 
Further, we are capable of understanding,, events and, actions. We 
endlessly try to tell ourselves stories that make our experience 
cohere. Any machinery we deploy to do this will be equally available 
to explain utterances. 
1.5. What is the effect of utterances? 
In this section I want,, to discuss, first.. why, it seems. odd that 
language should have, any. effect on people at all; and secondly, some 
reasons why, despite this. oddness., it does, have, an effect.,. What 
follows is inconclusive,; I have not got the, answer; but the, problem 
and. some attacks that can be. made on it are I think worth-describing. 
2ý 1 
Briefly, the difficulty is that any plan recognition process has to 
have as input some facts about what the doer of an action expects its 
effects to be; but when the action is an utterance, It is hard (for 
reasons to be given soon) to see ANY sort of effect that a rational 
agent could expect his action to have. 
1) When I push too hard on a pane of glass. It breaks 
because of the force I apply. The glass has no say in the 
matter. Are utterances like this? Do they have an 
irresistible effect on the person who hears them, at any 
rate beyond the purely physical? It is hard to see how this 
can be so without saying that we are compelled to believe 
what we are told. 
2) It is hard to see how there can be a systematic pairing 
between an utterance and the particular change in beliefs 
and values it might be intended to produce (the utterance's 
content). 
I try to suggest how utterances may be seen as compelling us to 
believe, and explained as if that was their purpose, without them 
actually compelling us. 
1.5-1. Why a story involving compulsion is wrong 
What is the alternative to utterances being understood via plan 
recognition? Restrict the discussion to languages in which all 
utterances are statements of fact about how the world happens to be 
at some moment. Would one then need to consider a speaker's 
intentions? Why can't one, be content with the notion that utterances 
have literal meanings independent of their maker's intention. which 
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enable,, a language to do all that we want it to do? Here is a parable 
a person who asked such a question might tell: 
Imagine intelligent rational creatures; that is, ceeatures 
who perform actions which they believe will collectively 
transform the world as they think it is into the world as 
they want it to be, Imagine further that they see each other 
like this, and can envisage non-actual courses of action. 
Then they will be able to foresee how others' actions will 
depend on their. beliefs. Now if they can cause each other to 
know about parts of the world they can't themselves see, 
they will"have a partial control over the others' actions. 
The advantages of this for the controller (altruistic or 
selfish) are obvious. How can they do such "causing to 
know"? Well, they could if they had a system of simple 
action-types (call them "sentences") which they could 






so, that given a performance of one of, 
these 
.I actions, 
(call. it an "utterance") they could find the 
related state of affairs and vice versa. Let's call this 
their "language". Now creatures like this "understand" an 
,. 
utterance made by someone else when they have found the 
state, of, affairs that it's associated with. Thereafter their 
actions may be based on the new states of affairs they 
.. 
believe in, but that's part. of their rationality, not their 
language use. 
This (my opponent says) 
-is 
of course a picture of human 
language. Where did I have to introduce recognition of 
speaker's intention? 
I don't believe this is a picture of language. Furthermore, I don't 
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think it could be. The two objections to this sort of account are: 
What it is that a hearer does when he reacts to an utterance 
is obscure. He certainly doesn't just bend to what he's 
told. 
It isn't possible to have a pairing of sentences and states 
of affairs in a way that lets the account go through. 
1.5.1.1. Problems with hearer's reaction 
What does a hearer do with an utterance when he hears it? Here are 
two wrong answers. 
1.5.1.1.1. The hearer does not have to believe 
The hearer recovers from it a picture-in-the-head of a state of 
affairs. Next he believes it; he alters his beliefs about the world 
until they include the picture he has been presented with. 
But this seems to make the detection of deceit impossible. Suppose A 
attempts to serve his own ends by getting B to injure himself by 
telling him one of B's intended actions was safe when it wasn't - eg 
that some vegetable was edible when it wasn't. How could B protect 
himself? He couldn't. A language that worked like this would kill its 
hearers. 
1.5.1.1.2. The hearer is not able to check 
Is it possible to evade the problem by supposing that the hearer 
applie. s some check to what he's told before he believes it. 
Zý 
He could compare what he's told with his own knowledge of the world. 
But if he's regularly in a position to do this authoritatively. 
there's no point in his ever listening to anyone, since he knows it 
all already; -and if he doesn't. his check is powerless. 
He may have a policy of believing only his friends, those who 
presumably always tell''him the truth. If he can make such a 
distinction, he's all right. But suýely his companions will sometimes 
lie 'and *sometimes tell the truth Nor could he tell whether a 
stranger should'be'list'ened to or not. 
Similar arguments apply to the detection of error rather than deceit 
in what he's told - in the latter case, with the replacement of 
"friends" by "people who know". We need a different account of how 
utterances affect hearers. 
1.5.2. Problems with pairing sentences and states of affairs 
No state of the world can be described even as accurately as we can 
perceive it, or as our hearer can imagine it. The best one can do is 
offer a description whose range of applicability covers what we were 
trying to describe. There is no one picture that corresponds to a 
sentence. 
But my'opp6nent objects: "This''is'sillY. of course"when I abstract my 
kitchen by saying "The sink is by the stove" I'm not attempting to 
describe my' whole kitchen, or even the sink and the stove. All I'm 
doing is specifying a condition that separates pictures where the 
sink is by the stove"iýom pictures in which it isn't. Your hearer 
isn't going 'to- ýe-able to recover the (so to 'speak) finished'oil- 
painting You have in your head, buts he's got a pencil sketch of some 
of its features.; " 
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Here I want to follow Searle, who argues that this account fails too. 
"(T]he received opinion errs in presenting the notion of the 
literýl meaning'of a sentence'as a context free notion. " (1978: 210). 
He 'takes the sentence "The cat is on the mat", and then imagines a 
series of 'peculiar cases (cats on'stiffened mats at strange angles, 
cats on boih"sides' 6f mati' , in free fail) where ýe would be stumped to 
say whetherý"'Tfie-6at* wai on"the mýt" was true or not. Then he goes on 
to"'-consider `6ases where we are neiierthelessýable'tduse "The cat is 
on 'the mat", peif6cily 'ýffeciively In'these funny'situations: for 
instance, when we assert that the cat isý not on the mat any longer if 
it "had' been" closely apposed to the mat in free fall but is now two 
yards away. From this he concludes that there is NO fixed picture or 
sketch associated with "The cat is on the mat", and that our 
successful use of it must be explained another way. 
He asserts that he is not denying that an utterance has a literal 
-hout consideration of meaning, just that it cannot be recovered wit 
the coýtexi'in wýich'it'was made. "Literal meaning of a sentence only 
has application relative to the coordinate system of our background 
assumptfons. "(1975: ý20). "He is in opposition'to the accounts such as 
that of' Fish '(1979), where literal 'and non-literal meaning are 
equated. 'Fish claims that our recognition of'the'pictuýe of the world 
that an utterance represents, and of'the ulterior intentions of its 
speaker, are the same sort of thing, at different points on a cline. 
In theory-lad6n terms, ' the literal meaning of an utterance and the 
indirect: s'peech"act' it realizes are the same sort of thing. The 
account claims that we exert the same faculty to understand that (in 
the Propeý' cir6umstances) "The'curtains are yellow" means that the 
curtains are'yellow. 'and that "Would'-you like a 6up' of coffee? " is an 
invitation to sexual intercourse. 
'2C 
Where these accounts are alike is in claiming that utterances will 
not have -a known effect which can be the uninterpreted data to feed 
into a plan recognition mechanism. In both, the claim goes. in order 
to recognize the content (whatever that is). one needs the vast 
knowledge we have as members of our culture. The amount of input 
beyond what we hear is as great whether we are deploying it to 
recover, speech acts, speaker's, intentions. or pictures of the world. 
Clearly one cannot. see the recovery of literal meaning as a more or 
less determinate sub-task of the task of recovering content. Very 
likely literal meaning and speaker's intention or speech act are the 
same sort -of thing., and the same process. sensitive 
to all that we 
know. recovers-them both. 
Such an argument seems. to have one large flaw. 
Either sentences have some minimal meaning independent of 
their use or they don't. 
-If they 
don't., then the process of interpretation will be 
, 
insensitive- to.. the utterance it Is set to work. on. All 
sentences will, be equivalent. The output of the 
Interpretation will, depend entirely on our cultural 
knowledge. At any time any utterance will be as good as any 
-other. 
While there are occasions that approximate to this. 
(eg when buying an underground ticket at rush hour I will 
quite likely construe anything the clerk says as "where? "), 
this isn't generally true. 
If they do, then the only mechanism that I can suggest for 
the process. whose details have not yet been specified. Is 
that it Is a plan-recognition process based on the effects 
caused by recognition of this meaning: which is what I was 
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arguing initially. 
Imagine a language where sentences had no meaning, however minimal, 
independent of their use. Another parable: 
Suppose the creatures, puzzled by the failure of their first 
communication -system, try again. They say. let us build a 
'picture from, the remarks, that our fellows make to us which 
is -, the one Ahat the speaker Intends us to make. Let us do 
this by asking ourselves, whenever we hear a remark, what he 
presumably, did mean-and respond only to-that. We can do this 
(they say) because we can tell what he would say in that 
context if he was rational. Let us be confused by nothing 
else. 'in particular not by the supposed literal meaning of 
the sentences which in any case may be different from those 
the speaker intended them to bear. 
What happens? They are no better off than before. One of them makes a 
remark, to-- another-as they, go off shopping-- for a bath plug in 
Woolworths. "'Woolworths, has them" he says. The other tries to 
understand this. What. he asks himself. does my companion intend me 
to understand? We are engaged in a plan we both know about. We expect 
It to succeedý if we carry on. - There is no point In his speaking 
unless, to tell me something important I don't know. What could that 
be? Ahal That the plan won't work. because Woolworths has none. That 
must be what he said - and so he abandons the enterprise. 
So I have to reject both accounts like Fish's and like Searle's. Both 
prevent a plan recognition process starting up. I also have to reject 
an account like Fish's for another reason. In the account of plan 
interaction given later in this thesis, utterances are said to affirm 
or contradict nodes In a plan. Affirmation or contradiction can onlY 
khhý 
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occur between propositions. So utterances must have propositional 
content. Searle agrees utterances have such content. but denies it is 
easily recovered. Fish denies they have such content. 
1.6. Can plan recognition be applied to utterances? 
At this' stage, understanding utterances may look impossible. They 
can't work as if'they were updates to a data base. They can't have an 
effect' based 'purely on, what happens'to a hearer If he applies plan 
recognition. And these facts may seem to prevent plan recognition 
being applicable to utterances at all. The problem is this: 
The process of plan recognition takes an action, considers 
the effects, immediate or remote, that its doer may have 
expected it to have, and hypothesizes that one (or more) of 
these effects is the goal of the action. 
- So plan recognition applied to an utterance must look for 
the effects that the utterer may have expected. and guess 
iwhich is'the, goal of the utterance. 
- The sort of effect that an utterance has (at the level of 
descripti'on--that matters here) is to affect an agent's 
beliefs and values, so that the plans'that he makes founded 
on those beliefs and'values change too. 
Which change In beliefs and values occurs must depend on 
the propositional content of the utterance. It was argued 
earlier that a system in which the propositional content 
made 'no difference to the effect of the utterance would be 
Impossible. -I 
-Z q 
- But it was also argued that utterances had no irresistible 
effect on their hearer's beliefs and values, so the speaker 
can have no certain expectations about the effect of an 
utterance. The effect on the hearer is not dictated by the 
content of the utterance. 
- So since plan recognition supposes that an agent has 
expactatIons about the effects of his actions. plan 
recognition is inapplicable to utterances. 
I must reject the conclusion. How? 
1.7. Plan recognition and actions that must fail 
But there are non-utterance actions that look as if they depend on 
plan recognition but which don't fit into the pattern of plan 
recognition sketched above. Here is an example from my own breakfast 
table: 
A and B are sitting at breakfast,, A has a cup of black tea 
in front of him. He usually has it white. The milk is not on 
the table, but an a shelf about two feet behind B, and about 
four feet from A. A stretches out his arm towards the milk, 
but clearly can't reach. B, seeing him stretching. reaches 
for the milk and passes it to him. 
13, guessed A's want, but on what grounds? It cannot have been by 
guessing that what A was trying to-do was to reach the milk. because 
B must have known that A could have seen that he wasn't going to 
succeed. and so B can't think both that the stretching was part of a 
plan and that A is rational. 
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It seems we have a way of construing actions that must fail as if 
they were actions that might succeed. and then responding to the 
goals they will not In fact achieve. Such a way of construing actions 
may be applicable to utterances as well. 
1.7.1. How abortive actions may seem to have effects 
There are three possible accounts I can give about how actions that 
are necessarily abortive are responded to as if they might have 
succeeded. 
1.7.1.1. Knowledge of conventional'effects of actions 
We all "know" that King Alfred burnt the cakes, and that Washington 
cut down a cherry tree. Whether these facts are true or not is 
irrelevant. We pretend, when in the right circumstances. for instance 
when being facetious about burnt cakes or felled cherry trees with 
people' of our own background. that they are true. We know that these 
p'retended facts are mutually known. We do not have to check that the 
other chap knows them; they can be relied on as part of our common 
mental furniture. 
Perhaps we are able to treat actions as if their doers expected them 
to have some effect. even when the action. were it to be performed 
with no-one about to respond to it, would fail. In the same way as we 
know the story about the cherry tree, we all know the story that 
tells us that when someone makes an assertion to us. we alter our 
beliefs' to allow' it in., Whenever we say something, we expect our 
hearer to pretend that he believes that the assertion will make him 
change his belief. and then go on and guess what else we might mean 
and intend in the light of this pretence. 
ýj 
For instance, if B thinks that he is expected to treat A's stretching 
for the milk as if he thought that A expected he would reach the 
milk, then B can guess what effect A expected hiý action would have, 
and B can apply plan recognition to grasp, and perhaps assist. A's 
plan. 
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(If instead what one did in such cases was to treat actions as if 
they WERE going to have some effect. not just as if their doer 
expected it to have that effect, plan recognition would not help 
recover agent's intentions. If B treated A's stretching for the milk 
as if A was going to reach it. there would be no need for B to assist 
A. and A would end up without the milk. ) 
Now straight plan recognition works because the recognizer has 
knowledge that lets him associate seeing an act with the effects the 
doer expects the act to have. The sort of pretending plan recognition 
described here will only work if the recognizer has knowledge that 
lets him associate the act with the effects that he should pretend 
that the doer thinks the act will have. 
Such knowledge could be called knowledge of the conventional effects 
of actions. We have conventional knowledge of WHEN an action should 
be performed regardless whether we perform it at such times: we know 
that the proper time to change into a dinner jacket is just before 
dinner, even if we never do so. Similarly. we have conventional 
knowledge about the EFFECTS of actions - for instance, about what 
happens If one tells an improper story In the presence of a 
clergyman, whether or not such effects actualXy occur. Jokes can be 
based on such knowledge. 
It is not the acts referred to that are conventional. it is our 
apparent (but of course non-existent) agreement to act as if those 
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actions had those properties. Such an apparent agreement is close to 
(but not the same as) the definition of convention offered by Lewis 
(1969: 78) of which the relevant parts are 
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P 
when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a 
convention iff It is true that, and it is common knowledge 
In P that, in almost any Instance of S among the members of 
P 
1) almost everyone conforms to R; 
2) almost everyone expects almost everyone to 
conform to R; 
I ... I 
It is this closeness that suggests calling such knowledge 
"conventional". 
Lewis also argues that the actual falsity of the beliefs that It is 
, conventional 
to act as if we believed doesn't matter. 
"A fictive precedent would be as effective as an actual one 
In suggesting a course of action for us. and therefore as 
good a source of concordant mutual expectations enabling us 
to-[do what we intend]. " ('1969: 39). 
That Is consonant with utterances In fact having no genuine effect on 
our beliefs and values. at least, not a compulsory and immediate one. 
For actions like stretching out for the milk, actions and 
I 
conventioanl effect can be associated item by Item. But this is 
impossible for utterances - there are infinitely many of them. There 
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must be a systematic relation between the utterances and the change 
in belief and value that it is conventionally supposed to cause. Such 
a connection could be provided by a compositional semantics for 
sentences. Such asemantics would assign to each declarative sentence 
(say) a proposition. But the effect of uttering that proposition 
would not be to makelts hearer believe that proposition. Rather it 
would be to, suggest to the. hI earer that he should apply plan 
recognition as if the utterer had tried to make him believe it. 
r 
Adopting this solution avoids Searle's point. It gives data to plan 
recognition which is independent of context, but does not identify 
that data with the proposition that is ultimately believed because 
the utterance was made. 
1.7.1.2. Remembering what worked last time 
The second possible mechanism for seeing intention in necessarily 
abortive actions is this: take someone who has been using language 
for years. He knows. from past experience, that making an 
assertion has often had the effect of making his hearer accept the 
picture the sentence, portrays. He can guess that the people he 
usually talks to have had the same experience. When, then, someone 
says to him "It is raining" he can guess that what the speaker hopes 
to do is to change his beliefs. "Hopes to do", not 7knows he will 
do", because 
, 
the speaker can't be sure that the regularity he has 
observed in the past will get him the effect that he wants this time. 
But this is, a tremendous_difference as far as plan recognition goes. 
Now the hearer is interpreting an action that he can believe that its 
performer at least thought might succeed. It is rational to attemot 
some actions even though they are not guaranteed to procure their 
end. So an action that. might succeed can beexplained as part of a 
plan, while an action that it was known must have failed can't be. 
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So we are entitled to suppose a speaker intended us to believe the 
literal meaning of his remark, because we know he knowsýthat has 
sometimes been its effect in the past. - 
This might be a, basis for explaining how some formulas get a force 
that they don't literally have: "Can you pass the salt? " becomes the 
request it is because we know it has often succeeded as such before. 
The first -times- it was encountered; a full deduction of what the 
speaker really intended would have been necessary. But thereafter it 
is treated by its hearer as having the force it had before - that of 
a request,. 
1.7.1.3. Trying to seem to try 
Here is the third and last possible mechanism for seeing intention in 
necessarily abortive actions. When reaching for the milk, A may not 
be trying- to-reach the milk-at all. He may rather-be trying to seem 
to be trying to reach the milk. He-argues to himself: 
"I cannot reach-it, But, let me do it in front of B. Perhaps 
he will, argue like this: 
"What is A doing? He looks as if-he is reaching 
desperately for something. But there is nothing he 
can reach that he seems to want. What are the other 
effects' of what he is doing? Ahal He has just made 
me think he may be trying to reach something. Could 
this be what he wants? If I think that, then I will 
think that what he wants to reach is the milk (his 
tea is still black). If I think that, then I will 
give, r it to him. He would want this. That must be 
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"' ý what he is after. I will help him" 
and' if B thinks thatý, then I will get the milk. Let me try 
it". 
How Is'' the - understanding of an abortive reaching like the 
understanding of an utterance? 
When A asserts something, say Fact, to B, he may argue to himself: 
"I cannot make B believe Fact. But let me say it in front of 
B. ' Perhaps he will argue like this: 
"'What" is"A 'doing? He looks'as if he is trying to 
make me believe Fact. But he must know he can't. 
What"'are' the other effects'of what he is doing? 
Ahal He has 'Just' made me think he may he may be 
trying- to-assert something. 'Could this be, what he 
wants? ýIf I believe Fact, then I will ((and here B 
will, ' start analysing his possible responses if he 
come- to -believe Fact. If he finds a response, say 
Response, that he thinks A may want. he will 
continue ... )) do Response. A would want this. That 
must be what he is after. So Fact must be'what he 
means. " 
and 'if 'B thinks that, then I will ((achieve the desired 
Response))"Let me try it". 
1.7-2. Which of these is right? 
Which 'of 'these 'is`, ý, 'right? I don't know. I like "Knowledge of 
36 
conventional effects of, actions" best. It seems to offer the best 
chance of systematically associating an uttered sentence with a 
proposition ýheld In a form that could interact with beliefs. 
"Remembering what helped last time" seems too behaviouristic, and 
, 
"Trying, to seem to try" seems too close to founding plan recognition 
on. plan recognition. -But these are not arguments, they are guesses. 
However, it would need just one of them to be true for it to be 
possible that, when used between sophisticated and mutually aware 
agents, -, an utterance which has no necessary consequence of changing 
the beliefs of Ats, hearer may behave as if it did have such a 
consequence, In which, case ordinary plan recognition can be applied. 
1.8. How plan recognition helps communication 
The problem facing the creatures trying to devise themselves a 
language was -how to associate a content with a remark made by a 
speaker. Making, the association either wholly dependent on, or wholly 
independent of, the form of the remark was useless. What they needed 
was a criterion by which to choose between various possible 
associations on different occasions. 
If plan, recognition is applicable to utterances, as just argued, 
there, is. such a test. It is, that since utterances are actions. they 
must be explicable as goal-directed. When a hearer tries a candidate 
association of content with an utterance, he must look ahead to the 
effects-of-accepting that content. Only, associations of content that 
lead -to -an effect that is a credible goal for the speaker can be 
accepted. 
Explaining-an 
-utterance via plan recognition can lead to changes in 
the hearer, in a, way that an utterince by itself could not. An m 
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utterance may have, a possible content C. But if a hearer attempts an 
explanation of. -the-speaker wanting C to'be believed. he may have to 
postulate the speaker's having beliefs and values that he didn't 
previously ascribe to the speaker. If the hearer accepts that 
explanation, he has to accept those postulates. Making such 
postulates-is 'entirely under the control of the hearer and so isn't 
impossible risky in the way updates imposed by the speaker would be. 
Giving, a -teleological- explanation may involve accepting novel 
postulates. Accepting such postulates will involve a change of 
belief, value,, or both. ' Such changes are the effects of utterances. 
They depend-on context land are not predictable without plan 
recognition. 
1.8.1. Help with choosing to accept utterances 
Deciding which utterances Ao accept is a special case of accepting 
postulates about the speaker's beliefs needed to make his action 
explicable. -- 
In allowing one's mind to'be changed, one makes two decisions: 
that' the speaker, is SINCERE - that his saying something is 
evidence for his believing it. 
that--the' speaker" is AUTHORITATIVE - that his believing 
something is evidence for it being true, or, equivalently, 
for'Your believing, it. 
Testing-., for deceit involves questioning sincerity. What one wants is 
a mechanism which, rather than making a one-off decision about the 
sincerity of-a speaker can ask about any utterance whether it may be 
3s 
deceitful. (If there were a mechanism which could detect deceit 
infallibly I suppose it would be redundant, since no deceit would 
ever be worth trying). I think one can do this by asking about 
speakers' purposes. 
The argument that would lead one to believe a statement goes like 
this: 
He said "X" so he intends I believe X 
He would benefit (perhaps altruistically, through my 
benefiting) if I were to act on X and X were true 
If I explain his utterance like this, I must assume he 
believes X is true 
So he believes X is true 
What leads one to guess it may be false is: 
He said "X" so he intends I believe X 
He would benefit if I were to act on X and X were false 
If, I explain his utterance like this, I must assume he 
believes X-is false 
So he believes X is false 
For example: 
A man whose-window has just been broken by a stone rushes 
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out and finds two small boys, Bert and Fred. One of them 
will get his ear clipped. Bert cries "It was Fred! " 
Bert benefits if the man believes him and and what he says 
is false - if it wasn't Fred - because then his own ear is 
not clipped. So the man has reason to suspect deceit. 
A! 
The man still has to decide in this and in any other case whether he 
is being deceived. The merit of looking at motive like this is that 
he can at least distinguish cases were he need not worry about being 
deceived. 
If you object that all this'leaves no room for irony, I suggest that 
that "He said "X" so he intends me to believe X" is not always going 
to be true. 
1.8.2. Help with pairing utterances and states of affairs 
Aa generate-and-test paradigm was proposed as a way of associating 
utterance and content. Though nothing that follows actually uses such 
, 1ý 
a method, I include a sketch of how demanding a teleological 
explanation can be the test phase. 
(The generate phase can rely on utterances suggesting their own 
content, if, for instance, the content is mediated by convention 
amounting to semantics. A previous section argued that that too 
demanded teleological explanation of utterances. ) 
A sentence doesn't divide possible states of affairs sharply into 
those of which it is true and those of which it isn't; there is a 
gradation. But if one knows the purpose for which the sentence is 
being used, the gradation is turned into a division. For instance: 
A; Can the piano be moved? 
B: No. 
A: Not even if we get some help? 
B: Oh, yes. 
What is A's purpose in asking his question? He wants (B thinks) to 
know if, the piano can be,. moved, presumably by A and B alone. Then it 
can't:, he says so. But-A's reply shows him A's purpose is In fact 
different., 
-What,. now matters 
is whether it could be moved by several 
men. It could:. so B says so, This sort of reason explains why A 
answers differ. ently. in 









The relevant content of an utterance is of course identified as the 
only one whose uptake benefits the speaker. 
Functions of different classes of sentences 
Traditionally there are in English three functions that a sentence 
can have: statement, question, command. (There may, be others. such as 
optative). These are, supposed to let the speaker indicate what he 
wants_ done by the hearer vis-a-vis the picture of the world that the 
Lýi 
sentence contains. The hearer should believe the world is like the 
picture if it is presented as a statement; he should say whether it 
is, an accurate picture if, the picture was presented as a question; 
and so on. 
Do these functions reflect some fundamental limit in the world on the 
things that one can do with a picture? If they do, then whatever they 
have in common ought to suggest what it was that made utterances into 
effective actions. For instance (to take an absurd case) it might be 
that we were'neurologically Incapable of not formulating an answer to 
a question or an obedient action in response to a command. Then the 
effect of utterances should be explained by our physiology. 
Alternatively, - -the functions might be reducible to some more 
primitive operations. If, so, - these primitive operations might suggest 
the sort of, thingýthat they could operate on; and that would suggest 
what sortýof thing one would have to look at if one wanted to predict 
the effect of some particular utterance. 
There --seem to be two obvious. ways of analyzing function: One can 
think of commands., as, -basic., Then , 
--a command to do X is a command to do X 
-a question whether-X is a command to say whether X 
-a statement that X isýa command-to believe that X 
Or one can think of. 'statementsas basic. Then, if one supposes, that 
one-can get other friendly people-to do what you want by telling-them 
what it is that you want; -ýI 
a command to-do X, is a statement that Sp wants Hr to do X 
a question whether X is a statement that Sp wants Hr to 
say whether X 
a statement that X is a statement that X 
How can one choose between these? One example that may show that the 
second is preferable is this: 
,L 
and S have just got up. They set the washing machine going 
the night before, but it has been being temperamental 
recently. Neither has yet seen it this morning. 
L: Has the washing machine worked? 
Now why did L ask? She knows that neither of them knows the answer. 
If asking questions is, best seen as giving commands, then L's 
question has to be seen as either an impossible command, because S is 
known not to know the answer, or else a command, not just to say 
whether the washing machine had worked, but to go and find out and 
'th'en bring back 'a: report. The trouble with the second analysis is 
that' L wasn't, as a"matter of'fact', In the sort of social position 
that: would make`sýchý-a 'command a"reisonable one., It involves too much 
trouble'to be'a"rea'sonAble'request'. '"' 
, "Lt ,,; 1. '1- 
This needý'not be'a fatal objection. -One could say that the'question 
was acommand, but'ýone'which'L*expected, even intended, to fail. But 
if S asks the question "What was L, tryi ng-to do when she gave that 
command? " he is going to have to suppose that she wanted to know the 
answer. Even if he doesn't do his part to make L's plan work. he is 
left with this inference. 'and may, fulfill L's 'want later'. If S can 
suppose that L expected that, he has an explanation of what L said. 
There' may be an analysis that'býoth explains'the'command-like feeling 
that questions generate, while not committing one to taking commands 
as primitive. It runs like this. The speakers of the language know 
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that the Interrogative marking of s'entences is used in the 
expectation that people hearing it will reply to the question. Where 
this" expectatfon comes; -from doesn't matter. Nor need it be a very 
certain expectatiOn. 'It May be a piece of knowledge rather like what 
we' know about 30 mph speed limit signs. We all "know" that they make 
people-drive'slower, even if-the knowledge that we use when crossing 
ihe road'a's pedestrians contradicts this. 
1.9.1. How do questions work? 
If' this is so, one could understand most questions as part of a plan 
like this: ' 
Sp knows'whetfier F 
----------------------------------------------- 
Sp isk Hr whether F Hr knows whether F 
But this is too compressed. It doesn't show that Hr has to reply in 
order for this scheme to work. Nor can it explain this case: A 
psychiatrist,, wants to find out whether an old person is oriented. for 
time and place. So the psychiatrist asks "Is this March? ". The old 
person's answer is not going to have any effect on the psychiatrist's 
beliefs about, 
'whether 
it is March or not. But the schema above 
suggests that it should. The point is that a question may provoke a 
reply, but a reply need not provoke belief. 
-- 
I must make this 
contingency explicit. 
Before you can believe in an answer to a question, you have to be 
sure of two things-., 
- The answerer must be SINCERE. If he says something, this must be 
because he believes it. 
- The answerer must be AUTHORITATIVE. If he believes something, it 
W 
must be good evidence that'what he believes is true. 
These are obviously separate 6onditions. A man- whose answer is 
authoritative'may be insincere: for instance, a thief who denies that 
he stole. 'A man whose answer is sincere need not be authoriative: as 
when you on boarding a train ask me-, already on it, if the train goes 
to Gloucester, and I say it is, with the result that we both 
inadvertently go to Exeter. 
To accommodate these extra conditions, perhaps the final stages of 
the plan that a question is part of look like this: (Q is the 
questioner. A is the answerer. )_, 
Q knows whether F 
I 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Q believes A believes what he does about FA is authoritative 
----------------------------------------------- 
A says whether FA is sincere 
On this account, saying that someone is sincere amounts to accepting 
the rule 
A says XA believes X 
and saying that A is authoritative amounts to accepting the rule 
A believes X 
In fact one would only accept someone's word on certain matters. A 
better rule would be 
A believes X&X is a fact that A is likely to be right about -> X 
4S 
but the principle is the same. 
The next, question is, how is A brought to, say anything? One might 
suppose this, rule would be sensible: 
A says whether F 
I 
-------------------------------------------- 
Q asks A whether FA knows whether F 
I have used expressions like "know whether", "say whether" as if they 
represented attitudes 'to, and actions on, proposition which were of 
the - sam 
Ie 
sort aIS. eI ven . ii"different 
'from, kn : owing 'and sayi 
I 
ng. This is 
I think wrong. To say'that someone knows whether X seems to be same 
as saying that either he knows that X is true or that he knows that X 
is false. In symbols 
A knows, whether F=A knows FvA knows -F 
which is of course different from 
A knows whether F-A knows (F v -F) 
But then what about the states in the plans above that refer to 
"knowing whether"?. How-can one expand them? The obvious thing to do. 
which is to substitute into the plans using the equivalence above 
produces nonsense. Here is the plan with the substitutions: 
Q knows FvQ knows -F 
I 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Q, believes (A believes,.. F v, A believes -F) A is authoritative 
7 --------------------------------------------- 
A says FvA says -F A is sincere 
The top sections of this appears to say that if believes A is 
authoritative and if he also believes that A knows the answer (that 
Y6 
is, either believes F orý-F, and is. not just in doubt), then Q too 
can be certain about F. This must be wrong. I may well know that you 
know whether your front door is red, and accept that you are 
authoritative aboutAt, but still not know whether it is red or not. 
Something is wrong. 
What one is really doing when asking a question is performing an 
essentially risky action that may have one of several outcomes. The 
question provkes the answerer to reply. He may say "yes" or "no" or 
else admit he doesn't know, or refuse to answer. You can't be certain 
what will happen., Differentý, outcomes will follow your question, 
depending on how,. the, world., was when you, asked it. The outcome may be 
this, if the answerer says "yes": 
Q, knows F 
Q believes A believes FA is authoritative 
---------------------------------------------- 
A says "F" A is sincere 
or else this, if the answerer says "no" 
Q knows -F 
I 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Q believes A believes -F A is authoritative 
-------- ------------------------------------- 
A says "-F" A is sincere 
or if the answerer doesnt know the answer, after which nothing can be 
deduced 
A says "I don't know" 
I 
The problem with the proof tree I complained about above is that it 
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is a comprehensible but mistaken attempt to conflate the trees below 
i t., "-1 11 i'', 
From this I conclude that thereýis`no need to have any'ingredient to 
explain the' effects'of different'sentence functions which is not an 
appeal to planned, -though`perhapsýrisky, action. 
1.10'. . Conclusion 
It ieems'that'there are in discourse several phenomena that cannot be 
properly described 'without looking' at the plans of the people 
talking. Indeed any account in which speakers are not able to coerce 
their'hearers' beliefs seems"'-to: 'involve'plahning. But to say anything 
more, detailed about what'constit'utes such discourse events, more must 
be said about how plans are made and changed. After looking at 
rI elated work, I shall attempt to fill that need. 
Lý S 
Chapter 2. Related work 
0 
This chapter looks at related work. The first part is about the 
philosophical background In the work of Austin, Grice and Searle. and 
the work of -Gordon and Lakoff, on the boundary of philosophy and 
linguistics. Then I'consider two ways of integrating utterances into 
discourse: 
- Allen's, which understands utterances by guessing the goals they 
serve, and supposing thatýthe goals persist throughout the discourse 
-The "Yale school" view, which sees actions (and so utterances) as 
fillers of, culturally determined scripts. 
2.1. Austin 
The observations aboutý speech acts that started the continuing 
current interest in them were made by JL Austin, apparently around 
1939. -They were the substance, of his 1955 William James lectures at 
Harvard, which were laterýpublished-as (Austin 1962). 
Austiný observed- that- utterances could be divided into two (non- 
exclusive) types: those that could be true or false - "constative" 
and -those- we: would usually say were neither,, but which instead are 
such -that, when one-makes them; -'one is doing something. These he 
calledý"performative". - 
Austin's way of understanding the force of a performative relies very 
heavily on, there-being-some "conventional procedure, ý having a certain 
conventional, effect, ýthat procedure to include the, uttering of 
certain words by1certain-persons in, certain, circumstances", (1962: 14)- 
yq 
An utterance--is a performative if it is an instance of such an 
utterance. Clearly it is possible to make an utterance of the correct 
form even outside the-correct circumstances. When that happens the 
utterance is guilty of "infelicity% Theýrequired circumstances can 
include states, of- intention-and belief on-the part of the speaker. 
and--it is by detecting infelicities there that he explains how a 
promise- can seem to be made by-a man who uses the words "I promise 
although-he has-no intention to perform. 
Austin- points out that there are utterances that are both constative 
and-performative; One, such class is those like "I blame ... 1, which is 
both a -conventional -act ascribing the social quality, blame, and a 
report-of an internal state. Another*, class is-those that he calls 
"expositives", such as "argue", "conclude", "testify", where it is 
impossible to do the. conventional performative act without also doing 
the-related constative. Ultimately he-seems to treat constatives as 
performatives (describable as eg "stating",, "maintaining") that-as 
well-as performing that act, can also be true or false. 
Separarate from the performative/constative distinction. Austin makes 
another which has beenýeven more influential: it is that between the 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (or locution. 
illocution and perlocution) involved'in an, utterance. The locution is 
"the utterance of certain noises (... ]-with a certain meaning. C ... I 
ie with a certain sense -and a certain reference" (1962: 94). The 
illocution is "the performance-. of- an act IN saying something, as 
opposed, ---to the performance of an act OF saying something", (1962: 99), 
which -he also -glosses, as- the-force that certain words 
have., The 
perlocution is "[the producing of] certain consequential effects upon 
the feelings, thoughts or actions of [ ... j other persons; and it may 
be done -with -the- design, intention oripurpose of producing-them. 
" 
(1962: 101)., Both the locution and the illocution involve convention: 
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the perlocution does not. 
This distinction involves him in having to separate those things that 
are true as result of an action (an utterance) because of what the 
action is, and those that are true as a result of what the action 
causes. 
- 
The first are ascribed to the illocution, the second, to the 
perlocution. He takes three chapters to do this (IX-XI) and they are 
much fiddlier and less compelling than what has gone before. This is 
(I claim) the result of his system giving illocution an explanatory 
loa& greater than it can bear. It is the essential step that 
determines which speech act is being performed. All utterances have 
the force they do because of their illocation. Illocution is 
constituted by convention. So utterances have force because of 
convention., ' 
Instead, I suggest, we should split what Austin attempts to explain 
by illocution in two. There are utterances, such as baptism, 
sentencing a prisoner and so forth for which his model seems wholly 
correct. A judge's sentence has its effect because it is recognized 
by jailers 'for what it is; and to recognize it, an understanding of 
certain conventions is essential. 
On the other hand, the supposed illocution in "threaten" (1962: 121) 
is different. What Constitutes a threatening is (roughly) making 
someone aware that if and only if they do some action, then the 
threatener will do some other action which is harmful to the person 
threatened. The perlocution of a threat will then follow as the 
response of any rational agent to discovering an unpleasant 
contingency of a contemplated action. 
These two cases are alike in this: the judge and the threatener have 
both done some things and caused others. It is a result of convention 
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that the judge's action and its effects are an instance of the 
definiens of the word "sentencing", and that those of of the 
threatener. of the word "threatening". So far, I follow Austin. 
However, the Jailer's resDonse only occurs because he knows how in 
his society he should respond to sentencings. His grasp of convention 
is part of a causal chain leading to his future action. But in the 
case of the threat. the causal chain starts with the perception of 
the unpleasant contingency, and holds regardless of convention. A 
purely expository picture of the two events could be drawn as 
SENTENCING 
locution + effects 
I 
I counts as 
v causes 
sentencing jailor's actions 
THREATENING 
causes 
locution + effects threatened man's actions 
I 
I counts as 
v 
Ahreatening 
If this is accepted, then a revision of Austin would be possible: the 
illocution of an utterance is to be whatever that utterance is called 
in the lexicon of that society. To describe people's responses to an 
utterance, one will need laws describing how awareness of its being 
called tha is causal in the behaviour of its hearer. But with such 
an (admittedly large) modification, it seems to me that Austin 
stands. 
I follow Austin in seeing utterances as acts having effects, and 
therefore falling under certain descriptions. The problem with his 
account is, not that he__. q_oes not state what the effects of each 
ý 
utterance type are, but that he does not even describe in detail what 
sort of effect they might be; and that he does not explain how 
context' affects the effect of an utterance. I attempt very partial 
answers-to -these; effects are to be effects on mutually-known proof 
trees, and (part of) context is to be the set of such trees. 
2.2i, Grice-- 
I 
In his paper "Meaning" (1957), Grice introduced a distinction between 
two sorts 'of 'meaning, and showed, by ordinary-language arguments, 
that they behaved differently. One he called "natural meaning". It 
occurs 'in such usage "Those clouds meant rain". The other, more 
interesting*sort, he called "non-natural meaning" or "meaning-NN". It 
occurs' in'such,, usage as "Those three rings on the bell meant the bus 
is-full". - The sort of thing that means-NN is an action by a person, 
and the interesting effects of such an action are effects on another 
person'. The paper'analyses, actions that mean-NN and their effects. 
Grice, rejects. first-. -the idea that such an action has its effects 
viaý a"Icausal chain, in which the hearer's beliefs are altered willy- 
nilly. Then he goesýýon to make the-first of two vital steps; he 
wonders- if the' hearer's recognition of the speaker's-intention is 
central. He rejects the simplest-notion; that meaning-NN consists in 
having'an intention to induce in the hearer both a certain belief and 
belief in that intention. Instead, he proposes a more complex notion. 
which 'he summarizes in, (Grice 1968) as "[Speaker] intends to produce 
in (Hearer] effect Eý by means of [Hearer's] recognition of that 
intention"., The effect -is, to be more general than just a change in 
belief. ' The , second vital step was, the introduction of the 
reflexivenessýin an intention that that same intention be recognized. 
'The paper concludes, by disavowing the idea that when talking we 
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explicitly, consider or recognize other peoples intentions, and 
roughing in an alternative in which we rely on our grasp of normal 
usage of words and expressions to abolish the need for so much folk 
psychology. So, where Austin sees the force of utterances mediated by 
the conventional action they embody, Grice sees it mediated by 
reflexive recognition of intention. Grice does however rely on 
conventional usage to explain how we recognize from the speaker's 
action what his intention is. 
The trouble is that, one still needs to know how grasp of convention 
affects recognition of intention, and the roughing-in is not 
satisfactory. Grice attempts an elaboration in (Grice 1968). There he 
lays.. out for himself a programme of defining and distinguishing the 
sort of thing-that is the meaning of a, speaker's utterance (construed 
widely) on a particular occasion ("speaker meaning"), and the meaning 
that the linguistic . machinery used to make that utterance 
conventionally bears ("utterance meaning"). 
His ýaccount of speaker meaning is essentially that of (1957), except 
that he takes the intended effect of an indicative-type utterance to 
be.. not that the hearer believes something, but that the hearer 
believes that the speaker believes something; and the intended effect 
of,, an imperative-type Utterance to be, not that the hearer does 
something,, but that the hearer intends to do something. 
That seems eminently right. But his account, on his own admission, of 
explaining utterance meaning is defective: "So I shall for the 
present- abandon the attempt to provide a definition, and content 
myself with a few informal remarks. ". I think it fair to state his 
final position as. -being: An utterance type U has conventional 
(utterance) meaning E for Speaker if Speaker is able to follow a 
group's (or his, own) practice of saying "U" when he wants to have 
5ý 
effect E on his hearer. 
I .ý 
He concludes the paper with a complex attempt to relate the 
compositionalities of speaker meaning and sentence meaning. I mention 
this because Searle's interest in speech acts seems to start in the 
same area. 
Grice also elaborates the notion of non-conventional meaning-NN. 
Early. in_(Grý. ce 1968) he declares he is engaged in trying to describe 
the,, total significance of a remark, part of which has been "said", 
ýut_, part, ofyhich has been "implicated, '. ' (= "insome sense, implied"). 
What is implicated can, be implicated either conventionally or non- 
conventionally. He develops the latter further in (Grice 1975). 
originally delivered as lectures in 1967. 
His,., initial observation- is, that in the exchange where A asks B, how 
their friend C, now working in a bank, is doing, and_B replies "Quite 
well; he hasn"t, been to prison, yet",, B i-s strongly suggesting, 
that C,, is dishonest., How can this happen, given, that 
such', an implication.., is no part of any conventional meaning in the 
exchange?., He calls it a "conversational im'plicature", in contrast to 
a "c, onventi. onal implicature", that might be part of the conventional 
meaning. 
, 
Grice points out. that this implicature is not an 
implication, since the statement could be true and the implicature 
I 
false. 
His solution has this structure: suppose that there are certain 
constraints on discourse. Suppose, when these are violated by some 
remark P., a hearer will. (and will be expected to) postulate the truth 
of another proposkýion Q, such that if Q is deemed to have been, said 
(as part of P? ), the constraints will be satisfied. Then P is said to 
have "conversationally implicated" Q. 
1'"" 
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Since one has to know the context to decide if some candidate Q is 
reasonable, Q cannot be a conventional part of P. Further, since 
there is a choice of Qs, the falsity of any one will not imply the 
falsity of P, so the implicature is not an implication. 
Grice's choice for the role of the constraint in this process he 
4 ýý . 1- 
calls the cooperative principle: it is, roughly, "make your 
conversational contribution such as is required by the 
talk exchange in, which you are engaged". This is expanded as a set of 
maxims to be obeyed - maxims of quantity, quality, relation and 
manner. He gives examples of how different ways of failing to fulfill 
these all signal the need to start looking for a conversational 
implicature. 
I shall argue later points similar in structure to Gricels, though 
different in content. I shall argue that insisting on the mutual 
recognition by the speaker and hearer of each others' intentions is 
right - but I claim that the intention that has to be so recognized 
need not be the intention to communicate; instead it is whatever 
intention it, serves their purposes to talk about. I shall also argue 
that postulating an unspoken proposition whenever the discourse seems 
to need one to fit constraints is also right - but that the 
constraint is really that each piece of the discourse should interact 
with already mutually-known proof trees in a certain goal-advancing 
way . 
2.3. Searle 
In Searle's book "Speech Acts" (Searle 1969) his main interest is 
analysing reference and predication by analysing their relation to 
the speech acts in which they occur. For him, "a study of the 
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meanings ofý sentences is not-in principle different from a study of 
speech acts" (1969: 18). and complete speech acts are illocutionary 
acts (1969: 23)., 1 shall however consider only his discussion of 
illocution and speech acts. 
An utterance usually involves, both a propositional and an 
illocutionary, part. The, propositional part is. unsurprisingly, 
tightly ýbound up with the knowledge and observance of conventional 
rules by the speaker and hearer: those governing the language used, 
for instance. But illocution too depends on the existence of rules, 
and Searle is more detailed than Grice in describing this dependence. 
Perlocutions exist too, but are not constitutive of a speech act, 
though, they may be mentioned in the definition of a speech act verb. 
Searle's counterpart of -Grice's meaning-NN is the act of saying 
something and meaning it. He defines. the action like this: 
S means "what he says" by the utterance U to H of sentence T iff 
(i) S intends U to produce in H the effect E, where E is the 
belief that the state of affairs conventionally expressed by 
T is true. 
,. (ii) S intends U to produce E by H recognizing that (i). 
(iii) S intends that M will be recognized because H knows 
I rules governing T. -, 
But-this action is an illocutionary act. So because of the novel last 
clause, Searle makes, illocution depend on convention as well as on 
intention. 
c5 
The same framework can be used to define other illocutions. But the 
details are quite tricky. The point is that one can give conditions 
under which an utteranceý does constitute the illocutionary act of 
promising, (and Searle does so,, (1969: 57ff)), but these rules are not 
the sort -of., rules referred to in (iii) above, though they will be 
closely, relatedi. The, first sort of rule is about when an utterance is 
a promise; the second, about how an utterance may announce itself to 
be_a promise. 
An, utterance announces itself to- have a particular illocution by 
satisfying,, -I"felicity" ýconditions of four types: the preparatory, 
sincerity, propositional--content,, and, essential conditions. These may 
be -conditions--on either the--ýutterance or the content of the 
utterance; Searle gives many -examples of these for different 
illocutions. The -preparatory condition for for instance a directive 
(a. request),. is given in (Searle-1975) as "Hearer is able to perform 
[the, requested act]". 
In 
. 
(Searle., 1975) he -tackles the problem of utterances where the 
illocution clearly present is different from the illocution that 
ought, accordingý toticonvention, -to be there. For instance, the 
evergreen :, example. "Can you., pass the salt? ", which should be a 
question, but is really-a. request. Such cases, where one speech act is 
performedý-by, ý performing a Aifferent one, he calls indirect speech 
acts., - -- ,IýII 
Responding, to such utterances isý. to be a two-stage process-First one 
must spot that an Indirect speech act has occurred: this is to be 
done by, seeing an apparent violation of something like Grice's 
principle of cooperation. Second. one has to find which indirect 
speech act itýwas. I 
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To do this, he re-uses the four conditions mentioned above. (Though 
Interestinglyi, and- I- suspect inadvertently, they are here taken as 
"conditions 
-that are, necessary 
for the successful and felicitous 
performance of that, jillocutionary] act" in an utterance (1975: 44), 
rather than rules, about how an utterance may indicate its illocution; 
but it doesn't matter. ) 
The generalýscheme is, that an. indirect-speech act of some kind K can 
be made by -asking whether, or, stating that, 
(or sometimes either). 
any -of, the four conditions on a direct speech act of kind K is true. 
For instance, the preparatory condition on a request is that the 
hearer, is able to perform the requested act: so "Please pass the 
salt" only announces, itself to be a request if my hearer. can pass the 
salt. But if I were to state, that condition (in "You could pass me 
the salt"), or to question it, (in "Can you pass me the salt? "), I 
could be making an indirect request. Again, Searle provides many 
examples, 
My, objection, to Searle's approach is three-fold. 
Firstly,,,., I think the definition of illocution in terms of the four 
felicity-conditions is flawed. The parallel between conditions for 
the performance of a speech act, and indirect ways of performing the 
same act, is not-smooth. The "essential condition" (which for instance 
for directives is that the utterance "counts as an attempt by Speaker 
to. get Hearer-! ýto do Action") might be expected to sustain indirect 
speech acts,, Just as the other conditions do. But one cannot make 
indirect requests by stating that or asking whether the essential 
condition obtains, as with the other conditions. Instead. one does it 
(usually) by stating that, or asking whether, there are good reasons 
for doing the act. I think this is a symptom of a deep problem. 
Searle -sees -that the fact that an act satisfies the preparatory, 
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sincerity, and propositional conditions is not enough for it to have 
to be- the appropriate illocutionary act, and, so adds the essential 
condition. This, unlike the others, is non-operational. Since the 
essential condition is not operational, questions or statements about 
it aren't operational either, and so they can't be used to mark 
indirect,, speech acts. 
I claim that the reason that he doesn't give an account of how one 
can telL whether the essential condition is fulfilled is that it 
would. be impossible; the-condition is ill-defined unless one looks at 
how speaker's and-hearer's plans change. Indeed, if it was possible 
to define it-, it would presumably subsume the other conditions. How 
could- aný speech act.., -count-as a directive if it demanded an action 
that the hearer couldn't do and so violated the preparatory 
condition? 
Secondly, I want to see speech acts defined by intended perlocution 
rather. -than illocution. The relevant perlocutionary-effects-will be 
either effects on mutually-known proof trees (and perhaps on what 
Searle - calls "institutional facts" - facts about our social 
environment - which I would need to explain such speech acts as 
sentencing). If I can, I will not need clause (iii) of Searle's 
revision of meaning-NN, nor the complex but still wholly pre-formal 
machinery-he needs, to implement it. 
Further, r I guess (I cannot show), that were I to meet a creature that 
spoke-, my language but which came from an arbitrarily different 
society (a Martian, for the sake of argument), we would still be able 
to makei indirect requests to each other. If it said "Have you got a 
space helmet? " I -could reasonably take this to, be a request for a 
space helmet, If this is-so, then, either knowledge of the conventions 
necessary, to sustain illocution is a part of knowJedge of a language; 
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or speech acts- should be explained without reference to such 
convention. This is not an argument for my position or against 
Searle's. It is an argument for why my position should be examined to 
see if it'is feasible. 
Searle explicitly rejects this sort of account founded an intended 
perlocution when criticizing Grice. He argues 
"When I say. 'Hellal and mean it, I do not intend to produce 
or elicit any state or action in my hearer other than the 
knowledge that he is being greeted. But that knowledge is 
simply his understanding what I said, it is not an 
additional response or effect. " (1969: 46) 
and again 
may say something and mean it without in fact 
intlending to produc e that effect. Thus I may mak6 a 
statement without caring whether my audience believes it or 
not, but simply because I feel it my duty to make it. " 
(1969: 46) 
But the first seems flat contradiction; change of knowledge is an 
_effect. 
And the second misunderstands what the intended perlocution 
Is: there, the perlocution is the bringing about of the 
(institutional) fact that on this occasion the speaker stood up for 
his principles. 
My third objection is that Searle's approach underplays something 
that he does mention. In sketching the process of finding which 
indirect speech act has been performed. Searle Imagines the hearer 
testing the candidate speech act to see whether it is one the speaker 
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might have wanted to make. In the salt-passing example, the hearer is 
imagined as thinking that because he and the speaker are at dinner, 
getting the salt is something the speaker might want. This testing is 
however appqrently merely a heuristic. It chooses the best from from 
a candidate set defined by rules about questioning and stating the 
illocution conditions. I want to argue that in fact this teleological 
test is central, and that 'being useful to the speaker' is the 
essential property that defines which speech act is performed in an 
utterance. My reason for this is that 'being useful to the speaker' 
is the only credible convention-free criterion available. 
2.4. Gordon and Lakoff 
Gordon and Lakoff (1975) attempt two things: to make more formal 
Grice's intuitions about how non-literal communication arises from 
general principles of conversation; and to show that syntax is 
sensitive to such principles. I consider only the first part. 
Their central machinery is deductive. The "conversational 
implications" of an utterance are to be the ordinary implications 
that follow from the conjunction of its literal meaning, a 
description of its . context, and certain extra axioms, the 
"conversa_tional postulates". 
The set of conversational postulates does not seem a priori to be 
closed. But interestingly they attempt to derive some of them 
systematically. They observe that there are conditions on the 
I 
sincerity of requests that can be formalized to give sentences such 
as 
i SINCERE(a., REQUEST(a, b. Q)) WANT(a, Q) 
ii SINCERE(, a,, REQUEST(a, b, Q)) ASSUME(a, CAN(b. Q)) 
ýz 
i is called "speaker-based" and ii, "hearer-based", because of the 
distribution, of person-variables in ihe consequent. These principles 
are not themselves-conversational postulates, but axioms about 
rational behaviour. 
They add a principle (called (6)) that "one can convey a request by 
(a), -asserting a speaker-based sincerity condition or (b) questioning 
a hearer-based sincerity condition" and so derive-(with an explicit 
fudge, about, ASSUME) 
il SAY(a. b, WANT(a. Q)) ->, REQUEST(a, b, Q)) 
iiI ASK(a. b, CAN(b, Q)) ->ýREQUEST(a. b, Q)) 
V.,, -and ii-I are conversatIonal postulates. When someone says "Can you 
take out theýgarbage? ", the antecedent of iiI becomes true, and the 
presence of the, indirect request is revealed by simple deduction.. 
They also have a notion of "challenges" of unreasonable speech acts. 
A,, challenge to, a request occurs in such remarks as 
"Why,, do-you, want me to do that? " 
"I can't do that -I hurt my arm" 
They offer a similar general principle, (called (14)), which can be 
re-expressed-as the function from sentences to sentences 
SINCERE(a, F) -> C 
REASO. NABLE(a, F) -> (Er)REASON(r, C) 
for -F-of the right form. From this-and the-same sincerity conditions 
used before they can obtain 
ill- REASONABLE(a, REQUEST(a. b, Q)) 
, 
(Er)REASON(r, WANT(a, Q)) 
0 
ii'' REASONABLE(a, REQUEST(a, b", Q)) -> 
(Er)REASON(r, ASSUME(a(CAN(b, Q))) 
It is because, of these that the challenges above are supposed to have 
their force. Both a question about S and a denial of S tend to 
suggest-S. The question presumably suggests -S because asking it 
presupposes that S is not provable, though this is not made clear. 
one challenge asks about the reason for a want, the other denies any 
reason for assuming the requesteels'ability. So by modus tollens each 
implies the negation of the reasonableness of the request. 
Another example, which is not connected to sincerity conditions on 
actions, is' an attempt to explain why the unprovoked remark "Your 
wife is faithful" is insulting. Tidied up, their account assumes a 
conversational postulate 
SAY(a. b, Q) -> INTEND(a, KNOW(b, Q)) 
and a general rule 
INTEND(a, X) -> ASSUME(a, -X) 
so that one can derive 
SAY(a, b, Q),. -> ASSUME(a, -KNOW(b, Q)) I 
Hence the' remark "Your wife'is faithful" entails that the speaker 
believes his hearer does not know this'- commonly an insult. 
There seem to be two problems with this account. The first is that it 
seems to have made'the wrong things explanatory. The postulates show 
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how to derive REQUEST(a, b. Q) from SAY(a, b, WANT(Q)); and clearly 
sometimes this 'will 
ýe very useful. One can only characterize the 
action "rudely ignoring a request" if one has some prior definition 
of "request". But ignoring such institutional facts, what is there 
that is needed to predict how my actions will change which Is 
included in saying. that someone has made a request of'me, but which 
is omitted from saying that they have expressed their wants to me? 
Two possible answers are', that I cooperate with the requester, and 
that the requester was sincere. Those points seem right. But Gordon 
and Lakoff's account covers neither; it does not mention cooperation 
at all, at least In the account of why "Can you take out the 
garbage? " is a request; and it does not suggest any way one might 
test whether an ostensible request is sincere. (I would like to have 
ciaimea 'that for them the proof of the occurrence of a'request 
depended an prior proof of the 
.1 
sincerity of any utt'erance, but I 
can't. The relation between iand I' is"not imp 
. lication, but rather a 
sort of meta-rule-like projection. ) 
The other problem is, where do"the conversational postulates come 
from? Where do principles like (6) and (14) come from? They have a 
'lot of axioms. I shall try and argue that the regularities they see 
are real, but are in fact cons'equences of I actions that alter what is 
mutually known about the participants' plans. For instance, that 
flasserting a speaker-based sincerity condition" (that the speaker 
wants Q or believes -Q) is a request is not an axiom. but a 
consequence of the fact that if it becomes known that Sp wants Q 
(when it can be assumed that he believes that -Q) or if it becomes 
known that he believes that -Q (when it can be assumed that he wants 
Q) then from general principles of rational action it will follow 
that he will want actions by his hearer that tend to achieve Q. 
However, o ther f, ac I ts to i0 will f ollow'ý(ior instance that he will want 
actions ý_y' 'himself "'th'a't ten'd ý to achieve Q) and this will explain 
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indirect meanings (such as requests that his hearer abstain from 
actions that would-prevent his own) that Gordon and Lakoff do not 
contemplate-at all., - *. - 
Gordon and Lakoff'st. approach has been continued by Gretchen Brown 
(1980). but with a ., rather different purpose. She accepts that an 
approach such as Allen, Perrault and Cohen's may be the general 
explanation oU,, speech acts,, but argues that what Gordon and Lakoff 
propose, is an-"appropriate technology" for recognizing Indirect 
speech acts -An discourse, and so presumably for systems in which 
natural janguage, communication is, to be used rather than studied. 
once she has claimed to be giving a purely descriptive account. it is 
not, weakened by -theýrfact that she has toýlist literally dozens of 
postulates., There is-still ýa-, -difficulty in explaining how one can 
recognize the antecedent, of, one of the postulates in an unprocessed 
input. sentenceý. Eg, her -rule -NECESSARY-ASSERT says that one can 
perform a-. speech act. -by asserting that it is necessary to perform 
that speech, -act. -But\--how--exactly, -is "I must-ask you to join the 
Marines" an "assertion that the intended speech act is necessary" and 
so a way of making a request? And a purely deductive NECESSARY-ASSERT 
postulate should say that if one asserts that it is necessary to 
perform, a,, speech, act, then one DOES perform that-speech act (though 
that -problem can I think be patched). Within the limited scope Brown 
considers, the, Gordon/Lakoff/Brown approach seems- extremely 
practical. 
2.5., Allen's work . 1. - 
2.5.1i. Background to Allen 
Work in which planning and natural language meshed has been done for 
some while (eg, Grosz 1977), but the first that mixed this with the 
philosophical tradition mentioned above came from Toronto, where 
Cohen, in his thesis (1978), and Perrault and Cohen (1979), wrote 
about the production of speech acts by a planning system. This relied 
heavily on the notion of recursive belief and Searle's analysis of 
speech acts. It also used action schemata with preconditions on the 
wants of the action's agents. 
Shortly afterwards, Allen wrote his thesis (1979), about the 
recognition of speech acts rather than their production, which relied 
on the notion of recognition of intention. Allen's ideas were also 
used by a group at BBN (Brachman 1979). 
Later work in the tradition has been that by Perrault and Cohen 
(1981) on recursive belief and what speakers do when they refer; and 
the ARGOT project under Allen at Rochester (Allen 1982, Allen et al 
1983), still in its early stages. The most striking change there to 
my eye is that the acts performed in discourse are not all at one 
level. Some are as always concerned with the state of the domain, but 
others, such as attempts to change topic, act on the discourse 
itself. 
Below I concentrate on Allen's ideas. They occur in many papers, but 
the one that I find the clearest and the most readable is one by 
Allen (1983). He himself describes it as his final attempt to clean 
up his thesis work. 
2.5.2. Allen and the recognition of intention 
Allen considers a system to which the user can say something - often 
but not always a question. His system imitates an information clerk 
at a station, and the user, a man meeting or catching a train. From 
what the user says, the system deduces what plan the user has. Then 
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it looks to see what obstacles there are in this plan, and attempts 
to-ýremoveý them. These obstacles are lacks of knowledge which can be 
removed, by giving'the user-information. 
(In the work done at BBN. the 'system. actually went further and 
achieved"goals-, for the user. The system could display different parts 
of, a, ATN- on a, VDU in' different ways, and would change what was 
displayed to'accommodate the user's indirectly expressed goals. ) 
If the 'system, deduces the-obstacle from the utterance, then the 
user's utterance has-had, the indirect effect of revealing the 
obstacle. " So it' is an indirect form of whatever direct speech act 
would 'have revealed the obstacle. - So -the system ýcan recognize 
indirect speech acts. 
Recognition' of the user's plan is done like this: The'system starts 
with-the' observed utterance and some expectations about the user's 
goals. '' The utterance is taken to be an action directed-to'some yet 
unknown goal, - which will probaby turn-out to be among the expected 
goals. - The'problem, is to fill in the gap, between the observed action 
and the. expected goal. Thisgap can'be, closed from either end. One 
can-work down from the-expected goal - if the user wants to catch a 
train, then'theýsystem can, infer that he probablyýwants to be at the 
platform it leaves from. This'ýis an instance of a general "plan 
construction", rule, that "If a person wants to do some act, he 
probably-wantslthe, preconditions of, that". - 
Some of 'the rules. - refer. "not to'domain-specific actions or states 
that will occur-lin the plan. but to "states of the planner's 
knowledge! ' He may', have the goal of knowing the reference of terms 
such'as "the departure-, time". or whether a-train-has arrived yet. 
ý 
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But the system can also work the other way. There are inference rules 
that allow the system to infer from goals that it already thinks the 
user has to -other goals that generated them. These are "plan 
recognition"-rules. Theyare the inverses of the rules that one might 
use to construct' a plan. For instance, the inverse of the plan 
construction'--r'ule' would be "If someone wants the precondition of an 
action. 'then'perhaps he"wants to do the action". Allen has a list of 
about a dozen such"rules. 
The limiting case of -a goal whose ulterior purpose has to be 
recognized''is an observed utterance. This, and any partial plan 
deduced from'such by the-plan inference rules, -but which has not got 
far 'enough to 'Join up with an expected goal, Allen calls an 
"alternative". 
Several rules may be applicable to one alternative, so from one 
alternative, It -may be'possible to guess many others. Allen's system 
has to know what -it should infer, as well as what it may. He does 
this by using two sorts of numerical weight. one is attached to the 
alternatives; the other, to tasks. There are certain actions that can 
be' performed- on 'aW' alternative: for instance, 'applying one of the 
plan- construction or plan recognition rules, or deciding which can 
apply, or 'accepting 'an' alternative as so much better than its 
competitors that it must be the user's real goal. A task is the 
opportunity of applying one of these actions to an alternative. The 
merit -of 'each task is a function of the type of the task and the 
merit of the 'alternative that it is to be'applied to. The best is 
done. Ultimately the task of accepting one fragment as definitive is 
the best, and when it' is done the process stops. The merit of an 
alternative depends on- how well it'matches an expected goal (eg do 
they 'refer 'to the''same objects? ), on whether it relies on things 
known to be possible, and on whether inference rules have been 
ýq 
fruitfully applied to itin the past. 
What the system eventually produces is something like this: 
BOARD(A, trainl, TORONTO) 
I enable 





INFORMREF(S, A_, tI'me1) 
I want-effect 
WANT( S, INFORMREF(S, A, timel) 
I effect 
REQUEST(. A., S, INFORMREF( S. A, timel) 
I have described all this without referring to recursive belief or 
belief, contexts., Let me take one of Allen's rules as he gives it 
(thoughj have renamed, the agents): 
Know Positive. 
Hr. b Sp w (Sp KNOWIF P), 
Hr. b Sp w P, 
The-initlal modality, of the sentence means of course "hearer believes 
speaker wants All the sentences that start with the same 
modality are said to be in the same belief or want context. 
If you want to see what was actually deduced during the building of 
the structure above, prefix each line in it with "Hr b Sp w 
since it is, in,. that context that simple plan recognition, is done. 
The sentences on the main line are goals of the user. The words on 
the right are the names of the inference rules employed, (or at any 
rate, a, clue to why the, link is allowed). 
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But though Allen calls it a plan, it isn't. States resulting from 
actions (AT) are mixed up with domain actions (BOARD). Knowledge 
goals (KNOWREF) are included as if they were ordinary preconds of an 
action. And the whole thing is linear. No goal can have more than one 
sub-goal. What it is of course is the trace of a series of inferences 
about a plan, rather than a plan. As a result, all the nodes in it 
are things made desirable by the plan. 
So much for guessing the speaker's intention. But Allen wants his 
system to go on and make a cooperative response. The next stage is to 
detect obstacles to the speaker performing his plan. For instance, 
catching a train requires one to know where and when it leaves. If 
the plan. - that the system ascribes to the speaker involves this. and 
If further it knows that he doesn't have this information. then it 
can C070perate by giving it. 
I. thlnk, --this. is one place where not really recognizing plans-may 
hurt. Suppose you ring the station and ask the information clerk when 
the Toronto train leaves. Unless he makes a guess at your full plan, 
eg thatý, you. are going to come. to-the. station bytaxi, he won't ever 
think to tell you, about such obstacles as, all the taxi drivers being 
on strike. ý: ý" 
That -,, 
is, roughly. the machinery, needed for making co-operative 
responses,. But as,. Allen observes it, can. run without having to 
consider whether the speaker was, actually attempting to get the co- 
operative, response. Allen', identifies -such-an -attempt! with the 
performance of an indirect speech act. How can such attempts be 
spotted? 
He uses two extra notions: - 
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ý- 'mutual -belief. A believes that A and B mutually believe that P 
(written as mb(A, B, P) if AbP & AbBbP & AbBbAbP & ..., where 
"b" 
stands for "believes" 
-a distinction between illocutionary, "real". REQUEST and INFORM 
acts, and SURFACE-REQUEST and SURFACE-INFORM acts, which are just the 
utterance of sentences grammatically-marked in the right way. The 
definitions for the requests are 
REQUEST( speaker, hearer, action 
-, body- MB(-hearer, speaker, speaker WANT hearer DO action 
effect: hearer WANT hearer DO action 
SURFACE-REQUEST( speaker, hearer, action 
effect: MB( hearer, speaker, speaker WANT hearer DO action 
The intuition behind this is that if what constitutes the body of the 
act arises then ipso facto the act has been done. Any act, such as a 
SURFACE-REQUEST, is a "real" request just in case it makes the body 
of REQUEST occur. 
one problem here is that Allen suggests that the preconds/body/effect 
structure of the action is "to allow the possibility of hierarchical 
planning". But for that to be so, I would expect the effects of the 
REQUEST action to be a subset of the effects of the body of the 
request action. But I don't see that that's so. Suppose I had 
maliciously attempted to get you to do something foolish, but had 
been detected. We would mutually believe that I wanted you to do that 
thing, but surely that wouldn't count as having requested you to do 
it? 
Allen gives examples of chains of inferences that can be made from 
the fact, that the user made speech acts of some surface type to the 
fact that he made a speech act of a perhaps different type. To do 
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this he has to add a new inference rule. 
Hr b Sp w mb( Hr, Sp, Sp wX 
Hr b Sp b mb( Hr. Sp, (Hr b Sp w X) (Hr b Sp w Y) 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Hr b Sp w mb( Hr, Sp. Sp wY 
and new heuristics to govern it. These say that deductions about what 
is mutually believed should be preferred as long as there is only one 
deduction to make, but if there is more than one possible, none 
should be made. This is sensible. Once an Invisible choice about what 
to deduce has been made, the result cannot be mutually known, and 
nei'iherparty can hav 
IeI 
expec ted to rely on 
'its being mutually known. 
Allen's methods were incorporated in a large NLU program built at BBN 
(Brachman et al, 1979). The only significant differences Were these: 
Belief and contexts spaces were implemented in a ways that turned 
on the features of KL-ONE, the project's knowledge representation 
language. 
Some words in the input were treated specially to change the 
system's expectations about the user's goals. For instance, when the 
user said. talking about the part of the ATN displayed on the VDU, 
"No, I want to be able to see the S/AUX", the "no" created the 
expectation that the user wants the display to change. As a result, 
in the example they give, the system chooses to keep but move what is 
displayed so as to show S/AUX, rather than to display the node by 
itself. 
- The inferences can be short-circuited. The special case of the user 
telling the system that he wanti something is recognized by the 
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parser. Where Allen would have had the two-step inference (the 
inference runs downwards) 
Hr b Sp w surface_inform( Sp, Hr. Sp wQ 
Hr b Sp w Hr b Sp w Hr b Sp wQ 
Hr b Sp W nL- b Sp w Hr wQ 
the BBN system goes immediately to 
Hr b Sp w surface 
- 
inform( Sp, Hr, Sp w 
Hr b Sp w Hr b Sp w Hr wQ 
2.5.3. Problems with illocution 
Allen offers this relation between "surface" and "illocutionary" 
speech acts: From the performance of a surface speech act, the hearer 
deduces a chain of goals. One of these may be the same as the body of 
an Hlocutionary speech act. A speaker who wants the body of an 
action wants the action. So he also wants the action's effects. Now 
two things are possible. One can name the illocutionary speech act 
that has been performed; or one can carry on inferring ulterior 
goals. But it is not clear that the first is necessary to the second. 
(Cohen and Levesque (1980) make this point). 
Consider the definitions of REQUEST and SURFACE_REQUEST again. The 
illocutionary REQUEST is there so that one can infer from the mutual 
belief 
mb( Hr, Sp, Sp w Hr do Action 
lo wit to a credible goal for the speaker, . 
Hr want Hr do Action 
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(Remember this is applied in the context "Hr B Sp w so the 
hearer is not in the odd situation of deciding what he himself 
wants), But one doesn't need to apply the body/action plan inference 
rule to do this. In the simple example of interpreting "Pass the 
salt", Allen lists the inferences as 
Hr b Sp W surface_request( Sp, Hr, pass( Hr, Sp, salt 
action/effect 
Hr b Sp-w mb( Hr, Sp, Sp w pass( Hr, Sp, salt 
body/action 
Hr b Sp w mb( Hr, Sp, Sp w pass( Hr, Sp, salt 
But the hearer should be able to recognize the speaker's goals from 
line (2). Allen provides the "decide inference" 
Hr b Sp w Hr b Sp wP 
---------------------- 
Hr b Sp w Hr wP 
Why should one not also have its mutual belief analogue 
Hr b Sp w mb( Hr, Sp, Sp wP 
------------------------------ 
Hr b Sp w Hr wP 
Now the hearer could apply that to line(2) to recognize the speaker's 
final goal. Then line (3), recognizing the illocutionary act, is 
otiose. 
But If Allen doesn't allow himself this, then he does need 
illocutionary act recognition if he Is to allow what speaker says to 
have any efect on what hearer does. Presumably hearer will only 
I 
respond to what he thinks speaker really wants - to X in the the 
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context "Hr b Sp w as in "Hr b Sp w X". But there are only two 
ways to get things into this context: 
an inference rule that explicitly changes context, as suggested 
above. 
by proceeding indirectly. suppose there is an act Act like this: 
preconds: ..... 
body: Cl x 
effects: C2 Y 
where Cl,. C2 are contexts. One way of changing context is by doing 
these inferences 
Hr b Sp w Cl X 
I body-action 
Hr b Sp w Act 
I! - . ", I. action-effect Hr b Sp w C2 X 
Then if Act is in fact REQUEST, one can go from a goal of the form 
Hr b Sp w mb( Hr, Sp, Sp w Hr do X 
to one like 
Hr b Sp w Hr w Hr do X 
one still has to get this to the form "Hr w SP w Z". The details of 
this will depend on X and Z. 
Nevertheless one will want to recognize illocutionary speech acts for 
other purposes. For instance, if A wants to answer B's question "Did 
you hear my request? ", A has to be able to spot the request to know 
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what B is talking about. 
Cohen & Levesque propose a way of recognizing speech acts that uses 
the body/action rule, but which does not make this essential to 
recognizing speaker's intention. For instance, REQUEST( Requestor, 
Requestee, E) is 
effect: (MB-Y, x-. (WANT y E)) 
body:, (MB y x. (WANT, x, jBEL y (WANT xE 
prereq: (AND. (MB.. y x (CAN y E)) 
(MB yx -(WANT y -E)) 
, 
(MB ýx (HELPFUL y x))) 
(I trust the notation is obvious). 
They,, say-"If the prerequiste holds, any action making the body true 
achieves the effect". While the general approach seems right, I doubt 
that. -. anýaction body is Just aýproposition. I would guess it. would be 
some set of-, actions, intuitively a more detailed description of eg 
REQUEST, If it is not, -why. can't the action, be written as - 
effect: (MB, y x (WANT E)), 
body: 
prereq: (AND (MB yx (WANT x (BEL y (WANT xE 
(MB -y, x (CAN y E)) 
(MB yx -(WANT y -. -E)) 
(MB yx (HELPFUL y x))) 
The difference between "John murdered Tom" and "John killed Tom" must 
reside, not in the preconditionss or effects of the act schemata, but 
in the description, of which acts with those preconds and effects 
count, as murders and killings. 
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2.5.4. Differences between Allen and me 
The major difference between what Allen did and what I propose is 
this: 
For him, an utterance works by revealing the speaker's plan to the 
hearer. This may reveal previously unknown goals of the speaker's. If 
the hearer is cooperative, the hearer may try and help him with them. 
So the speaker benefits. 
For me, an utterance works by changing a plan, either the hearer's, 
or what is known of the speaker's. This change may be intrinsically 
beneficial, either because it altruistically improves the hearer's 
plan, or because the hearer's plan is selfishly made better for the 
speaker; or it may be remotely beneficial, since it makes a change in 
what is known of the speaker's plan. Then comparison of how the 
speaker's plan was, and is now, thought to be may reveal new beliefs 
and values that the speaker entertains, which in their turn may have 
an effect an 
'the 
hearer. Goal recognition of Allen's type is, for me. 
the special case in which what the speaker says alters the plan that 
he is thought to have, so revealing values he was not previously 
known to hold, and which he hopes the hearer will help him with. 
The sort of thing that Allen's account can't even in principle deal 
with is that where what speaker says affects a plan but doesn't 
involve revelation of a goal. For example, If A says "It's about to 
rain" in these two contexts the effect of his utterance is quite 
different. 
A: Shall Lget the laundry in? 
B: It's about to rain. 
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A: Shall I water the vegetables? 
B: It's about to rain. 
The difference must reside in the effect that the statement has on 
B's obvious plan. But to find out what the effect is requires a 
notion of how new facts and goals interact with extant plans. That 
needs knowledge about how plans can be affected, and about the real 
world. 
2.6. Attack on explanation by script-like knowledge 
Here is a quote from Schank (1980) where he reviews some of the 
motivation for his earlier work. 
"We began to focus on the problem of inferencing intention 
We got into this problem because of a peculiar use of 
language that we happened to come across The example 
was 
Q: Do you want a piece of chocolate? 
A: I just had an ice cream cone. 
Clearly, it is necessary to understand the answer given here 
as meaning "no". In attempting to figure out how to do this, 
we realized that it was necessary to fill"'out the structure 
of the conceptualizations underlying- both sentences so that 
a match could be made from the answer to the question. " 
This "attempt to figure out" has become what can fairly be called the 
Yale ''ý'chool' of language understanding'. It descends from the work of 
Schank and his students and colleagues. Its results appear in (for 
example) (Schank & Abelson 1977) (Schank 1980) (Schank 1982). Central 
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themes are 
- knowledge-based parsing. 
-a rich collection of semantic primitives and ways of 
combining them. 
- an understanding of intentional behaviour that relies on 
"scripts". 
It, is this last, that I want to, consider. The Yale school Is ideas have 
been refined and altered for about fifteen years, and the notion of 
t'script" has not stayed the same, nor has it continued to play the 
same role in explanations. But these things can I think be said about 
it: 
Agents are masters of, parameterized knowledge structures: 
,, scripts..., 
Understanding -experience is largely a matter of 
recognizing it as an instantiation of one or another script. 
Scripts will-be justified, by some deeper level of 
explanation; for instance, Af the structure describes 
agents' actions, there may. be a reason for the structure 
being the shape It is in terms of the agents' intentions; 
, but that is not vital -, 
for its use in understanding 
experience. 
Despite the excerpt, the Yale school. considers, not discourse, but 
stories. Instead of such texts as 
At cinema entrance- 
Boy: A ticket please. 
(go 
Ticket seller: You're under sixteen. 
they consider those such as 
A boy asked for a ticket at a cinema entrance. 
The ticket seller thought the boy was under sixteen. 
The ticket seller refused. 
Is it possible to see how in principle techniques of script-based 
story understanding could be adapted to discourse understanding? I 
think not. Or rather, only as useful heuristics for reaching a proper 
explanation. Scripts have no explanatory force of their own. 
But has it been claimed that scripts are irreducibly explanatory? 
After all, Schank points out "Scripts are really just prepackaged 
sequences of causal chains. " (1980: 253). So surely a script is 
explanatory because it was built in accordance with a prior theory of 
intentions, and so any actions that instantiate that script will also 
instantiate some theorem of the theory? 
Clearly; but he also claims "plan-based processing is different in 
kind from script-based processing" (1977: 99) and that "There is a 
causal chain [in a sequence of events that is to be understood by 
script application] but inferring it bit by bit is impossible. which 
makes scripts necessary. " (1980: 253). So if explanations of an 
agent's actions in a context are to be founded on his beliefs about 
that context, and if certain beliefs are only available to him when 
he knows about certain scripts, then such explanations make 
irreducible u"se of the agent's knowledge of scripts. 
Now it seems that (in discourse at least, whatever happens in 
stories) there are crucial events types Of speec-h act that must 
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be recognizable if script application is to be possible; but they can 
be recognized 
- either in, stories but, not-in discourse 
--or by a version of -script which -has been so weakened that 
recognizing one is not different from recognizing a straightforward 
plan. 1 -1 .. - 
Scriptso-will- then be either insufficient or unnecessary to explaJn 
the remark's function in the exchange-. - 
The, central objection is that when one, describes what people say, a 
reported-speech account has to use speech act verbs, but a quoted- 
speech account does not. Consider an example from (Schank & Riesbeck 
1981: 150). The story in question is I 
John wanted Bills-bicycle. , 
He ( ... I asked him if he would give it to him 
Bill refused. 
-Then John told Bill he would give him five dollars for it. 
To understand this, the sentences have to be read, converted to the 
'language of semantic primitives, and then matched with the script 
that the story Is currently supposed to instantiate. But see what has 
happened; the story has made explicit that what John saidto Bill was 
an asking. The -translation -of "John asked Mary for her book" is 
(following Schank and Abelson 1977: 157) 
I 
John MTRANS (ATRANS book) to Mary 
Such ýa structure is-then matched with that predicted by the script, 
and the purpose of the asking can be recovered. That structure can be 
recovered because the analysing system knows not merely how to 
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translate an asking, but-also that it is dealing with an asking. 
But if the system'were faced with the discourse, all: that it would 
know' about (for instance) the ticket seller's remark "You're under 
sixteen" is 'its' literal 'content and 'its maker. Suppose that the 
script about cinema ticket selling demands either a refusal (or an 
acceptance) at this point. How can it tell that it has got one? There 
is 'nothing intrinsic-to the remark that makes it a refusal. "Your'e 
under sixteen" can be used in countless ways. If the script demands 
that the' utterance make itself known as a refusal, then it will be 
inapplicable,., 
But perhaps' scripts can'be refined so that they do have some way of 
recognizing a refusal. Scripts can have embedded scripts. Why should 
the 'ticket'selling script not, inclilde'-another, the "refusal" script, 
perhaps as'an alternative? A refusal script, would perhaps look for an 
action-, that'made-'; itself'known to-be awassertion of -F, when F was a 
precondition `of? -ýsome 'plan P. P would'be"alparameter of the refusal 
script, ý and"would in 'case be'bound by the embedding ticket 
selling script. 
7 
One"way, of- doing-this: is to create, mini-scripts, where-events are 
characterized -in terms' merely of how agents' goals-and actions 
Interact,. - Such" scripis-are"content-free; 'they are independent of 
particular actions and situations,,!, such as going into restaurant. 
This, has, -been a -, popular. approach. -For, instance Dyer's thematic 
abstraction units (TAU's) (Dyer 1983) or Lehnert's plot units 
(Lehnert 1982) are the sort of thing I mean. 
But then what is the ticket selling script doing? It is unnecessary 
for saying what the utterance is called. One would only need that to 
confirm the finding of the expected "refusal" event, in order to 
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confirm that the ticket seller's actions were still following the 
ticket selliing"script. But to recognize the refusal one must have had 
a depth of understanding of the seller's plan P at least as great as 
would be provided'b'y'grasping the "scripi'he was executing. A script 
mentions only observable actions, not preconditions, which are what 
must ' already'' have' been grasped her , 6. Equally, the script is 
unnecessary to see 'the 'effect that''the utterance had on the 
participants' plans. Seeing that was in fact part of the recognition. 
I conclude'-that' script' applicaiion' is at most a (perhaps very 
powerful) heuristic for finding purely plan-based explanations of 
utt6rances designed''io"'affect beliefs and values. It has no 
explanatory force of its own. 
on the other hand, there may well be a place for irreducibly script- 
like` explanations of actions which are purely textual utterances 
that' mark change of" topic,, or turn takJng, 'or'utterances that 
constitute the producing of the sort of features of text reviewed in 
(Levinson'"1983: 6.2). There for instance he cites the way that the 
length Of' a pause before laughing at a Joke can be crucial to the 
-occurrence of the event of a-Joke falling flat. Postponlýg a laugh to 
`flatt6n'a Joke is som I ething one"only*knows how I to do if one knows the 
expected order I Of events after a Joke. Such knowledge is 
intrinsically script-like. But such actions are somehow ancillary to 
actions describable'as attempts to change their hearer's beliefs and 
values-, - even if they are realized in the same physical utterance. 
Sý 
Chapter 3. Rational Action 
I claimed that utterances mI ust I be seen as actions that are part of 
plans. Discourse is supposed to cohere because it is a example of 
rational action. - Rational actions cohere because they are parts of 
rational plans. This chapter goes into more detail about how actions 
in general compose plans. Once that has been done, it will be 
possible to go on and explain how plans are sensitive to utterances, 
and therefore how utterances can be eplained as actions that are 
intended to affect plans. So this chapter, though it has intrinsic 
interest'as a description of action, is essentially preliminary. 
3.1. Rational action 
Rational action is a vague' concept. It is nevertheless a vital one 
for explanation of human'action, and needs to be sharpened up. How? 
Roughly, an action is rational if it part of a set of actions that 
its performer believes is the best way of getting what he values. 
This supposes people are able to look ahead at the states of the 
world'that will follow a-sequence of actions and'choose the ones that 
make the'world end up'the way they want it to be. 
Now one -needs a way of descýib*ing such sequences of actions, and 
criteria' ap'plicable I to such sequences which licen I ce calling them 
"rational". The sort of description I shall use is the plan. 
The critical features of ratioýal action appear to be 
that it is directed to benefitting, its agent - its end is correct 
that it will contribute to benefitting its agent - its means are 
correct 
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A plan is a structure that shows how an action included in it 
satisfies these criteria. The sort of plan that Iýshall work with is 
the and-or tree. in which the nodes are the sort of thing that can be 
true or false and wanted or feared, and where a father node is true 
if its son nodes are true. 
3.2. Goals 
Suppose one asks a person "Why did you do that? ", and insists on an 
answer of the from "Because I wanted such-and-such". Then one can ask 
"And why did you want that? ", and demand the same sort of answer. 
This game can go on for a long while, but not forever. At last he 
will have to say "Well, I just wanted it". What are the sort of 
things that a person can "Just want" without being able to give a 
further reason? Are they all the same? Do they have something in 
common? There have been lots of answers. Some of them are: 
they are morally good: that is, there is a rule which 
applies to actions or states of affairs (SOAs) which 
identifies some as good, where part of one's understanding 
of "being good" is that good things should be goals of 
actions. The rule may be concordance with the revealed will 
of God, or being conducive to the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number, or being the outcome of that which one 
would will to be a universal law. The source of the rule is 
immaterial. 
they cause physical pleasures or remove physical needs: 
warmth, sexual pleasure, the ending of pain or hunger are of 
this sort. Perhaps it is impossible for the sort of beasts 
we are not to take these as goals of action. even if they 
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can be ignored in the face of more important goals. 
they are aesthetically/emotionally pleasing: they provoke a 
sensation of a particular kind which is distinct from that 
brought about by physical enjoyments, but which when present 
is undeniable. 
they tend to preserve our, or our fellows', life: perhaps 
animals that arose as the result of natural selection must 
necessarily be constructed so that they act for this reason. 
I suggest that even if these are all radically distinct, as far as 
their being springs of action goes, they are identical. They confer 
goalhood on (say) a SOA. What does this mean? That action is directed 
towards it. Surely this leads to a circularity - rational action is 
directed to what rational action is directed to. 
Not necessarily. There are two reJoinders possible: 
We have a prior understanding of what goals are. Indeed. 
since we are goal-directed ourselves, we have an excellent 
introspective understanding of them. It's then a separate 
matter to find out what our goals actually are. (Moral 
enquiry could be conceived of as finding out about goals we 
have but don't know about. or about goals we will have as 
soon as we are told about them). 
If we acceDt the idea of rational action. we can construct 
the idea of value out of this: "valued" will merely mean 
"being a goal of action". But then this theory-laden term 
may well be coextensive with terms from other fields: 
perhaps with those listed above. That this is always so is 
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an-interesting falsifiable hypothesis. 
At. any rate-, ý I am going to suppose that we can identify things we 
value. But "being valued" is not the same as "being a goal". A goal 
only arises ýwhen something, valued-is not the case. I may be glad to 
own a car, but if I already have one, and I don't value having any 
more, I won't spend time and effort getting another. At first 
approximation', a goal-is something both valued and false. This 
however is'too §imple. - 
3.3. 'Fears , 
Firstly, 'there are fears--as well as wants. I fear toothache or 
damnation or- bankruptcy. But this is not hard to handle. Fears and 
wants can both be construed in terms of value: 
I, want X- I value X 
I fear X I value -X 
So if the conditions', for X being a goal is: 
-X is a-goal =I value X& 
then of course: 
X is a goal =I want X; & -X 
-X is a goal'= I fear X, &, X 
3.4. Abstaining versus Doing 
Secondly, just as there can be reasons for doing an action. so there 
can be reasons for-not doing it. For instance, I won't-pick up a hot 
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Iron, because it will burn me. and I fear this. Something bad and now 
false would become true. Similarly, I won't take my purse and drop it 
down a manhole. Something good and now true would become false. 
(In fact these two sorts of reason are the same. The first transition 
is 
hand burnt hand burnt 
FEARED is FALSE FEARED is TRUE 
and the second: 
have money have money 
WANTED is TRUE WANTED is FALSE 
But since the negation of anything feared is wanted, the first can 
also be seen as: 
- hand burnt hand burnt 
WANTED is TRUE WANTED is FALSE 
just like the second. ) 
Whether an action is done or not is decided by the merits of the SOA 
that ensue. The more valued things that are false after the act, the 
worse; and the more feared thing that are false. the better. These 
things are REASONS for (or against) an action. A reason for an action 
is its effect on the truth of something valued. 
3.5. Preventing versus Achieving 
In fact what I just said is false. Certainly one decides whether to 
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do something or not by comparing the SOA that ensues with some other 
SOA. But that other SOA is not "the world as it now". It is "the 
world as it would be if the act isn't done". 
For instance, suppose I have a car, and I like having it. If I see a 
car thief trying to enter it, I'll try and stop him. Why? 
Suppose I compare the world before I stop him and after it. Before, 
my car isn't stolen. After, my car isn't stolen. There's no apparent 
benefit: indeed, the effort I've put into stopping him may well count 
against the merit of the "After" SOA, 
If on the other hand I contrast the world as it WILL be after my 
action with the world as it WOULD have been if I hadn't acted, (call 
these the WILL and WOULD SOAs)-then there is a clear benefit. In the 
WILL SOA I have my car, in WOULD I don't. 
This gives one a way of distinguishing achievement from prevention. 
Look at'theie'diagrams of'sequences of possible SOAs. V is something 
valued: " 
go 
Time ---------- > 
--------- >: -V I Would 
Now -V I ACHIEVEMENT 
--------- >1. V Will 
Time ---------- > 
--------- >; -V I Would 
Now, iý- v, I PREVENTION 
--------- - -------- 
--------- >i V Will 
In achievement, something wanted but now false would have stayed 
false, except that something is being done to make it true. 
In prevention, something wanted and now true would have become false, 
except that something has been done to stop that. (Or equivalently, 
something feared and now false would have become true, except that 
something has been done to stop that. Perhaps a diagram of prevention 
looks more intuitive if we consider the prevent of something we fear. 
say W. Logically the diagram is the same, with W written for -V-) 
ql 
Time ---------- 
--------- >! W Would 
Now I -W I PREVENTION 
.4 ---------- >1 '-W Will 
3.6. Beliefs 
Values are part of rational action. The other part is beliefs. An 
agent has got to know what is true, both so that he knows what goals 
are extant. and so that he knows what he can do with hope of success. 
I have just confused "belief" and "truth". I did this on purpose. 
There may be a distinction between things being true and being 
believed. It does not emerge in considering action. A person believes 
something if he thinks it true. If he thinks it true he believes it. 
of course he may change his beliefs and say that what he used to 
believe is false. This is just to say that he no longer belie-ýes it; 
he may still be wrong, or have been right the first time and 
misunderstood the evidence. Even if there was a useful distinction, 
one would still have to judge a man's actions against what he 
believed. 
There are (at least) two sorts of things that can be believed: 
Simple propositions about the world. I call these states of 
affairs. -They can 
be true or false. The metaphysics of this 
claim is unimportant. If you prefer, talk about them as 
those things that sentences in some ideal language describe. 
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or even those sentences themselves. How they are used in 
what I say is independent of the ontology you prefer. 
Rules about what propositions follow from which (or, 
equivalently, which SOAs are consequences of which). 
These rules represent, not what "actually" follows from what, but 
what a person believes follows from what. They tell us, given some 
state of his belief, what else he will believe. They also enable him 
to dire'Ct h'is actions: by'usi ýg them he can predict what will follow 
if he performs, or abstains from, an action. 
Because thise rules'are epi'stemological rather than "real" they are 
of several sorts: but they are all licences for belief. If their 
holder believes the antecedents, he believes the consequent. I write 
them like''this: 
Consequent <= 
Antecedent-1 & Antecedent-2 & Antecedent-3 
hese"ýre '-some of iheir kinds: 
- rul Ie-sI about physical 6ýents. Thes e are the epis"temiccounterpart of 
physical causation: 
object falls <'= 
object massive & object unsupported 
obJect burns <= 
object has burning point T& 
temperature of object is T 
ý3 
- rules drawn from lexicography. These are meaning postulates: 
agent is brutish 
agent careless of causing pain & 
agent is stupid 
agent buys object <= 
agent pays something to someone in return for object 
rules drawn from knowledge of social world: 
agenti dislikes agent2 <= 
agent2 sincerely insults agentl 
3.7. Representing actions 
If I ask you "Why is there tea in that pot? " the answer you give need 
not -be teleologicalý. You may say-'Because 1, poured hot water over 
tealeaves" We both know that doing that produces tea; or to put it 
another way, if I believe you did that, then I am licensed to believe 
that there is tea made. This is the same sort of licensing of belief 
as I just talked about. But there SOAs were connected. Surely pouring 
hot water Isn't a SOA, but an event, an action. Does this mean one 
needs a different mechanism to to allow one to infer the effects of 
an action? 
I think not. It seems to me that one can draw a parallel between SOAs 
and actions: 
q tý 
--a SOA is true or was-true 
7, an event is occurring or did occur 
it is possible, for-an action to be a goal. For instance. I may want 
to go for a walk, and I may perform actions to this end - for 
instance. putting on wellingtons. It should be possible to represent 
this as -the goal', of a plan. -but-that, is only possible if SOAs and 
actions, are the-same sort of thing. 
One standard -way-, of representing actions is by defining an action 
schema. A, schema-consists of: 
- an operation 
-a list of conditions, which must hold before the operation can be 
performed- 
-a list of the conditions-that are, true afterwards, 
For instance: 
Make tea: 
Postconditions have infusion-of-tea 
,, - water in kettle . - Operation pour hot-water from kettle to teapot 
Preconditions tealeaves in teapot 
I 
But this sort-of representation is not ideal: 
- There are actions that don't fit into this mould at all. Eg, going 
for a walk. While this may have preconditions, the postconditions -a 
healthy glow perhaps - certainly don't reflect the important parts of 
what has been done. Furthermore. what is the operation in the "goingg 
for a walk" schema? "Walking" can't be it because one can walk 
without going for a walk. 
I ý- 
- The relation between an effect "have tea-the-infusion" and an 
action "make tea" seems analytic. If one doesn't end up with tea one 
hasn't made it. There is no operation "make tea" which can be defined 
Independently of its effects. There is no specifiable course of 
action a person could follow after which one said "He made tea. but 
It-'didn't work". 
-A plan may involve both rules and representations of actions. For 
instance, supposing I want to clear a house of mice. I have to deploy 
both knowledge about' possible actions (buying and laying poison) and 
non-action knowledge - that mice die if they eat poison. The planning 
process will be complicated if these bits of knowledge come in 
different formalisms. 
Instead I propose a representation based on the idea of formal cause. 
The formal cause of an event or SOA is those things in virtue of 
which one can say the event occurred or the SOA holds. For example, 
if ý'I say "She is'beautiful" and you ask "Why? ", I can reply "Because 
she has blues eyes and flaxen hair and is divinely tall". These facts 
have not caused her beauty in the way that dropping an egg causes it 
to be smashed. It is just a lexicographic fact that these facts mean 
that she'is beautiful. Written as a rule: 
x is beautiful'<- 
X is female & 
X has'long flaxen hair & 
X has blue eyes & 
X is divinely tall & 
But similarly actions'can be unpacked in terms of other actions at a 
more detailedlevel'Which taken together in certain circumstances are 
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grounds for'saying the gross action occurred. The formal cause of an 
action is just a specification of these actions and circumstances. 
What is involved in, say, "I met Celia off a train" ?I have to have 
gone to the station, Celia must have alighted from the train, and I 
must have greeted her. I identify actions and events by prefixing 
them with an up-arrow So: 
I meet Celia of train <= 
I go to station & 
Celia alights from train & 
I greet Celia 
What action takes place may depend on what circumstances it is done 
in. If I apply a match to a pile of wood, paper and sticks in a 
garden I'am-lighting a bonfire. If I do the same thing in a grate in 
a hearth I am lighting a fire. So: 
light bonfire <= 
apply match to a pile of wood, paper and sticks 
pile of wood, paper and sticks is in garden 
light (ordinary) fire <= 
apply match to a pile of wood, paper and sticks 
pile of wood, paper and sticks is in a grate 
3'. 8. 'Relations b6tween actions 
Going back to the schema representation, imagine how schemata will 
fit together t6form a plan. "There are two things that could count as 
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"fitting'together". two axes of relationshipt 
- one-Schema could'have postconditions that were the preconditions of 
the next. 'The first is ENABLING the'second. ' 
- One schema, could be-the operation'-of another. The first is REFINING 
the- second'. ''It is 'telling one in greater detail how the second is 
done. "This is-'of course a'making explicit'of "actions having Internal 
struc, tuýe" 
i, " 
For exampl6. "i4ith'what-I'hoPe-iý'an obvious, notation- 
have"tea-the--infusion, in teapot hot-water in teapot 
pour hoi-water on tealeaves'-=-==; ---[ 'tip kettle 
have teaieave's'ln''teapot Refiheýent hot-water in kettle 
kettle over teapot 
Enablement 
have tealeaves in teapot 
put', 't'ealeav'es iný'teapot 
i 
have tealeaves 
Now how far can these processes be taken? How far in a plan need one 
imagine enablement and refinement going? Presumably no schema can 
enable an already true precondition, and so in a plan a chain of 
enablements stops at preconditions which are either true or incapable 
of enablement. 
How far can refinement of action go? I suspect that the bottom level 
is something like, muscle-fibre motions. Actions are a special case of 
event in which there is an agent. What the finest-grained sort of 
events in general are, I don't know. But I don't think it matters. 
one needn't go all the way down. At some point one can say "This 
gross action occurred. I am not interested in its internal structure. 
I can make it happen simply by willing it. Here I stop". 
Ultimately, - one could expand a plan in such detail that its fringe 
was entirely ýeither SOAs or muscle-fibre motions. At this point one 
could say both that that the whole plan had genuinely become a 
contingent proof - if the fibres moved as specified then everything 
else would happen as expected, and the physical consequences of these 
movementsý would show exactly what the effect of each action arose - 
and that, it was credible to see such things as true when wanted. 
In fact both ends of a plan are usually negligible. At the bottom, 
there in no point, in analyzing actions as far as they will go. At the 
top, though all value may perhaps stem from some value such as "stay 
alive". it's not useful to look that high. 
flow acts can be said to cause SOAs? 
If you are unhappy at the idea of actions causing SOAs. let me try to 
show how, one can-. get rid of this by looking at the expansion of 
actions. -Suppose we have a bit of an and-tree: 
- tea-the-infusion in teapot 
tealeaves in teapot - pour hot-water into teapot 
Any gross action can be broken into finer-actions and circumstances. 
So analyse pour hot-water into teapot": 
pour hot-water into teapot 
---------------------------------------- 
tip kettle kettle over teapot hot-water in kettle 
If one accepts that the action tip kettle" can in its turn be 
analyzed'. then one can allow: 
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hot-water in teapot <= 
tip kettle & 
kettle over teapot & 
hot-water in teapot 
But these antecedents are exactly those that licensed the assertion 
of pour hot-water into teapot". So if that action was done. then 
the conditions for hot-water being in the teapot are also fulfilled. 
if one ignores problems about indicating sequence of events, one 
could redraw the tree as: 
tea-the-infusion in teapot 
7 ------------------- 
tealeaves in teapot hot-water in teapot 
---------------------------------------- 
tip kettle kettle over teapot hot water in kettle 
In general there seems to be a translation from schemata- 
representations to rule-representations like this: 
postconditions postconditions 
operation to ----------------- 
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preconditions operation preconditions 
and if the operation is in its turn a schema like this: 
postconditions detailed postconditions 
ýrefinement 
operation detailed operation 
preconditions detailed preconditions 
then there are two alternative and-tree Pictures of a plan using 
these schemata, which correspond, not to two degrees of checking that 
the plan's preconditions are enabled, but to showing it at two 
leo 











3.10. Actions which are defined by their effects 
The schema-representation of the structure of an action explicitly 
includes the effects of the action. In one way the rule- 
representation can't do this. Consider the action of "putting a bowl 
away in a cupboard". What are the criteria for an action to count as 
this? The answer isn't a description of the action's fine structure, 
because this isn't unique. There are so many ways one can put a bowl 
away: by hand while gripping it from the side or from below, by 
sliding it off a tray, by putting away a larger bowl that contains 
it. There is no feature common to all these sets of actions. What 
makes them all cases of "putting a bowl away" is the outcome - the 
bowl's being in the cupboard - and the fact that that events that led 
to this were actions you performed. 
So how can one represent this in rule form? Think back to the case of 
pouring hot water into a teapot. This action summarized a set of 
finer actions and SOAS. Those finer parts entailed a SOA (hot water 
in the pot) that explained the effect of pouring the tea. In the case 
of putting away the bowl, one knows the entailed state (the bowl's 
being in the cupboard), but not. the fine detail that led to it. one 
is saying that a proof-tree of this sort exists: 
jol 
bowl in cupboard 
------------------ 
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various unspecified actions and SOAs 
but since the unspecified bits are unspecified, one can say nothing 
about them. The action "put away" has no fine structure but must be 
taken as primitive. On the other hand, there is (by definition) a 
rule: 
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bowl in cupboard <= 
- put bowl away in cupboard 
This is not really sufficient. Imagine me throwing a bowl so that it 
lands in the cupboard unbroken. One ought to be able to recognize 
this as a special case of "putting away". Unfortunately to be able to 
catch this one would need a rule something like: 
person put bowl away <= 
person did an action A& 
action A caused the bowl to be in the cupboard 
But this involves predicates ("did", "caused") that range over 
actions. Furthermore. -whether A -caused B is not something one can 
assimilate to a SOA or an event; it is essentially a relation between 
such things. But it could be used if-its-truth conditions looked at 
proof-trees. Then one could identify "A caused B" with "A is below B 
in the proof-tree, that containsV'- The Justification for this would 
be that, if one explicates "A causes B" as "B would not have occurred 
if A had, not occurred", this is, paralleled by "B-would not be true if 
A were not -true"., (I am ignoring the problems about alternative 
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proofs and causes). 
3.11. The relation between proofs and plans 
A proof in the form of and-tree is true when all the nodes at its 
fring6 are true. I Now - imagine an I and-tree some of whose fringe isn't 
true. One_"isn't' licensed to believe in the , nodes at the'top of the 
tree. But suppose the false parts of the fringe were made true. Then 
all the other nodes in the tree would be true too. 
This""Is how, I 'think" of'a plan. It is a proof with a fringe which 
includes 'actions ,' These actions are'not at first believed to have 
happened. But'they''have the curious property that they become true if 
it's desired - or to look at-it'anotheýr way, they can be performed on 
demand. For ýinstafice, if the actions in this tree are performed, it 
will be a proof tree that shows we can'expect to have scrambled egg: 
have scrambledL-egg 
---------------------- 
have beaten-egg fry beaten-egg 
----------- 
II 
have egg beat egg 
^'buy'egg 
A pure and7tree is too restrictive. One can easily form plans. which 
involve alternatives. One may intend, to buy sugar at any of several 
shops. To allow for this, I treat a plan as an and-or tree. 
But if a plan has a*lterna. tives, one has to distinguish between the 
tree. as a whole, and that subset of it which is actually intended and 
which, will beexe_cuýed- This subse t will reduce to a pure and-tree, 
and represents what the agent is going to try first. That may of 
course fail. and at some or-branch another branch will be selected. 
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It is quite possible that there should be no complete selected plan. 
3.12. Why actions behave like facts in proofs 
This section attempts to make the the relation between facts and 
actions more precise, and to explain why both are legitimate nodes in 
a proof. 
Agree that the facts about the states of your muscles are, unlike all 
other facts in the world, true or false according to what you want. 
These facts are capable of being the grounds of a proof tree. Their 
immediate consequences will be facts about the position of your body. 
These position facts may then have other consequences. Here is a 
sketchy instance of such a proof: 
trigger in pulled position 
I 
--------------------------------------- 
finger on trigger gun in hand finger in crooked position 
--------------------------------------- 
long flexor of finger flexed short flexor of finger flexed 
Now of course these muscle-state facts can become true at some moment 
when they were previously false. This is what a movement is. If facts 
can become true, then proof tree can become true. A proof tree is 
true if the rules that it involves are valid. and all the facts at 
its fringe are true. Need I be more formal about a proof tree? 
I suggest that one can identify an action with the becoming true of a 
proof tree when that occurs because of the becoming true of some 
muscle-state facts. What the action is, or rather what you call it, 
depends on what how you define that action. The definiens of an 
action will involve predicates over-proof-trees and changes in the 
loý 
truth of proof trees. For instance, one could define "X pulls 
trigger" as, 
A proof-tree P became true 
I. ý- -1 , (, % 
P has top node "trigger in pulled position" 
All the fringe-node muscle-state facts in P were about X's 
muscles, and they became true because of X's intention to 
bring about the top'node 
Obviously 'this is not an exhaustive description of the proof tree. 
That must be right. There are many ways a trigger might be pulled 
(With'teeth, ''string, toes ... ) and the 
'proof trees that correspond to 
each of them'wili-differ, but all should qualify as trigger-pullings. 
Under this definition-th(iý will. 
If this is true. 'then believing that an action has occurred will 
involve you in believing that a proof tree has become true. Other 
dedýctions' that"can then be made from the things proved in the new 
proof tree. These deductions can tell you either about new facts or 
about different actions. 
3.12.1. How can an action support a fact? 
This is the ^case that corresponds-"to''enablement between rule 
sch6mata, though the analogy 'is not perfect'. ''" 
Why is tfifs'rule, where-an action supporis a fact, 'valid? 
tea-theý-infusion in teapot 
--------------------------- 
tealeaves in teapot _X pours hot-water into teapot 
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First, -accept these uncontentious rules, 1 and 2, which contain only 
facts: 
rule 1 
, tea-the-infusion in teapot.. t 
------------ 7_7 ------------- 
tealeaves in teapot hot-water in teapot 
rule 2 
hot water in teapot 
----------------------------------------- 
kettle aslant kettle over teapot hot-water in kettle 
Now, suppose that I define "^X poured hot-water into teapot as 
A proof-tree P became true 
P has top node "hot water in teapot" 
P looks like this: 
hot water in teapot 
----------------------------------------- 
I 
kettle aslant kettle over teapot hot-water in kettle 
Pi 
(All the muscle-state facts in P1, a sub-tree, were about X's 
muscles. ) 
If I do, then to accept that the action fl-x pours hot water into 
teapot" occurred is to accept that a proof tree like the one above 
has become true If I accept this, then I must accept "kettle over 
teapot" and "hot-water in kettle" are true. If I accept these and the 
uncontentious rule 1 about tea-the-infusion then I know that tea-the- 
infusion is in the teapot. 
3.12.2. How can, an action support another action? 
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This is the case that corresponds to the refinement relation between 
rule schemata. 
Why is this rule, where an action supports an action, valid? 
^X pour hot water-into teapot 
I 
--------------------------------------- 
-X tips kettle, kettle over teapot- hot-water in kettle 
Suppose we already have a definition of " -X tipped the kettle " like 
this:, 
- proof tree Q became-true 
and'here-follow other conditions on, Q. All that matters for now 
is that they, require that-Q contains or entails "kettle is aslant" 
Then if I accept that "^X tippedýthe kettle". I accept Q became true, 
and so I also accept "kettle Is aslant" became true. If I further 
assume "kettle over teapot" and "hot-water in kettle" then a proof 
tree whose top rule Is rule 2 becomes true. But this becoming-true 
satisfies the definition for, "-X poured hot water into teapot". So. 
when I discharge my assumptions, I must accept the rule in question. 
One may want to insist that for X, to haved poured water into the 
teapot, then the-waterls'being in the teapot must be a consequence of 
Xlsýtipping, the kettle. One, wants to, rule out the case where, while X 
is pouring hot water from a-kettle onto, the-floor, someone else moves 
the -teapot -under, the stream. If so. one Just has to require that 
"kettle over teapot" and "hot, water in kettle" were true just before 
and- after the moment at, which the pouring into the teapot is defined 
to have, occurred. ThenAhe only change thatýcould have made rule 2 
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fire would'be a change, that made "kettle aslant" true - for instance 
the'becoMýing'true of Q. - ' 
3.13. Action and facts in general 
In'general. one can relate actions and facts like this: 
- if ^A is defined as'the becoming true of a proof tree P 
and P contains the node G 
and'G, H-'entail J 
then ^A. H entail J 
and one can relate-action'an'd actions like this: - 
if -A is defined as the becoming true of a proof tree P 
and P Contains the node"G 
aI nd'^B is defined as the becoming'true of a proof tree Q 
and ^B contains the node G at its fringe 
and the rest-, of the fringe of Q is'H, ' 
then, -A. H'entail ^B 
3.14. 'Actions defined by intentions 
This sort of definition of actions doesn't refer to the intentions of 
the 'people' who make 'the'muscle movements. But of course there'are 
action* words whose definition essentially'involves intention. 'Th& 
conirast between "X killed Y" and "X murdered Y" is an obvious 
example. The account above can't deal with such distinctions. But 
typically even such an intentionally defined action has an objective 
Component. For instance, the case of Lamb, where Lamb put an empty 
chamber of the barrel of a gun against the hammer. 'showed it to his 
friend. pointed-th6 g6n-, 'at-his friend and pulled the trigger. The gun 
Jos 
went of and killed Lamb's friend. A gun changes which chamber lies 
under the hammer before firing, not afterwards. On appeal Lamb was 
held not guilty of murder. The court accepted that X did kill Y by 
pulling the trigger of a gun, an objective action. definable in the 
way I outline above, before it went on to consider the question of 
murder. 
I shall say more about intentionally-defined action later. 
3.15. What makes a good plan? 
obviously not all and-or trees are plans, 
-and 
not all plans are good 
plans. What makes a good plan? Putting it most generally. a plan 
should be 
beneficial the SOA it brings about should be better than the one 
that would occur anyhow. This means a plan should be needed and safe. 
effective it should in fact bring about the SOA it's intended to. 
A plan should be sound. 
3.15.1. Need 
The SOA at' the top of a proof-tree will be the plan's main goal. 
Besides being valued this must also be false, or else it will be part 
of "what would happen anyhow".. This is the requirement that a plan be 
NEEDED. 
3.15.2. Safety 
The execution of a plan won't have only one effect. Some of the 
effects may be good, some bad. The net value Of a Dlan will depend on 
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the difference between these, so when making a plan one has to pay 
attention not only to the effect that you intend a plan to have. but 
all its side-effects as well, 
A side-effect is a valued consequence of a proof-tree that grows out 
of the the side of a plan. An example is the best way to explain 
this: 
go to shop get wet 
--------------- 7 ------- ------------------- 
enter. shop -, 
in street outside shop it is raining 
7 ------------------- I 
in street go to outside shop 
etc 
Here the effect actually, sought is to go to the shop. If all the 
actions, in the fringe of the, tree are performed, that Is proved. But 
so also is the. side-tree, leading to "get wet". If the tree proves the 
one, it also proves the, other, 
To determine whether the plan is actually worth performing, one would 
have to,,. balance the merits and demerits of all the effects. To do 
this properly one would have to remember that not all values are of 
, 
the same. importance. The. mer, it of getting to the shop may outweigh 
the, annoyance of getting wet., But what I am interested in doesn't 
need -this 
refinement. One can assume, that what one wants is plans 
without,., side-effects, or at least, without bad side-effects. A more 
elaborate model. that considers the net benefit of a plan. will be a 
strict extension of a model that assumes there is only one effect - 
nothing will needto be retracted. The requirement that there be no 
bad side-effects is the, requirement that a plan be SAFE. 
3.15.3. Soundness 
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Any plan should work; if one performs the actions it involves, the 
goal should follow. The most basic condition for this is that the 
preconditions in the fringe of the tree should be true (if SOAs) or 
possible (if actions)_. These two properties seem to be analogous. 
Just as one believes that some facts are true, so one can believe 
some actions are possible. I, now believe that I can clench my hand, 
though events might make me abandon this belief - for instance if I 
am holding something. Such beliefs will probably only be about 
actions that are. immediately under my control. Whether I can, say. 
travel to London is going to be a matter of proving " get to London" 
from more basic facts. The requirement that all the nodes in the 
fringe of a plan should be trusted in this way is that the plan 
should be SOUND. 
of course that isn't all that one need to be sure a plan will work. 
Proof-trees such as I am using are only partial orderings of actions, 
and if a single agent is going to execute the plan, he must convert 
this into a linear order. Doing this can be difficult. However, I am 
going to ignore this problem entirely. 
3.16. Flow of truth and value 
When drawn 
from the t, 
flowing up 
very top is 
because, they 
like this, one can 
op. and bestowing 
from the children 
supposed to be intr 
tend to produce the 
think of value flowing down the tree 
value on all its children, and truth 
to bestow truth on their parent. The 
insically valued. Subgoals are valued 
main goal. 
But imagine a man who is going to work and asks his wife to make him 
sandwiches for lunch. Obviously his desire for sandwiches comes from 
the fact that he is going to work. How does this appear in a pian 
such as I've described? Since value flows down a plan, presumably 
like this: 
at work 




is absurd... It implies that eating lunch entails being at 
work. What one wants to demonstrate is the dependence of a goal on a 
fact. -without always supposing that. satisfying the goal entails the 
fact. 
My first attempt at this was to suppose that to demonstrate a plan 
was rational one should show both 
that there were actions that would achieve one's goal (the and-or 
tree) 
- that the goal was worth getting 
If the plan was to achieve X, then there was to be separate proof of 
"good(X)". Then the plan would have two parts, like this: 
Plan Proof of Need 
eat own lunch ............... good(-eat own lunch) 
have sandwich at work 
The rule involved in the proof of need 
good( 'eat own lunch) <= at work 
would either be a primitive reflecting common observation or else a 
summary of a proof that being at work prevented one from eating any 
other sort of lunch. 
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However there -is another case of goals arising in a way that isn't 
handled by downward flow of value. ý 
Briefly, -if one has a plan that involves. say. having money, one is 
also going to- have a goal of, knowing whether one has money. If one 
doesn'l, knowi-one may well formýanother independent plan to find out. 
But how does one describe the relation between the initial goal and 
the knowledge goal? A bit of plan like: 
have money 
know whether(have money) 
is absurd. It supposes that knowing whether one has money entails 
one's having money. To avoid this, I imagined a link in plans that 
says 
SubGoal is wanted because Goal is wanted 
which, so to speak, permits the flow of value down but not the flow 
of truth up. Or more formally, it is a rule 
good(SubGoal) <= good(Goal) 




Then the problematic plans above look like: 
at work 





know whether(have money) 
The second appears. preferable. It appears to allow one to indicate 
the flow of value in both cases, while I can see no way of applying 
the first representation to cases where a need for knowledge arises. 
3.17. PlansAo prevent-and, maintain 
So far ýIlve talked about plans to achieve SOAs not currently true. 
But there are plans whose purposelis to preserve something now true 
which is, threatened, orýto prevent some bad thing which is nowltrue 
from coming about. Do these require a different sort of treatment? 
No. Preserving and preventing are the same sort of action, since 
"preserving G" is the same as "preventing -G". They can both be 
likened to- achieving, If one asks how one knows when there is 
something, that one needs to prevent. What for instance makes me feel 
I must, prevent myself being locked out when I see Tom about to close 
the front door? It is a proof-tree like this: 




I am outside door -I have doorkey tom locks door 
if being. locked outAs something I fear, the value from this fear is 
going, to ! 'flow down" the treeJust as desirability does. If I desire 
a consequence. I desire the conjunction of its antecedents. If I fear 
a the consequent l, fear the conjunction of its antecedents. I seek to 
negate what I fear.. So I seek to negate the conjunction of the 
antecedents. This happens if I negate any of then individually, which 
I do by achieving its-negation. So in this case I am going to try and 
achieve" either'"- I am outside door" or "I have doorkey" or tom 
locks door". 
If you prefer it done slightly more formally, one can catch the 
flowing down of value as 
x => YI and good(Y) entails good(X) 
and X => Y and good(-Y) entails good(-X) 
(or* X => Y and bad(Y)- entails bad(X)' 
so, if A&B&C => D 
and good(-D) 
then good( -(A &B& 0) 
Since -P => _(P & Q) 
then good(-A) & good(-B) &'good(-C) 
To summarize all this: if you have a fear that something bad will 
happen, based on a proof-tree leading to that bad, then the negation 
of any 'Of'the"nodes in the fringe of that proof-tree may be a goal. 
3.18. An alternative method: inverted plans 
The trick 'above relied on considering implications between modal 
statements about the values of SOAs. In trying to find a teleological 
explanation' of' an action Action. one is really trying to prove that 
it was worthwhile. In effect one is trying to prove "good(Action)". 
A proof-tree'that reflects this Is going to be the opposite way up to 
the ordinary'kind. ' What were low subgoals, which derived their value 
via'-every' node 'above'them are now high-up conclusions which derive 









good D good E 
----------------- 
I 





In fact, this is wrong. This suggests'that it's worth doing D as long 
as one does B. But suppose one were unable to do C. D would then be 
pointless. It is only really worth doing D if one is going to do both 
B and, C. But if we take the antecedents not individually but a set at 
a time, it looks better: 
good (D, E) 
good C good B 
II 
--------------- 
good JB. Cj 
I 
A good 
One could imagine the steps in this proof licensed by a general 
deduction rule like this: 
B <= Al & ... & An 
good(B) 
----------------- 
good((Al ... An)) 
one advantage of this approach is that it doesn't need the extra type 
of link_ that transmits value only. The bottom of the plan to take a 
sandwich lunch now looks like: 
11; 
good( have sandwich) 
good. (-eat own lunch) 
at work 
and could continue up to show 
one's having a 'sandwich. The 
telling how the truth of the 
inside the "good") depends on th 
to let truth flow down. If 
good(X) <- good(Y) 
then there was also a rule 
<= 
the goodness of actions that tend to 
catch is that now one has no way of 
non-modal part of one node (the part 
e truth of others. The obvious fix is 
and so if X is true so is Y. But this runs into almost exactly the 
same problem as before. In this case 
good( know whether (have money)) 
good(have money) 
it will make "know whether(have money)" entail "have money" 
I prefer the direct version, in which the proof trees are proofs of 
the truth of sentences. not of their value: not least because it is 
the more conventional and better understood approach. 
3.19. Conclusion 
So it Is possible to represent plans and proofs alike. There need be 
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no deep difference between reasoning about states and about events, 
as long' as one igrnores any serious representation of time. That can 
be done as long as the actions in the nian do not interfere with each 
other. '-But the picture so far is purely static. Utterances interact 
with plans and change them. They will do this in the way that new or 
lost assumptions may affect the validity of a conventional proof. The 
next chapter, exploits the'likeness of plans and proofs in describing 
how such interaction occurs. 
111,3 .,. 
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Chapter 4. The benefits of, changing plans. 
4.1. Introduction 
What does ýwhat ýI have said about planning have to do with language 
use? The answer comes in two parts. 
- It ýmay only be possible to give the right description of 
what an utterance does to its hearer by seeing how it 
affects his. plansi 
- It may only be possible to give the right description of 
why a speaker attempted to make the change that he did by 
seeing that change as-awaction in a plan of the speaker's. 
I'll start by giving some-examples of-utterances whose whole point is 
their effect on their hearer's plans. Then I'll show that making 
these changes can be seen as the speaker attempting a particular 
goal: to advise his hearer; 
After that, I shall 'say-, more about the ways a speaker can affect 
plans; then more about the sort of changes he can make; then more 
about the benefits he gets-from the changes. 
4.2. Some examples 
Let me start with some sample exchanges. They are all based on real 
examples, though they are, simplified. 
A: I'm going to wash up. 
B: I've-only Just-turned on the hot water. 
IN 
2 A: I'm going to make some tea. 
B: I used the last of it this morning. 
3 A: I'll park behind that red car. 
B: There are double yellow lines there. 
4 A: I'm going to have some of that crumble. 
B: I wanted to give it to Elaine and Richard. 
A: I'm going to the library. 
B: The electrician is coming at ten o'cl6ck. 
6 A: I'll bring you some cocoa. 
B: I don't like milk drinks. 
7 A: I'll get some sellotape when I'm out. 
B: There's some In the cupboard. 
What do these have in common? They all start with A saying something 
about his intentions. Then B says something to make him give up, or 
at least doubt the usefulness of, his intention. How does B do this? 
I suggested that there were 3 things that a plan should be: sound. 
safe. and needed. What B does is say things. which if accepted. must 
make A feel that his pl an fails one of these criteria. Let me sketch 
the deduction that A has to make to see this. 
A: I'm going to wash up. 
B I've only just turned on the hot water. 
A plans to wash up. Washing up can only be done effectively in hot 
IZO 
water. A and B know that in their flat the water is only hot if the 
I 
boiler has been turned on for twenty minutes. B says that he has 
"Just" turned it on. This presupposes it was not on before. So there 
is not hot water. A's plan has been claimed to be unsound. 
2 A: I'm going to make some tea. 
B: I used the last of it this morning. 
Making tea-the-infusion requires tea-the-leaves. B says he used the 
last of the, tea, which entails that none is left. Again, A's plan is 
unsound. 
3 A: I'll park behind that red car. 
B: There are double yellow lines there. 
What B says does, not at all affect the possibility of what A intends. 
A can still hope to park successfully. But if he does, then a fact 
that is a consequence of his action, and the fact B has stated. taken 
together, entail that A is committing a ýarking offence and may be 
fined. A and B share the assumption that fines are bad. B's remark 
points out that A's action is not safe. 
4 A: I'm going to have some of that crumble. 
B: I wanted to give it to Elaine and Richard. 
Here again B points out that A's action is unsafe. But it does so 
rather differently. It may be that what B says has no effect on A's 
e xpectation of the SOAs that will follow his eating the crumble - 
mainly that it won't be there any longer. He may have known that 
Elaine and Richard were coming. But what has changed is that B has 
put a different colour on these effects by saying that he wants to do 
something that A's action will make impossible. Things that prevent 
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the obtaining of goods are bad. B has shown A's plan is unsafe, by 
stating, not a fact, but a value. 
5 A: I'm going to the library. 
B: The electrician is coming at ten o'clock. 
Again, B states a fact that makes A's action unsafe. A can get to te 
library. But if he does, the plan of letting the electrician into the 
house in order to do some repair will be unsound. B announces the 
existence of this plan by referring to one of its preconditions. (How 
this happens I'll discuss later. ) Again, things that prevent the 
obtaining of a good are bad. B has shown A's plan is unsafe by 
stating a fact. 
A: I'll bring you some cocoa. 
B: I don't like milk drinks. 
After B's remark A's plan stays both possible and safe. But It become 
pointless. A will have the cocoa to drink, a fact at the moment 
false. But as B doesn't want it, it doesn't count as a goal. B has 
shown A's plan is needless by stating (or rather denying) a value. 
7 A: I'll get some sellotape when I'm out. 
B: There's some in the cupboard. 
A intends to bring some sellotape into the house, in order to do 
something else with it. B points out that A's goal (strictly A's 
subgoal, since he wants the sellotape in the house for a further 
purpose) is not really a goal, since it is true already. B has shown 
A's plan is needless by stating a fact. 
4.3. What good do utterances do? 
22. 
In those examples, B's intercession in A's plan is rational language 
use. But why rational? What goal does it serve? 
one can explain why people choose to act as they do by pointing to 
the expectations they have about what is going to happen. These 
expectations are sequences of SOAs that will ormay follow each other 
, 
if various, things occur or. are done. People act so as to end up in 
the SOA, they most like'. But utterances can change expectations and 
the values put', on SOAs. With new expectations people may choose 
differently', and expect to reach different SOAs. If Sp prefers these 
new SOAs, his utterance is explained. 
(This assumes that SpIs goals are all SOAs. In fact aims such as 
being seen_ to be helpful, which involve the evaluation of actions 
rather than of the results of actions may be even more important. I 
shall come back to this. ) 
From this account, I shall try to extract a description of a process 
that, Hr can apply_ to see what effect Sp intends. But though this 
shorter process will able to find that effect, it will not be able to 
explain why it is intended. 
Why cannot the longer, Justifying, process be used? Because the 
formulation that justifies the shorter process assumes that people 
are always contemplating all possible actions and events. No such 
process could explain people or animate programs. There are all sort 
of-cohtifigenci , es'thai are possible but which they never have in mind. 
if Sp shouts "Look out, the floors going to give way", Hr will move 
off it. ' One can point to the disaster that Hr acted to prevent, and 
reifY it as a certain sort of proof tree. One can explain Hr's 
changed choice in terms of his first thinking this proof tree 
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unsound, but later, sound. This odd approach is convenient when it 
comes to describing the shorter practical process. But it SUPDOses 
that Hr thought about the proof tree before Sp'S utterance, which is 
absurd. 
The long process comes in four stages. First I will give an abstract 
and impractical account of how plans are expected to change the 
world. Then how these expectations lead an agent to make his choice 
about what to do. Then how an utterance can lead an agent to change 
his choice. And finally why changing an agent's choice can be good 
for a speaker. 
4.3.1. How execution of a plan changes a state of affairs 
A plan can be seen as a complex description of an action. An action 
is a simple name for a plan. I shall mix my terms. 
I identified an action with the becoming true of a proof of a 
particular sort. For Instance, to take a joke example, one could 
identify "fry an omelette" with the coming true of a proof tree like 
this. 
omelette exists 
mixed egg in pan pan hot 
Then frying an omelette in the current SOA (call it NOW) would mean 
ihat that' SOA 'had' to 'be'updated with the "add-list" of new facts 
(omelette exists, mixed' egg in pan, pan hot). If the proof tree is 
true, "all the nodes in it must'be true, and they will all be found in 
the updated world. 
Because this formulation doesn't include a "delete list" there is a 
risk''of an update producing an inconsistent SOA. It arises this way. 




.. -., various hand movements occur 
But when I put, my shoes on, 1 start with them off. So the initial NOW 
SOA must contain "-shoes on". If I just add the nodes of the proof 
tree to the initial SOA, the new SOA will be inconsistent. 
In that case the inconsistency was between a fact in the NOW SOA and 
a node in the proof tree. One could also have a contradiction between 
a fact' in the NOW SOA and one entailed by the proof tree though not 
in It. For instance, suppose it is raining but I am Indoors. My coat 
is not wet. I go outside. The proof tree of going outside will not 
include a node "my, coat is wet" but this fact will be entailed by the 
tree. I must be careful to avoid this contradicting the initial fact 
that my coat was not wet. 
The solution is to remember that an update is not a logical 
assertion. It takes place in time. Suppose that the NOW SOA contains 
A, and that the proof tree contains -A. Just as -A springs into 
existence, A goes away. They never co-exist. (Of course in fact 
actions aren't instantaneous. I shall just ignore the problems that 
follow from this. ) 
Here is- a definition of the updating process that produces the SOA 
that obtains after an action. It can fail. If it does, then I will 
assert that the initial SOA, the rules or the action that lead to 
this cannot be a proper' description of reality. (This Is not 
tautological. What I am doing is preferring to keep my method of 
updating rather than any particular description of the world. But if 
I did decide that some set of facts and rules actually described the 
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world, and the update of some event then turned out to be undefined, 
then I would have to abandon the method). 
Suppose there is a set RULES of rules of the form C <= Al & ... & An. 
Suppose all SOAs are consistent sets of ground literals, closed with 
respect to inference using RULES. 
Let TREE be the set of all the nodes in the proof tree that become 
true when the action in question is performed. 
Let CHANGES be the set of facts entailed by TREE U NOW but not by NOW 
alone. ( "1-" and are "entails" and its negation). 
CHANGES -*(, S I NOW U-TREE-,, I-., S & NOW I-/- S) 
If, this set is Inconsistent, Ahe updating process is undefined. 
Let SAME be those facts true in NOW and left the same by the action, 
and NEXT, be-the, -SOA that, follows the update. 
SAINIE =(S. j S member NOW &: 4-(-S member CHANGES) ) 
NEXT CHANGES Uý SAME 
NEXT must,, be consistent-Af CHANGES is. Proof: 
If-xýmember NEXT, then x member CHANGES or x member SAME 
If x member CHANGES, then NOW U TREE i- x 
If x member SAME, then x member NOW, so NOW !-x, so NOW U 
TREE I- x 
SO if x member NEXT, then NOW U TREE !-x 
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So if NEXT. is inconsistent, CHANGES must be too. 
4.3.1.1., Events are like actions 
0 
This gives me a 'mechanism to define "event" that points up the 
likeness ýof events and actions. An event, such as a fuse blowing. is 
the -, becoming ýtrue of a proof tree of some particular sort. For 




fuse overloaded fuse intact 
.................. 
The way, RULES + NOW'+'EVENT-THEE (the'facts in the proof tree that 
defines the event) update NOW will be just the same as for actions. 
An action 'takes place when the simple actions at its fringe become 
true, because of what the agent chooses. An event is the same, except 
that the facts at its fringe that become true are not actions. 
Why do these fringe facts become true? I could just say that at some 
level the universe "Just does" those things, but before I couldsay 
that I would have to have broken the proof trees down to a level 
where their fringe facts were at the limits of physics. At any higher 
level, there is an answer to "Why? ". The right answer (not vital to 
me) may be like this. A SOA must be described, not just by the facts 
in it, but also by an attached date. Some rules true in the SOA will 
be sensitive to this date. Then the event, "egg timer runs through" 
would be the coming-trueof a proof tree like this. 
lower void of egg timer full 
egg timer inverted at tl time now is tl +4 mins 
12.7 
(Clearly one might use more rules to give a more detailed account of 
the event. But the principle of facts true because of the date at 
which the proof tree is considered will. stay the same). 
There are also events that appear-to need to be described by saying 
that----a proof has ceased, rather than begun, to be sound. One could 
define "the shelf on the wall collapses". occurring as the wall 
softens. as the ceasing, to-. be true of a proof tree like this. 
shelf fixed relative to wall 
I 
----------------------------------------------- 
bracket-fixed shelf fixed 
relative to wall relative to bracket ... 
screw-in plaster plaster harder than K 
Then the decay through time of the plaster could be caught by a rule 
such as 
- plaster harder than K 
--------------------------- ------------------- 
plaster set at t1 time now is t1 4ý 25 yrs 
When eventually, -., this rule fires, -the update process will 
lead to the 
deletion of "plaster harder than K" and the collapse of both the 
proof and the shelf. 
4.3.2. Expectýtions-'and ch'oice 
4.3.2.1. Expectations 
Expectations are drawn as in Expec/l. A SOA is drawn as a rectangle. 
Its name--is- written above it. What is or isn't provabie in it is 
written inside the box: - 
Time runs from left to right. The arc between SOAs can be labelled 
(2,3 
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with (the name of) a proof tree. If the preconditions of the proof 
tree 'P are trde in NOW, the arc labelled P can be labelled with a+ 
too, to''re6all that the nodes of P have to be added to the first SOA 
to get the next one. If the preconditions are not all true, the arc 
can be labelled with a 0, as in Expec/2, to recall that NOW should be 
copied without alteration to derive NEXT. 
Whether the preconditions of the proof tree of an action are true in 
a SOA is not the only determinant of whether that proof tree is 
sound. Those preconditions that are simple actions are true at the 
election of their agent. So perhaps the nodes of the tree have to be 
added 'to get the next SOA:, perhaps not. This is represented as in 
ExpLII-c/3- When the agent choose's'whether to act or not. he then knows 
what wfll follow. His choice is marked by a star on one arc, as in 
Expec'/4, where he has chosen to act. 
In Expec/3/and Expec/4, and some later diagrams, what is being 
illustrated is not any particular possible course of events, but 
classes of courses of events which have in common only the shape of 
the choices open to an agents and the choices that he actually makes 
among them. To emphasize this the boxes representing SOAs are left 
empty of any assertion about what will or won't be true in that SOA. 
4.3.2.2. Choosing what-to do 
When you contemplate the execution of a plan, you are faced with an 
option. You can turn the world as it is now into either the Done 
world, as it will be'if you act, or into the NotDone world, as it 
will be if you don't. 'Given this option, you make a choice. How? 
Assume that there is a'function Judge which takes a world. finds all 
the true good facts in it and counts their worth. finds all the true 
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bad facts in it and counts their worth and subtracts the good from 





The simple benefit of not doing it could be described as 
Judgre (NotDone) 
But contemplation of an act is not all that is involved. You have to 
perform iý, and that takes effort. Some great goods take so much 
effort that they will not be done. Imagine another function Effort 
- 1ý 
which measures the effort involves in executing a plan. The merit of 
performing a plan will be 
Judge(Done) Effort(plan) 
The merit of abstaining from it will be 
Judge(NotDone) 
(In fact you may have several options, each ; i1th its own merits. But 
the option of doing nothing is always there. ) These are the apparent 
merits of your set of options. You want the best future SOA. So you 
choose the action (or abstention) that seems to lead to it. 
Your choice is not truly between the possible SOAs may that result 
from your possible actions. You have estimated the outcome, but you 
know you may be wrong. What you really choose between are your 
possible actions. This distinction is important. 
13 J 
4.3.3. The effects of what a speaker says 
Your choice can only be made on the basis of what you know about the 
Now world, and what you value. That is what tells you whether your 
plan will run to completion and what consequences it will have. And 
you can assume that your current values will remain those that you 
judge the future worlds by. 
Unless of course they are changed. One could distinguish the changes 
that arise from what you perceive of the world from those that arise 
from what you are told about it. But when one is interested In 
teleological explanation. a better division is between those updates 
that arise from your actions (such as looking to see, or listening to 
hear), and those tha: t arise from the other's actions. These are 
typically_ verbal, but need not be - eg the display of a cut finger; 
or of a broken rope to clinch an argument about whether a particular 
method of suspension was wise. There, will be many assertions true of 
such a non-verbal "remark". Explaining it as if it were an utterance 
will require taking one of them and showing that if Hr comes to hold 
that assertion, then Sp benefits. 
II am distinguishing between facts and values. Both can be expressed, 
but they are quitedifferent and affect Hr by separate mechanisms. 
4.3.3.1. The effects of expressed fact 
I talked at some length about how remarks could have any effect on 
the hearer, at all; in particular, about how they could ever be taken 
to be an attempt to present a picture of the world. I assume here 
that this can be done. 
But presenting a picture of the world is not the same as presenting a 
picture' and claiming that the-p. lcture is veridical. I suggested that 
an-expression of fact first had to be seen as sincere. 
4.3.3.2. Opinions about fact 
When I talk about an attempt to changes someone's opinion about a 
matter of fact, I could mean any of 3 things. 
An attempt to change their belief about its truth 
Or about its provability 
Or about a particular proof of it. 
I-suggest that if one wants to talk about language use, the last is 
the', most important. 
Clearly the first is not useful. Humans do'not have access to the 
truth. (Indeed, I would argue that truth is merely a reification we 
use to explain the oddity that at t1 we hold that at tl F is true, 
but at-a later moment t2 we hold that at tl F was false. ) 
Sometimes though we, believe that we know enough about the world to 
bet' that-we won't be surprised this way. Then we can make the closed 
world''assumption; to wit that I-/- X entails I- -X. But in the real 
world we often know we are ignorant, and daren't make the bet. 
Logically, the second must be what I mean. At least. if at the end of 
an argument ... you no longer hold that P is provable, I have convinced 
you. And if you stillýhold P. 1 have not. But during the argument, I 
have to describe what I do in terms of attacks on specific proofs. 
suppose you hold that nuclear disarmament is a bad idea on the 
grounds of Soviet- agressiveness and'-, of reduced research funding. 
Suppose 'I attack you on the first of these, which I believe 1 can 
convince you over. But suppo; e at the same time I think that I don't 
have the facts- or persuasiveness to convince you of the second. I 
know I will. leave you thinking that nuclear armaments are worth 
having. Does this mean my action is irrational, since I know it can't 
succeed? . No, if you explain me as attacking a particular proof. You 
can say that tho . ugh I don't see-how-to finish your conversion, my 
attack on one proof tree of your belief at-least tends to the goal I 
seek. 
Similarly, suppose -you are refusing 
to accompany me to the cinema, 
because. you will be bored both by the tedium of the drive there, and 
by the tedium of, the film. I tell you how well reviewed the film has 
been., I hope,, that if I convince you, the tedium of the drive will not 
stop you going. But I still know that you will still find it provable 
that,,, you,. will, be bored. So my action is explicable only as a an 
attack on a single. - proof of a proposition. not on its general 
provability. 
4.3.3.3. The effects of expressed value 
The obvious, way to express a value is to say "I want X" or "I don't 
want (=fear) X". If I say this, you can doubt my sincerity, but not 
my authority., I am the expert on what I want. 
Insofar as my wants are objects of your belief, my expressJon of them 
is expression of fact just like any other. But it can be more than 
that. It may be that YOU will let you own values be influenced by 
mine. General benevolence is the obvious case. If you are benevolent 
towards me., then just your knowing that I want something will instill 
in you the desire that I get it. for no other reason than that I want 
it. General malevolence is also possible: if you know I want 
something, thereupon you want me not to have it. 
I -ý Cý 
I can also affect your values by expression of other people's values. 
I could say "Celia wants to be met at the station". Here I am not 
authoritative in the way that I am about my own values, but 
nevertheless you may accept my authority an other grounds - for 
instance, that I have just spoken to her on the phone. If you believe 
me, and, if you are benevolent to her, you will adopt her reported 
value as your own and go and meet her. 
Adoption of other people's values does not have to be general. It can 
be true for just some sorts of goal. For instance, parents who 
practice demand feeding adopt their child's goals if they are that it 
be fed, but not if they are that it play with a power point. It is 
not the case that that they do it in order that the child will not 
starve. Feeding it at any time would do that. Feeding it when it 
wants is feeding it because it wants. 
4.3.3.4. Accepting belief and accepting value are alike 
There is a likeness between the way a hearer may infer what a speaker 
believes, and what a speaker values. In the case of belief 
Hr observes that: Sp says Sp believes X 
so if Hr believes Sp is sincere, Hr infers: Sp believes X 
and if Hr believes Sp is authoritative, then: Hr believes X 
similarly, in the case of value 
Hr observes that: Sp says SP wants X 
so if Hr believes Sp is sincere, Hr infers: Sp wants X 
and if Hr is cooperative towards So, then: Hr wants X 
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4.3.4. How Sp benefits 
Suppose Sp's utterance does change Hr's choice about his intended 
action, - 
Why is this a good thing for Sp? SpIs action can only be 
explained, by benefits he expects to receive. 
His benefit is not that'he-has changed Hr's choice. Mere deceit might 
do that. Nor that he has changed it, as he thinks, for the better, so 
that Hr is working with a better picture of the world and is 
therefore more 
_likely-, 
to succeed in what he attempts. If that were 
so, it would be impossible to explain why Sp should ever attempt to 
deceive Hr. so that Hr acted in a way that Sp thought more likely to 
fail. 
, 
ýo'-'-What-,. matters is that when Hr makes a choice. he choose a course 
of action. " Later he will execute it in the real world, which he and 
Sp share. What Sp expects as the result of what Hr does depends on 
how Sp thinks the worldýreally is. How much Sp likes what he expects 
depends on what he really wants. What Sp expects to follow HrIs 
action need not be what Hr expects. 
.I. - : -_., 
To see SpIs benefit, look at the world after the choice Hr would have 
made if Sp-hadn't spoken, then at the one that follows the choice Hr 
will now make, and see why the latter is better for Sp. 
Initially Hr's choice might be as in Alts/1. Then Sp speaks. Hr's 
beliefs- and values are changed. He re-evaluates what he is going to 
do. His choice' is-now as in Alts/2. But now look at that from SpIs 
point of view. SpIs action is his utterance. The worlds that result 
from his utterance differ only in what Hr thinks, but different they 
are. SpIs options are as in Alts/3. SpIs choice is governed not by 

















after Hr in his turn acts. 
Could one represent this with an ordinary game-tree, such as Alts/4? 
No. The differences are that 
- There may be no description of the world at the nodes of the tree 
that Hr and Sp agree about. If they expect different results, there 
may.. be n, o,, tree that shows both their actions as rational. 
- In a game explained by a game tree, one player moves and waits to 
see what the other will do. But after Sp has spoken. he does not see 
himself as waiting to find out what Hr will do. He believes he has 
forced -, Hr's choice. Hr's reasons for acting are part of a different 
tree. 
Finding Sp's benefit has two twiddles to it. One is deciding in which 
SOAs to look-for the benefit. The other is that Sp need not be purely 
selfish. 
4.3.4.1. Three,. moments to benefit 
once Sp has spoken, we can look forward various distances into the 
future'-'to see how he benefits. 
4.3.4.1. 'l. HrIs belief's and values may change 
I 
1n abstract argument about such things as the good. the beautiful and 
the true, I may seek to persuade you, not so that you will act 
differently, but just in order that you believe differently. To see 
the benefit to me in this-. - we need look no further into the future 
than Is shown in Alts/5. Any benefit to me will accrue merely because 
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those that you have in NotSaid. 
4.3.4.1.2. Hr's actions may change 
As a result of what, you come to hold, your chosen action may change. 
If it -does, the worlds I expect after you have executed your choice 
will be different. one needs to look as far ahead as is shown in 
Alts/6. The difference between Donel and Done2 may be my final goal. 
It will be if for instance I have advised you that the shops are shut 
so that you give up your abortive plan to go shopping; or if I have 
asked you to turn down the heating because I am too hot, and you do. 
4.3,4.1.3. SpIs opportunities may change 
And lastly, if-you act differently, my opportunities for action may 
change. once you., have acted, you leave the world in a state where my 
actions are made possible or easier. One must look ahead to the 
difference between Done3 and Done4 in Alts/7 to see my benefit. This 
arises when for instance I ask you to lend me your bicycle. You 
choose to do so; and I. Can then make my journey more easily. 
4.3.4 2.1 Other 
- 
peoples values affect SpIs 
What counts as Sp-'s benefit need not be a matter of pure self- 
interest. There are three basic ways that Hr's values can be related 
to 
- Sp can_, be benevolent to Hr. If Hr wants X, Sp wants X. 
7 sp, canbe malevolent to Hr. If Hr wants X, Sp wants -X. 14 
-. sp,, can be, indifferent to Hr. Hr's wants do not affect Sp's- 
The criterion that makes Sp's utterance rational Is that it leads to 
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a better SOA for Sp. But what exactly this is may depend on Hr. And 
similarly, Sp may cost Hr's effort as his own. When Sp advises Hr, he 
is doing exactly that. 
4.4. A simpler way of choosing what to do. 
I've presented a picture of how one chooses what to do which involves 
I 
computing a picture I of the whole world as it will be after the action 
and contrasting it with another picture of the entire world as it 
will be if the action doesnýi-take place. This may be theoretically 
elegant, but as a practical way of making choices it must be a dead 
loss. Any process that involves transitive closures under- inference 
will be. 
A more reasonable process would start with the action, and look out 
to see__-what. 
_,,, 
effects it does or doesn't have, regardless of how the 
rest of, the world is. An action should be chosen if and only if its 
effects are on the whole beneficial. Changing a person's choice about 
I 
his a p*lan li a matter of changing his opinion about what its effects 
are and what their merit is. 
But what is an effect? And what is an effect an effect of? Consider 
Sns/1. In i, X is provable after the chosen, starred, course of 
action is executed. Otherwise it isn't provable. One could call X the 
effect of the choice, since it occurs if one does what one has chosen 
to, but not otherwise. 
In ii', X occurs after some action P is done. but not before. Perhaps 
X is the. effect of the action P. Though it need not be. X may happen 
anyway, as in iii. 
The effect that matters is the effect of choice. I say this because 
:ý,, ,. ý, 0', " T"? 4 I" 
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If one's expectation are as in III, where there are effects of action 
but not of choice, one's anticipation, of X is not going to affect 
one's choice. How could it? It is the same whatever one's choice. 
Something else, or-an'arbitrary choice, must sway one. 
But given' that one is contemplating a known plan, it is much easier 
to find out about the effect of that action. And indeed this will 
ofjiýý___be 1- as good as knowing the effect of choice. The reason Is that, 
typically, if nothing is done-the world stays the same. Sns/2 shows a 
choice between doing P or doing nothing. If one does nothing, and if 
one can assume that nothing is going to happen spontaneously. then 
the worlds Now and NotDone are the same. So contrast of Now and Done 
is equivalent to contrast of Done and NotDone. By looking for the 
effects of action one finds the effect of choice. What follows Is 
about how this, -can 
be done. 
So what are the effects of an action? Or more precisely, what are the 
effects that matter to your choice? For V to be an effect that 
matters, it seems that it, must be 
-, provable after you act 
- not provable before you act 
- valued; either good or bad, not indifferent 
If these are,, true, and the assumption of no change holds. then you 
have the expectations shown in Sns/3. If V is better (or worse) than 
its absence, then Done should be preferred (or not preferred) to 
NotDone. one has derived the effects of a choice from the effects of 
an action. 
Why are the effects of action easier to find than the effects of 



















To find its effects one can search forward from those facts that must 
be true if that action is performed, (the nodes of the tree) and see 
if one can construct a proof to a valued fact (V, say). By searching 
forward from a fact, J say, I mean 
looking for a rule C <- J& LI & ... & Ln, 
if so, seeing whether one can prove Ll,..., Ln, 
and if so, deducing, and searching forward from, C. 
What one is doing is finding a member of the set of facts CHANGES, so 
those facts provable in NOW, the initial SOA, are also available to 








where W and X are provable in NOW. If it then turns out that it is 
impossible to prove V in the SOA before one acts, then V is an effect 
of the act. 
This can be drawn as Sns/4, using the conventions described in the 
appendix. The overlap represents the occurrence of D in both of the 
plan and the effect proof trees. The triangle below D is the sub- 
proof that the proof trees share. 




guarantee that the valued facts one can find are effects. They may 
also be provable in NOW alone. But if one does not find them by 
searching forward from'.., the -action, then they definitely are not 
effects. Either they are not, -provable after the action, or they are, 
but were provable in NOW as well. 
Such search could, be continued indefinitely, but must in practice be 
limited. But, this is a separate matter to deciding what the search is 
for. 
I make a distinction between the necessary and the accidental (or 
side) effects of an action. Necessary effects are those that are 
entailed just by the facts in the proof tree of the action. For 
instance, when I buy something, this has the necessary effect of my 
having less money afterwards. This happens whatever the initial state 
is in which I do the buying. But some effects only arise because of 
the circumstances in which 1 do them. I will get wet when I go out 
only if it is raining, not whenever I go out. 
The goal for which a plan was made should be a necessary effect of 
the plan. A plan to get eg "have milk" should be co-extensive with 
the proof of its good effect "have milk". 
4.4.1. Undermining pr, oof trees 
Actions can add valued facts to a future SOA. They can also take them 
away. Suppose the water in the kettle is boiling because it is on the 
hob. This proof tree is sound. 
water in kettle is boiling 
water in kettle kettle on hob hob above 100C 
Then the action of taking the kettle off the hob, which might have a 
llý s 
proof tree*like, this 





is going to disrupt the first proof tree. Before my action "water in 
kettle is boling" was provable; after my action, it is not. That 
should count as an effect of my action. But according to the criteria 
above, it doesn't. Those criteria require something to go from being 
unprovable to being provable. Nevertheless, sentences ceasing to be 
provable also matter for making a choice. The SOA diagram of what 
will happen is Under/l. If the no-change assumption holds then the 
change that the act_ion brings about is an effect of the choice, as in 
Under/2. 
In the shorter process, 1 must eschew comparison of SOAs, and Instead 
look at how proof trees interact. Undermining can be handled in this 
way too. Rather than the action supporting another proof, one of the 
action's nodes' -'(here the topmost) contradicts one of the 
preconditions of the proof tree that is being undermined. I draw this 
relation as Under/3. The square marks the contradiction, such as 
.......... I 
---------------------------- 
-kettle on hob ****** kettle on hob I 
.......... 
No overlap between the proofs can occur. They are contradictory. 
If an action makes a proof sound, the merit of the plan is increased 
or decreased by the merit of the consequence of the proof. But if it 
undermines a proof, the merit is changed by the opposite of the merit 
of the consequence. Undermining bad is good and preventing good is 
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good effect, proved by proof P, then NotPrevented is better than 
I 
Prevented, and so choosing to act is unwise. And conversely if E is a 
bad effect. 
4.4.2. Effects on future actions 
Consider-'ihe example 4 above. 
4- A: -'I'm going to have some-'o-f"ihat crumble. 
B: I wanted to give it to Elaine and Richard. 
Clearly what one wants to say about this is that the result of A's 
eating the crumble is that it will undermine. B's plan to give it to 
Elaine and Richard. There will be no crumble to give. But the trouble 
about seeing the result of A's action is that the good A seeks, that 
Elaine-and Richard have 'crumble, is provable neither before A's 
action. nor afterwards. So how can their not having it be a result of 
what. A has done? 
The SOA diagram explains it. This is an occasion when one has to look 
further into the future, to after when B has acted. See Prev/6. i 
shows no effect. ii does. As an*interaction of proofs, this can be 
drawn as Prev/7. The node in contention will be something like 
locrumble exists". 
Defining the results of actions by looking at proof trees sound only 
In the future produces no novelty. 
4.5. Changing the apparent merits of a plan 
If you are going to perform an action, it must be possible and 
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so that when the actions in it are performed. it will run to 
completion. It is worthwhile if its good results outweigh its bad 
results and the effort involved. (I use "result" to be more general 
than "effect". and to include what an act prevents. ) I do not want to 
get involved in weighing good results against bad. so I shall 
simplify, and say an action must be needed and safe. An action is 
"needed" jf it has good results. An action is "safe" if It does not 
have bad effects. 
o 
If an utterance does change your estimate of the action's merits, it 
must do so because it persuades you differently about either its 
soundness, or its worth. An action's soundness is just a matter of 
fact. It worth is more complex. The utterance must persuade you 
-"either that it has a result that you thought it didn't. 
or else"ihat it 'doesnltý'have a result that yo Iu thought it did. 
The results that matter are that a valued fact V gets added to a SOA 
or id eleted fr om it. If this happens it must be because a proof tree P 
which has the conseque nce V goes from sound to unsound or vice versa. 
If V is wanted, these are'the'transitions that count as a result. 
A fa ct may b6-added 
P sound after P sound after 
-P sound before P sound before 
V wanted V wanted 
P sound after P sound after 
-P sound before P sound before 
V wanted V wanted 
P sound after P sound after 
-P sound before P sound before -V wanted V wanted 
A fact may be deleted 
-P sound after 
P sound before 
V wanted 
-p sound after 
p sound before 
V wanted 
-p sound after 
IP sound before- V wanted 
p sound after 
p sound before 
V wanted 
p sound after 
p sound before 
V wanted 
p sound after 
p sound before 
V wanted 
Changes in your estimate of a result such as 
P sound after P sound after 
P sound before P sound before 
V wanted V wanted 
are not important, because neither before nor after the change is Va 
result. 
If "V , feared! Is. equivalent to "-V, wanted", these tables cover bad 
results-too. 
4.6. Unexpressed plans 
So, far I've talked about how utterances can attack or support plans 
that have beenýannounced or suggested by their agent. But there are 
some utterances whose point you can only see if you are prepared to 
see them as affecting unannounced plans. For example 
SP: Vve bought some mackerel 
points out thatýa plan like this 
, 
have cooked mackerel 
I 
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.. various cooking actions 
have mackerel 
is, surprisingly, sound. Sp presupposes that eating mackerel is good 
ana'ýot just at the minute possible. so that his utterance points out 
novel good effect. Similarly 
Sp: The bathroom shelf is about to collapse 
suggests that a plan to buy screws and fix it Is, surprisingly, 
needed. 
One way of explaining the point of such remarks would be this. 
Initially Hr expects the world to carry on just as it is. Suddenly, 
(by some undescribed process), he realizes both that he has options. 
and'that-one'choice''is'better than the other. His expectations change 
from Unsaid/ii, to ii. But doesn't this deny my claim that one chooses 
an-action because of one's changed estimate of its effects? For where 
in Unsaid/li is the action "cook mackerel" that Hr starts by choosing 
not to do? Nowhere. How can a remark change Hr's estimate of an 
action he doesn't see as an option? 
This is a good processing point, but a poor logical one. The logical 
come-back is that in fact one is always contemplating all possible 
actions; or, even if one isn't thinking about them, they are laid out 
before one in some Platonic sense, visible if one cared to look. Then 
HrIs real expectations are as in Unsaid/2. Before Sp speaks, they are 
as in i. No advantage comes from cooking the mackerel. But after Sp 
speaks, advantage is possible, and Hr should choose accordingly. 
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When Sp speaks, Hr is not in fact contemplating. any action, and he 
can't search forward from it. If he wants to find what action Sp is 
trying to-affect. he is going to have to guess it merely from what Sp 
said. He-, may though be helped by reflecting that it is more likely 
that Sp iS'irying to persuade him to an action he has not chosen than 
poihtlessly't6 dissuade him-from'one-he has not chosen. 
4.7. A wrong approach to finding Sp's benefit. 
I 'did at one time try a different framework for demonstrating SpIs 
benefit from speaking, which 1 ended by rejecting. The 
--central' notion was to construct a plan that could be attributed to 
Sp, which included his utterance as a sub-action and which had some 
desired fact about the world as the goal. All other actions, 
especially the utterance, would be explained as rational because they 
tended to produce that goal. What would be distinctive about the plan 
would be that it would contain inferences which allowed predicates 
over plans, as well as over things in the material world. For 
instance, the plan could involve rules that allowed the inference of 
facts about the world from facts about the execution of plans to 
alter the world, and of facts about knowledge about plans from facts 
about knowledge of the world. 
For example, suppose you were planning to buy tintacks. Buying 
something requires knowing where they are sold. If you do not know 
this, I can help you by telling you that they are sold at Blogg's. I 
might explain my saying this as part of a plan of mine like the one 
in Failnote/1. An example of a rule that entails facts about plans 
from facts about knowledge of the world would be the rule that allows 
step A. It would be an instance of a rule schema such as 
A thinks plan P-is effective if 
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Failnote/I 
you have tintacks 
you execute plan P 
you think P sound 
-, 
you want you think P achieves 
(you have tintacks) (you have tintacks) 
A 
you think and various other facts 
(Bloggs sells tintacks) that P relies on ... 
I tell you 
(Bloggs sells'tintacks) 
P has preconditions CI ... Cn & 
A believes C1 & ... & Cn . 
The merit, of this approach is that it fits my intuitions about what I 
would say if asked to explain why I had told you that Bloggs sold 
tintacksi at least-when handling-utterances that help someone get a 
single good thing. But there are two problems with it. 
4.7.1. It can't see that bad is better than worse 
It won't explain my telling you something that makes you give up a 
plan that you thought was a good one. Suppose you are going to buy 
milk. -, I,,, tell you- that, the shops are shut. You no longer think the 
plan- is effective. and so you. give up the plan. Clearly there is a 
benefit. - You. do not waste effort. But that is not the right sort of 
fact to be the goal of a plan like Failnote/1. The goal has to be a 
desirable fact about the world. But what can that be? That you do not 
have milk? That is hardly a benefit, and anyhow could hardly be the 
goal of a plan. It is true already. 
4.7.2ý It can't see that good is worse than better 
Suppose you and I are normally avaricious persons. There are two sums 
of money, $10 and $1000. We will each get j ust one of them. You do 
not know it, but there are two course of action open to you, one to 
get each of the sums of money. Disingenuously I tell you things that 
lead to you to. choose, the course of action that leads to you getting 
the $10 while I get the $1000. It will be possible to give an 
explanation of what I said in terms of my ensuring that you get $10. 
This is wrong. The explanation should be in terms of me ensuring that 
you don't. get the $1000. But since your having $10 is an absolute 
good, my action is explained. 
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In -both of these, what is missing is an ability to contrast one 
outcome with another. 'In the first, a bad state (not having milk) is 
still better than the alternative (not having milk and having gone to 
to, shop-to get it). In the second, a good state (having $10) is still 
worse than a the alternative (having $1000). 
Any method that seeks, to explain-an action by saying that it leads to 
a good state, rather'than'the best state, will have these problems. 
4.8. The arguments for'and against'an action 
To summarize: there-are four sorts of argument for or against an 
action'. They all turn-on what happens to some valued fact V. Here is 
a-table that shows how the se cases affect the merit of the action. 
V V before action V after action Merit of action 
good unprovable provable good 
bad unprovable provable bad 
good provable unprovable bad 
bad provable unprovable good 
But finding which facts are provable and which are unprovable in a 
SOA is in general too difficult. It is better to look at particular 
proofs of V, and replace the notion of "provable" with that of 
"having a sound proof". If P is a proof of V, the table looks like 
v P before, action P after action Merit of action 
good unsound sound good 
bad unsound sound bad 
good sound unsound bad 
bad sound unsound good 
I 
I (o (ý 
Attempts to change one's estimate of the merits of an action are 
attempts to show that some proof P of some fact V in fact do or in 
fact don't fit one of these patterns. 
4.9. Conclusion 
Plans may or may not seem to their planner to be worth doing. If a 
speaker gives the planner new information. it may change the 
planner's estimate of the worth of the plan. This change in estimate 
may itself be beneficial to the speaker: 
- either-because a friend is provided with a new plan whose execution 
will please the friend more than the old plan's execution would have 
- or because the execution of the changed plan will please the 
speaker morq than execution of the unchanged plan would have, either 
because of its immediate effects, or because it facilitates another 
of the speaker's plans. 
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Chapter 5. 'Indirect'Communication - 
Int; oductlon 
Consider, these examples. '-- 
Do you like Florence? 
B: We've gone there three times. 
A: Have you emptied, the bins? 
B: I'm just about to. 
-A- Is junction 30 open? 
B: I came through it on the'way here. 
What 'happened in: them? B has given an answer to the question that A 
asked. He has done it, not explicitly, but by saying something about 
his''plans', from 'which the answer follows. In this chapter I want to 
suggest' how this information is derived, and that that information 
can be used in the same way as information from an explicit 
'utterance. ' 
In outline: 'if -B 'knows A has a plan, then B must think that A has 
certain beliefs and-values. He must think that A wants the effects of 
the plan, believes that the plan is sound, and so forth. If the plans 
that' B- thinks that A has have changed, then the beliefs and goals 
thaV, B must believe A has must have changed too. If B takes A to be 
authoritative-on the subjects of these beliefs, B's beliefs will 
change-too. NOW'A"can, exploit this. He can change the plans that he 
is known to have, intending that this shall change B's beliefs. The 
change produced will-then act just as a change produced by utterance 
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would- have. This change is indirect communication. The ultimate goal 
of the utterance will be an effect* of that communication. 
Here are some examples of bits of dialogue. They are collected 
because in them one of the speakers is expressing a belief or want, 
without however overtly saying what it is he wants or believes. 
Expressions of, fact 
A,: 
'I 
I-11 wear my new Jersey. 
. 
., B; Ilm, 
just going, to put, the sleeves in. 
B is saying "... and f would only put them in if they weren't already 
there. So you can't use your Jersey". 
A: I want to use the car. 
B:,,. I was going to take it to the garage. 
Again, -B. is, saying "... and I would only do that if it wasn't running 
properly. So 
Expressions of wants 
,,, A:, 
Pass,, me the sponge. 
B:, I'll wipe the table. 
A,, Is saying "I will only want the sponge if I am going to wipe the 
table. So I want the table wiped. Will you do it? ". B agrees. If you 
find this counter-intuitive, try reading A's remark in an impatient 
tone. Such exchanges really occur. 
; A: 
My cheque book isnt where I thought it was. 
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It's by-the cooker. 
A is saying "... and not knowing where it is affects my plan. It 
would do this if my plan depended on knowing where it was. So I want 
to know where it is". 
A: The 5: 14 bus has already gone. 
B: 'I can give you a lift. - 
A is saying and my plan relied on catching it. Since my plan has 
collapsed, its-ultimate goal of going somewhere is still outstanding. 
Can you help? " 
The two main questions are: 
0 
What facts does a person having and changing a plan entail? 
How are the plans that a person is known to have changed? 
5.2. -What does a plan entail? 
5.2.1. Facts about beliefs entailed-by a plan 
I have claimed a plan can be seen as a proof tree proving a goal. If 
a person adopts a proof tree as a plan he must believe it will have a 
good effect and will, lack bad effects. A fact is an effect of a set 
of actions if it occurs in no sound proof tree which includes none of 
the actions, but occurs in a sound proof tree which does include 
them. The-proof tree for the goal of the plan'is the plan itself. 
The proof tree can be divided into those nodes that are expected to 
be true after execution, and those that are beleived to be true 
before. Those nodes expected to be true efter execution are those 
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that lie above any action. Eg in 
----- -------- ----- 
P, Q, -R are false now and true later; U. V, S, -T are true now. So the 
holder of a plan will believe that: 
The nodes at its fringe that are facts are true, and those 
that are actions are possible; otherwise his actions 
wouldn't have their intended effect. 
The- nodes above its fringe, that rely on nodes that are 
actions, must be false; Otherwise they would not be effects 
of"'the ''plan', and'would have been assumed, instead of being 
: 'planned to. - 
Analogously, he must believe that any proof tree that might be an 
effect of his, plan and that would then prove some feared fact does 
not satisfy both those conditions. Either some of the nodes at the 
fringe of the tree are false, or the nodes above the actions in the 
proof tree are true anyhow. In an example such as 
A: Is this water safe to drink? 
B: I drink it. 
what agitates A is -that he doesn't know whether the water is 
contaminated, and so he doesn't know whether a certain bad side- 
effect will in fact occur. 
jq 
-A thirsty A ill 
Ii 
------------------------------ -------------------------------- 
A has water A drink water water contaminated 
When B says he drinks it, it must mean he believes that his plan to 
drink it has no bad effect. This can only be true if the water is not 
contaminated. So he indirectly communicates that he believes it isn't 
contaminated, and so answers A's question. 
In this example, the fact that is indirectly denied is obvious. But 












Now a friend tells him that his plan is in fact safe. A can go ahead. 
He can-, infer. -that. -(J & K).. But he does not know which is false. He 
needs some other test. It may be that he knows that his friend thinks 
i is true, so it must be K that is false. But if he can't reason like 
that. then. he, may be. able to say that there is only one fact whose 
falsity would, have,, an effect on his own plan. So if he believes his 
friend_ is trying 
-. 
to- affect his plan, it must be that fact that hs 
intends to, deny. 
That a. person. abstains from an action may also be informative. If I 
say that I won't do such and such, you may conclude that it is 
because that- action wouldn't have a good effect or would have a bad 
one. II 
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Here is an example which Illustrates both those points: an abstention 
is info , imative, 'even though "the hearer has to make a choice about 
which of several facts that might have been denied actually has been. 
A: I'm going to try and see the RSC Macbeth. 
B: I didn't even try to get tickets. 
Presumably B's plan is 
B sees RSC Macbeth 
1, 
,. -1 1. . - ------------------------------------------ 
B has_ticket B goes to theatre 
------- 7-77-7 --------- ------------------------------------- 
B gives money to theatre ticket is for sale B has money 
for ticket 
Several things could go wrong with this plan. But the only one of 
them that. could also affect, A's plan, which is presumaby very 
similar, is, that, _. 
there might be no tickets for sale. The main good 
effect of B's plan will be unsound. And that is presumably what B is 
trying, to convey. 
5,2.2. Facts about values entailed by a plan 
A plan entails facts about its holder's goals as well as about his 
beliefs. Suppose we know a plan of his that he takes to be sound. but 
which . 
he hasn't yet started to execute. Given the proof tree of a 
good effe, ct, " 
he will fear anything that makes it unsound. If it is 
unsound, he will want'anything that makes it sound. Analogously with 
a bad effect: he will want anything that makes it unsound, and fear 
anything that makes it sound. 
in fact he may desire facts that do less than turn a good effect from 
being unsound into being completely sound. 
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Suppose a good effect is already sound. Suppose some of the 
facts that the planner thought he had to achieve by himself 
become true without effort on his part; perhaps they are 
done by someone else. The effect is still sound, but it is 
better for the planner. 
Suppose a good effect is unsound. Suppose sume of the facts 
that the planner hasn't achieved become true. But the 
planner may think he can achieve the remaining facts in the 
fringe, or thinks that they may become true. perhaps by the 
action of someone else. The plan is still unsound, but it is 
better for the planner. 
C 
It should also be possible to infer that an agent wants the topmost 
fact that is brought about by his plan. But there is a catch here. 
Suppose you act so as to achieve something that I find it hard to 
believe that you might have as an ultimate goal. I may in fact know 
all your plan. But if I don't know that it's all your plan. I may be 
more likely to Infer that it is part of a plan to some more credible 
goal, rather than that I am wrong about your goals. I remember a 
"Peanuts" cartoon in which Lucy has this problem. 
Lucy sees Schroeder with a record. 
Lucy: What are you going to do with it? 
Schroeder: Listen to it. 
Lucy: Are you going to sing, Along wit it? Or dance to it? 
Schroeder: No. I'm Just going to listen to it. 
Lu, ýy: I never heard anything so dumb. 
5.2.3. How does someone change the plans that he is known to have 
M 
The change in a person's plans that matters in indirect communication 
is not howl his plans alter. but how what is known of his plans 
alters. Altering a known plan (whether it is made better or worse or 
just different) and letting it be known that one has a plan where 
none was known before are for these purposes the same. 
How can he alter what is known of his plans by what he says? It seems 
there are three ways. I shall later try to show how part of this 
range, can be seen as special cases of a more general process. 
5.2.3.1. Description of his plan 
The planner can just announce what he is doing. fie says "I am going 
to the shops" or "I shall buy the vegetables tomorrow". 
5.2.3.2. Showing that he has grounds for making a plan 








and if he 
PI The 
tion, comes 
a plan P (perhaps the null plan). He says 
wants or believes. If he really wants or 
is a rational planner, then he must have a 
contrast-between-P and P' is where the 
from. This Indirect information leads to a 
5.2.3.3. Inviting the recognition of the plan that he has 
Or,,,, 
'he, 
is thought to have a plan P (perhaps the null plan). He says 
something that is likely to get a response from B. This response will 
only help, A if his. plan is in fact in some way different from how B 
initially thought it was - if it is PI. The contrast between P and P' 
is where the indirect,,, information comes from. This indirect 
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information leads, to a, benefitlor Sp. 
Here are'some examples where B guesses what A's plan is and responds 
appropriately, 
A: Do, you, mind if I turn the fire off? 
B: It's on a, time clocký. 
A: Have you been to the bank recently? 
B: ýYes. How-much, would you like? 
But, this scheme does not--handle examples like this one. 
A andýB-are both about-toýgo home'at the end-of the day. 
. A:. The 5: 14 bus has gone. 
B: Can I give you a lift? 
A has', said something that can count as an indirect request. At any 
rate, he has indicated that he has an unsound plan. He wants to get 
home, by catching'the-bus; but a precondition of that plan has failed. 
So , he wants--to, get, home some other way: perhapsýby getting a lift 
from B. 
But how can he expect B to see this? The obvious thing to say is that 
this exchange fitsý, scheme 2.. He has a plan. He discovers new facts. 
So -his-plan is changed. The contrast of his former and latter plans 
reveals some -of his. goals to Hr. The objection is that initially B 
did -not know that A. had a planý B has to hypothesize A's plan (to go 
home by bus) before he can see the effect on it of A's remark. 
When -what -A says is a question, A can expect B,. to, hypothesize A's 
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plan by. straight-forward plan. recognition. A's question has an 
effect. What goal could that question serve? One that the answer 
could affect. What plans could it affect? one that relied on the 
answert for instance ... And hence A's plan has been recognized. But 
the normal-response to A's remark is not quite a reasonable goal. But 
if B looks for indirect communication derived from contrast of his 
former: and current picture of A's plan, he can see SpIs goal. 
When what A says is a statement, the straight-forward plan 
recbgnit'ion-6anIt'work'. , A's remark is not an actual part of some plan 
of his. So A can't expect B to find his plan, and then, after having 
done that, to derive'indirect information from a contrast. A has to 
expect, that B is going to look for indirect information in its own 
right, and that he will hypothesize plans just because they have the 
property of being affected by what Sp says. But is he licensed to 
expect'-th'is? 
I could propose that, when people listen, they do expect to have to 
look for indirect information. This would be a new principle 
governing what they do. But I would rather'suggest that there was one 
scheme for looking for the benefit of SpIs remarks of which this was 
a special case. This scheme is known to be practised by all hearers, 
so all speakers can rely on their hearers getting the conclusions 
that drop out of it. 
What a speaker expects his hearer to do with his remarks to see the 
point of them can be described with a flow-chart. Take this flow- 
chart not as a, claim about the order. of events but the conditions on 
saying that something is the intended benefit of an utterance. I 
The simplest cases of benefit are (1) when Sp affects Hr's plan to 
SpIs benefit, or (2) when Sp asks a question, and Hr's response to it 
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II 
will affect SpIs plan to Sp's benefit. 
yes 
SPIS utt --------------------------- > change benefits Sp? 
affects Hr's plan? .I no I yes 
no v 





Hr's response to SpIs utt ----------- > change benefits Sp? 
affects SpIs plan ?I 
no I yes 
no v 
-------------------------------- goal found 
v 
fail 
But Hr. may have, to hypothesize SpIs plan before he can see the 
benefit of his answer-So-I extend (2) to give, (3). 
(3) ý. N, ý ., - 
yes 
Hr's response to SPIS'Utt ------------ >, change benefits Sp? 
affects SpIs plan ?I 
no I yes 
no V 
7 ------------------ goal found 
V 
Hr's response to SpIs utt yes 
affects SpIs hypothesized plan? ------ > change benefits Sp? 
III 





And last of all I want to allow for the case when the indirect 





Hr's response to SpIs utt ----------- > change benefits Sp? 






Hr's response to SpIs utt yes 
affects SpIs, hypothesized plan? ------ > change benefits Sp? 




indirect info emerges from ----------- > change benefits Sp? 
contrast of SpIs initial 
and SpIs hypothesized plan, 
and affects Hr's plan? no yes 
no v 
-------------------------------- goal found 
v 
fail 
Now making alstatement and asking a question are in this way alike. 
There 4s- a person who precipitates'an information transfer. This is 
always-the -speaker, whether he, is stating or asking. And there is a 
person'- whose plan,, is , affected by that information. I'll call him 
"Aff! ',. If the speaker. --made, a-'statement. Aff is the, Hr (at first 
glance, anyhow). If he asked a question, Aff is the Sp. 
Now I can, -collapse-(l)--and (2), into one chart, (I'). 
(1 
yes 
SPIS uttý --------------------------- > change benefits Sp? 
affects Aff's plan ?I 
no yes 
no v 
-------------------------------- goal found 
v 
fail 
What happens If- I relabel the roles in (4) in the-same way? After 




SPIS utt"ý ---------------------------- > change benefits Sp? 
affects Aff's plan i 
no yes 
no v 
-------------------------------- goal found 
v 
SPIS utt yes 
affects Aff's hypothesized plan? ----- > change benefits Sp? 





indirect info emerges from ----------- > change benefits Sp? 
contrast of Aff's initial I 
and Aff's hypothesized plan, 1 
and affects, Hr's plan?, no I yes 
no v 
-------------------------------- goal found 
v 
fail 
Now I claim that this is the scheme that all Hr's apply to find the 
goal of SpIs, utterance. (1), (2), (3), (4), are all special cases of 
it, perhaps with some parts omitted, perhaps with a particular choice 
made between Sp and Hr for the-role of*Aff. That choice has to be 
compatible withýthe choice about, whether Sp madea statement or-asked 
a question. 1, '. ý' I
But It want to say-that Sp may-be attempting to, alter a plan of his 
own-that he'expects Hr to hypothesize. That is the extension I have 
to-make to cover-eg, the missed, bus example. ýSo I have to allow Aff to 
be either, Sp or-Hr, -regardlessýof whether Sp--was stating or asking. 
Another justification"for-making the. important distinction that 
between Sp and Aff, rather than that between Sp and Hr is that Sp may 
be able to achieve indirecticommunication by saying things that alter 
HrIs estimate, not of-Sp's plans, but of some third party's plans. Eg 
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A: Have we got the salad? 
'B: Liz is just bringing It. 
And"many charity advertisements work, similarly. "X is without clean 
water" As the pointing out of the falsity of a'thing good for X. The 
advertiser-'hopes his reader is altruistic towards X. and will act to 
serve the'revealed goal. The structure of this'intention is just like 
the, intention of'-. 'the'husband (with a certain sort of marriage) who 
says "I haven't got a clean shirt"., 
one question I can't answer is, how is Hr to hypothesize the right 
plan? In outline, ý the-heuristic must-be, not: is this a plan to a 
credible goal*thatýcould be advanced by the Information transfer that 
SpIs-remark has started?. but: is this a"plan to a credible goal that 
bould, be affected either way by that transfer? - 
5.3., Conclusion-, 
If a planner is known to have a plan, he is also known to have 
certain beliefs and values. --If this plan changes, the beliefs and 
values he,, 'Is -supposed to have must change too. The planner may be 
able' toý say things which imply that'-his real plan is different from 
the one he is thought to have. Thus it becomes known that he has 
different beliefs -and values. 7hese-: may influence other people's 
plans just as if they had been said. So when looking for the benefit 
of an utterance, ý one has to see if, it has provoked any of this sort 
of Indirect, communication, and if it has, one has to see whether that 
is, how the benefit of the utterance accrues. 
To do this- seems -to require 'complex modelling of other peoples, 
beliefs. 'The next chapter- discusses this, and'shows that in many 
cases this need not be as'complex, as it seems. 
M 
Chapter. 6.. Belief And mutual belief -f 
When people talk to each other, they know that they don't agree on 
everything. If they did, they wouldn't need to talk, at least, not to 
exchange information. They, know about lots of things in the world. In 
particular they know about that part of the world which is other 
people. What they know about is of two sorts. It is facts such as his 
having dark hair and being married; and it is facts about what the 
other person believes. 
But people know that other people are roughly like themselves. And if 
they, Are, then when John talks to Mary, he knows that Mary will have 
beliefs about what he believes. So he may have beliefs about what she 
believes he believes. And because he knows she can say the same to 
herself, -we are off on an infinite regress of possibilities for 
beliefs about what he believes she believes he believes ... How much 
does this matter in thinking about-conversation? 
in this chapter I glance at reasons for worrying about belief about 
others', -belief-,,, and then offer, a proof of a-sufficient condition for 
mutual belief to arise between observers. 
6.1. Why have people thought-it mattered? 
People. do not always understand what the other person has said, but 
this doesn't always stop conversation. For instance. failure of 
reference 
A. Can you give this to-John? 
B:. Yes, but, I won! t see him for aýcouple of days. 
A:,, No. I mean John at work., 
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Any accouht of what is going on during this in terms of what A and B 
are doing must be sensitive to the fact that they do not ascribe the 
same meaning to B's utterance - or at least, not to start with. 
Somehow A does come to see into B's mind, or he would be unable to 
correct him. More Important are deception and irony. I attempt to 
describe them below. 
6.1.1. Deception 
The whole point of deception is that there is a distinction beteen 
n7 
what the deceiver believes, and will found his actions on. 
what the deceiver thinks the victim believes, and will found his 
actions on. 
- what the deceiver believes the victim believes the deceiver 
believes. 
The deceiver attempts to get the victim to believe something that the 
deceiver does not. If the deceiver does believe it, we would speak, 
not of deceit, but merely of Persuasion. If I tell you that Rice 
Crispies make you big and strong, and intend you to believe it, only 
the contrast between what I believe and what I want you to believe 
distinguishes persuasion and deceit. 
It Is also vital that there is a distinction between what the 
deceiver believes and what he thinks his victim thinks he believes. 
The deciever can't try and fill his victimis mind with falsehoods 
while letting it appear that he, himself doesn't hold them. Suppose I 
gave you arguments, perhaps very compelling ones, that Rice Crispies 
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were nutritous while at the same time muttering "Loathsome poisonous 
muck", which I sincerely believed. I might change your mind. I might 
even have intended to change your mind. But my action would hardly be 
deceitful. So any scheme for recognizing deceit would have to be able 
to distinguish at least these three domains of belief. 
6.1.2. Irony 
Irony is in some ways like deceit. I say something that I believe to 
be false. But I do not expect or intend to persuade you of what I 
say, and I don't expect you to believe that I believe what I say. 
Suppose you drop the eggs and I say "Such grace, such skill". How do 
you know that I am speaking ironically? You would, I suggest, say 
that I didn't believe what I said, probably because I couldn't. No- 
one could believe that dropping eggs requires skill. Further, you 
would claim that I couldn't have believed my remark to be persuasive. 
since no-one can hope to persuade other people of the transparently 
false. 
Any system that hopes to to distinguish irony and deceit will need to 
know about nested belief. The only other distinction I can see 
between them is the speaker's intention that his remark being 
believed. But I don't see how one could attempt to discover the 
speaker's intention without being able to ask whether some advantage 
followed for him in the case where he got his hearer to believe 
something he didn't - if that is he succeeded in deceiving him. But 
this presupposes nested belief. 
A test of whether the speaker expected to be believed on grounds of 
the general credibility of his remark to someone of his victim's 
background would not be strong enough, since people may attempt to 
deceive with futile and incredible lies. 
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One' can distinguish irony and deceit by contrasting the beliefs that 
one'supposes the speaker wants to follow after he asserts "S" 
Irony Deceit 
Sp believes -S -S 
sp believes Hr believes -S S 
sp believes Hr believes Sp believes S 
But despite this, I think one can manage to explain a lot of what 
happens in conversation without nested belief. The point is that 
deceit and irony are wildly unusual in conversation. They are 
salient; they do occur; it can't be explained without them. But they 
are only a fraction of what we use speech for. I feel reluctant to 
use its heavy machinery unless one has to. 
6.2. Deriving mutual belief from simpler forms of belief 
6.2.1. Relat'ýd work on-mýtual beliei 
Belief iý'ýther people's belief (recursive belief) matters to machine 
understanding of natural language. Two main areas need it. 
1) Fixing reference: ' When'l say"the third jar on the left" I give 
you a wa Iy of I 'selecting an''object''i-fi'your world. " If your beliefs about 
the world"are different from mine, it may sel6ct"different things for 
you and me. You'may know we'have d. ifferent beliefs and have allowed 
for this. ' I may have alloWed"for your allowance. To do this I must 
have recursive belief' about you. (e'g Clark & Marshall, Donellan. 
Perrault & Cohen) 
2) Indirect speech acts: When 1 say "Have you got your car? " you have 
to guess that I ask because I hope that you will guess that I would 
IS3 
only ask (in the current context) if I wanted to know if I could ask 
for a, lift; so you see that I want a lift and so give me one. Such 
recursive plan reconition need recursive belief. (eg Allen & 
Perrault, Perrault & Allen, ýCohen & Perrault). 
The work I've mentioned that handles these using recursive belief is 
elegant. Why object? The problem is not that the accounts are false, 
but that they are counter-intuitive. They involve a lot of reasoning 
about what I believe you believe I believe. When one tells people 
about, recursive belief, they say "That sounds nice, but I'm sure I 
don't-do. all thatl,. ". If that was all, one could say that they did it 
all, but inaccessibly. But of course sometimes one does have to stop 
and-. -think about, what the other person 
knows; during misunderstanding 
or deceit or irony for instance. Since they sometimes can be 
conscious, 
_,, 
Of considering recursive belief, perhaps when they think 
they aren't using it, they really aren't. 
I believe, we use something simpler most of the time, with full 
recursive -, belief available if we need it. That something simpler is 
mutual belief, -a special case of recursive belief. This 
is the same 
idea, more. formally, done, that Clark and Marshall present. 
Clark and Marshall approach the problem of mutual knowledge as a 
result of worrying about how. speakers manage to refer. (I consider 
belief, not knowledge, but it makes no difference here. and Clark & 
Carlson . (1982). continue-, the argument in terms of belief. ) They 
imagine a speaker Ann trying to decide on a description "t" that she 
can reasonably believe wiil enable her hearer Bob to identify the 
referent "R" that, she has in mind. They present a series of examples 
in which it become clear that neither the fact 
Ann believest is R 
nor the fact 
Ann believes that: Bob believes that t is R 
nor! the fact ,, - 
Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann believes that t is R 
guarantees successful reference. They argue that though inventing 
counter-examples becomes harder and harder, there is no depth at 
whichý it- become In principle impossible. So what does allow 
confidence that reference may succeed? 
They argue 'that what one needs is in fact mutual belief. which they 
define thus (1981: 17). ý 
A and B mutually believe that p <=> 
A believes that p& 
B believes that p, & 
A believes that B believes that p& 
B believes thatýA believes that p& 
and then go, on to illustrate how mutual belief of this form can found 
reference. 
This- still leaves the problem of how mutual belief springs up. This 
can- arise -in several ways, for' instance from the palticipant's 
knowledge that they are both members of a community in which 
knowledge of certain facts is universal) but-the way that matters 
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here involves an induction. 
First, 
- 
they observe that when for instance-you and I and a table are 
all together in the same place in the right conditions, then we have 
mutual belief in the properties of the table. They call the knowledge 
that-we have when. we are-in such a situation as knowledge of our "co- 
presence". (This also arises in the form of "linguistic co-presence", 
but the principle is the same. ), 
Secondly, they adopt a "mutual-, belief induction schema" which Is 
A-, and B mutually believe-that p iff some state of affairs G 
-holds such that 
-, 1 A and B, have-reason to believe that G holds. 
2G indicates Ao-A and B that each has reason to 
believe, that G holds. 
,,,,, 3-G indicates to A and B that p. 
Then they point out 'that in fact co-presence of A and B with the 
state of affairs p is an instance of G that satisfies the conditions; 
so,,, mutual belief will -arise. This reduces the problem of safe 
reference to -that of ensuring some sort. of, co-presence with the 
referent and the hearer. 
This seems to me to be wholly, right as far as it goes. The ground for 
mutual beliefs that, I offer are very similar to the conditions for 
their schema. What they do not do is show that the definition of 
mutual belief that they accept actually follows from their mutual 
induction schema. 
What. I propose is to alter both the definition of mutual belief and 
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the Anduction schema. in ways that still capture the intuitions we 
share. but so that the schema really does support the defined version 
of mutual belief. The important change is in the definition of mutual 
belief.. though it is more one of form than of substance. 
Clark and Carlson , (1982), go. on to discuss the generalization of 
mutual belief from two people to a group of people. a notion that 
they call joint belief. Here each person does not merely have mutual 
beliefs with each member of a group; rather, each person believes 
that the members of the group collectively know that the members of 
the group collectively believe some fact. They show that some 
requests which depend on several people acting in concert can only 
reasonably be complied with if all the requestees have joint belieft. 
If any requestee doubted that the others shared the joint belief, he 
would not act. since others might not, and if any of them failed to 
comply, the joint act , 
would abort. Again, this argument seems 
compelling. However, neither I nor they can put it into formal shape. 
nor indeed even define joint belief. 
6.3. Deriving mutual belief from simple belief 
First some, terms. -If, AbF means "A believes F" then expressions such 
as AbBb... AbBbAb .... identify A's belief spaces - the set of 
sentences to which that expression can truly be prefixed. The hard 
case of rýcursive, belief is where., because of some twisted story of 
observation. guesses and error, some spaces contain F and some 
contain -F. To disentangle deceit. or misunderstanding. this is 
essential. 
The easy case is mutual belief. Here either every space contains F or 
every space, contains -: -. -In the classic example. it is the sort Of 
belief that arises about a lit candle that stands on a table over 
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which we look at each other. 
How 'does mutual"beiief help language understanding? I claim that in 
ordinary, non-ironic, non-deceitful, non-erratic speech, one does not 
have to' work out how what has been said affects different belief 
spaces. Instead, what follows from the discourse and context can 
become 'mutually known. "' Then to jI oin In or understand later 
c6n'v'ersaiion I need consult only one'space, the space that contains 
what is mutually known. 
One can't define mutual belief between A and B that F as 
mbl(A, B, F) 
AbF'& AbBbF & AbBbAbF & 
& BbF & BbAbF & BbAbBbF & 
because none of 'us . 
'can 'be sure that we have mutual belief with 
anybody else. All that one person can do is believe that he and 
someone else mutually believe something. If one defines it as 
mb2(A, B, F) <=> AbF & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & 
ther e is a snag. ' The definition mb2 starts with AbF. But in the 
candle' example". ' A could 'say afterwards that though he had relied in 
what 'he had said to'B on himself and B mutually believing that there 
was a candle on the table. in fact all along he had believed that, 
unknown to B. it was really a subtle electrical fake. So I define 
mutual belief as 
mWA, B. Fý <=> AbBbF-& AbBbAbF & 
Is$ 
This is an infinite expression, and the description of A and B and 
the candle and their perceptions is presumably finite. How can mutual 
belief arise from finite grounds? Here is an attempt to show how. I 
give the proof, because though it is ordinary natural deduction form, 
it uses'an Intensional logic with non-standard rules of Inference. 
The' essence of the proof is that there are situations which force 
predictable beliefs- on'people in them. A sighted man who looks at a 
candle must' believe that there is a'candle there. Then, using some 
brief conditions on someone being in such a situation, and knowing 
he can perform two inductions about what he and his that he Is in it, 
perceiver think, which together establish mutual belief. 
The-proof tries to capture the idea of one person reasoning as he 
thinks another person will. The whole proof is done by one person 
(here, A); -Sometimes A tries to reason as'he thinks B will. When he 
trie's to'do this,! he starts, a stretch'of embedded proof. A stretch of 
such an argument is marked by 
As B 
End as B 
Anything-that occurs inside that, stretch is something that A believes 
B believes, just'as AbBbF states that F is something that A believes 
B believes. Two rules exploit this. A third rule exploits the 
assumption'that if a person believes F, then he believes he believes 
F. 
Rule'"in" 
If XbF occurs in some stretch, and that stretch immediately 
contains another stretch labelled with "As X". then one may 
write'F in the inner stretch, on'the same assumptions. 
)'Sj 
Rule "out" 
If F occurs in some stretch labelled with "As X", and that 
stretch is immediately contained in another stretch, then one 
may write XbF in the outer stretch, on the same assumptions. 
Rule "+b" 
If-T occurs in a stretch of reasoning labelled "As X", one may 
infer XbF, with the same dependencies. 
If F is a theorem, it may be introduced into any stretch. 
Sx means "person x is in situation S". (AbBb)^n means that prefix is 
repeated, n times. 
The columns are: the line number; a sentence; the rule and lines used 
to derive it; the assumptions on which the line depends. 
PROOF 
As A. The assumptions: 
I y(Sy ybF) A 1 
2- Bb(y(Sy ybF)) A 2 
3 SB A, 3 
4 BbSAý A 4 
5 BbSB A 5 
abbreviate the conjunction of these assumPtions as <gmb>, "grounds 
for mutual belief". 




17 SA In, 4 
18 Y(Sy -> ybF) in, 2 
1 9, SA. -> AbF UQl 8 
10 AbF -', ->, 7.9 
End as B 
11 BbAbF out, 10 
12 AbBbAbF +b, 11 
13 "(AbBb)^l AbF rewrite 12 
14 <gmb> ->(AbBb)-l AbF + ->, 6,13 
So <gmb> ->(AbBb)^l AbF* is a theorem. 








15 SB -> BbF -UQ, 1 1 
16 BbF, - -> 3.15 1.3 
17 AbBbF +b, 16 1,3 
18 (AbBb)-l F, rewrite, 17-, 1,3 
19 <gmb> -> (AbBb)-i F + ->, 6,18 - 
So <gmb> -> (AbBb)-l F is a theorem. 
Induction 1. The induction hypothesis is that 




20 y(Sy -> ybF) in, 2 2 
21 Bb(y(Sy ybF)) +b, 20 2 
1,22 SA'ý in, 4 4 
1 23 SB in, 5 5 
1 24 BbSA +b, 22 4 
1 25 BbSB +b, 23 5 
26 , <gmb> +&, 20,21,23; 24,25 
2,4.5 
27' <gmb> -> (AbBb)-n AbF Theorem - 
1 28 (AbBb)^n AbF 26,27 2,4,5 
End as B 
29' ý-Bb(AbBb)^n AbF out. 28 2,4,5 
30 AbBb(AbBb)^n AbF +b, 29 2,4,5 
31- (AbBb)^ri+l AbF- 'rewrite 30 2.4,5 
32. <gmb> -> (AbBb)'ý'n+l-AbF - 
6ý 31 - 
Which proves theAnduction step. So., with, base case 
(A6Bb)^n AbF- is a theorem for n 
Induction 2. The'induction hypothesis is that- 
<gmb> -> (AbBb)^n F is a theorem. 
The proof is, exactly the same as for induction 1, except that 
"(AbBb)^n F" replaces "(AbBb)-n AbF". So. with base case 2. 
JU 
<gmb>'-> (AbBb)-n F 
is a theorem for n >= I 
So <gmb> -> (AbBb)^n F& (AbBb)-n AbF 
is a theorem for n >= 1. 
That- rewrites as AbBbF & AbBbAbF & which is the definition of 
mb3(A. B, F). So if A believes <gmb> for some S, F, then A believes he 
and B mutually'believe that F. 
The stronger case, mb2(A. B, F), can be derived by adding the 
assumption "SA" which will not figure in the Induction but which will 
entail the . first conjunct in the definition (AbF) as well as all 
those that also occur in mb3. 
Going back to the application to natural language: "Sx" will mean "x 
was in places where x must have observed certain context and heard 
certain parts of the discourse; and x has a theory Theory for 
analyzing 'discourse in context. " F will then be the deductions made 
using that theory. What I have said'about mutual belief places no 
constraints'on'what'Theory is. It just says that for the parts of the 
discourse, context and theory that fit the conditions for mutual 
belief. ' 'the conclusions will be mutually known. That means that one 
may be able to fillet the parts of your favourite theory of the bits 
of-it that handle'recursive belief, 'ieaving something perhaps simpler 
behind. 
6.4. In defence of mb3 
The definition of mutual belief (mb3) that I am using is contentious. 
It. is altered from the customary definition (mbi) in two ways - by 
dropping all the conjuncts starting "Bb... " (mb2) and by dropping, 
initial conjunct AbF (mb3). The latter change is less dubious; I have 
defended, it- earlier; -, but even if those arguments are rejected, only 
trivial alterations are needed to the proof of how mb3 arises to 
convert it into a proof of how mb2 arises. One need just add "Abf" to 
the,,. grounds.. for mutual belief. Given that, "why is mb3 better than 
mbl? " amounts to '! why is mb2 better than mbl? ", since any answer to 
the second can be converted into an answer to the first. 
Mb2 
, 
has its supporters: Joshi (1982: 183) uses it, where he calls it 
"one-sided mutual belief" (and mistakenly identifies it with the 
definition of Clark & Marshall (1981)). But he does not explicitly 
defend-., 
_it,. 
There are however two arguments for it. The first is that 
it,: is for, ced on us unless we are to make excessively strong claims 
about our knowledge of other minds; the second, that it has to be of 
that-form-to. be part of any teleological explanation of action. 
6.4.1. Argument 1 
Suppose, 
1 one 
is trying to construct an Induction schema that can 
explain how mutual belief can arise. Then what one is doing is trying 
to prove a theorem of the form 
<grounds>, -> mb(A. B, F) 
The grounds may mention both the world and A's and B's beliefs about 
the world or other beliefs. When proving this theorem, one can take a 
god's-eye view and postulate what one likes about exactly what it is 
tý'at A and B know. But this theorem is not going to be used by a god: 
it is going to be used by an agent, A say, to deduce that if he and 
jqý 
someoneý'else, are in such-and-such a situation, and so satisfy 
<grounds>', ' "then' they have mb(A, B; 'F). But this lets in a sceptical 
argument. 
What' does"A's belief that the grounds are satisfied entitle him to 
assent to? Not "<grounds> are true", but "I believe <grounds> are 
true". "In" general one might rely on some standard counter to a 
sceptical position to say that these are equivalent. Such a counter 
may be usually-, true but it can't be used here, because <grounds> 
refer among other things to B's beliefs. If <grounds> include a 
conjunct "B 'believes F", "then"if the anti-sceptical counter is to 
work, it entails the equivalence of "B believes F" and "I believe B 
believes F". That cannot be accepted by anyone unless he holds 
both that, in principle, other minds are knowable as certainly as 
the physical world is knowable 
- and that, in general, (whenever the induction schema is to be used. 
at least), "'agents know the contents of each other's minds as well as 
they know the physical world. 
Arguments for those claims exist - they are given by at least 
behaviouristst, ' people looking forward to a complete reductive 
neuropsychologyt' and some ordinary-language philosophers concerned 
with the use of "believe". However I shall assume their falsity here. 
if though one does take "F" said by A to be equivalent to "A believes 
that F" the schema-can*still be used. A can still reason 
A believes <grounds> 
A believes (<grounds> -> mb(A, B, F)) 
- ------------------------------------ 
A believes mb(A, B. F) 
but the version of mutual belief he will emerge with is that that I 
am seeking to defend as the correct analysis. 
lqs 
The reason for that is that I think the definition of mb(A, B, F) will 
have to be either of the customary. mbl, form 
, AbF & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & 
&, BbF & BbAbF & BbAbBbF & 
or of the mb2 form 
AbF. & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & 
In -either, case, -, what, A can conclude is Ab(mb(A, B, F)). For the mbl 
definition, I "'. II 
Ab(mb(A, B, F)) 
Ab AbF & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & 
& BbF & BbAbF &ýBbAbBbF & 
distributingýAb... over & 
AbAbF & AbAbBbF-& AbAbBbAbF & ... 
& AbBbF & AbBbAbF & AbBbAbBbF & 
reducing iterations of AbAb.. i and removing repeated conjuncts 
AbF & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & AbBbAbBbF & 
In the mb2 case, by the same steps, 
Ab(mb(A, B,. F)) - 
<=> Ab-( AbF & AbBbF. & AbBbAbF & ... ) 
<-> AbAbF & AbAbBbF & AbAbBbAbF & 
<=> AbF & AbBbF & AbBbAbF & ... 
mb(A, B. F) 
That is, whichever definition of mutual, belief is used in the theorem 
that is the essence of the induction, what A can conclude is of mb2 
form., 
6.4.2. Argument 2- 
Suppose one undertook to explain an agent's rational actions in terms 
of his beliefs and values. Then obviously one is only allowed to 
refer to what the agent believes to be true, not to what is true. If 
Fred As known to want to get to-town, and Is. seen to walk to a bus 
stop, 'one can say "Fred is going to the bus stop because a bus is 
coming" only as an abbreviation for "Fred is going to the bus stop to 
catch a bus because HE BELIEVES a bus is coming". 
Mutual belief is to be used as a notion that helps explain agents' 
rational actions-; - But if-it is used in this way, then. just as with 
beliefs about whether. a, bus is coming,. what matters is not that two 
agents have mutual belief, but that the agent whose actions are to be 
explained believes that they have mutual belief. 
Teleological explanations of A's actions (or B's - it doesn't matter) 
depend, on the existence of arguments of the form 
A wants-F 
A believes G 
, -A believes act Act done when-G entails F 
---------------------------------------- 
A does Act - 
where;, in- the cases An which mutual belief about some fact are 
explanatory. C will be-of the form , 
P. & mb(A, B, F), 
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where P'is everything else that it matters that A believes. So if one 
Is to give'explanations of the form above, one, must show 
Ab-(P & mb(A, B, F)) 
<=> AbP &-Ab(mb(A, B, F)) 
Concentrating on the conjunct that matters to this argument, one has 
to show 
Ab(mb(A, B, F)) 
But by"the step's given above, -that is equivalent in either case to 
mb2(A. B, F). So for a'teleological explanation to go through. what one 
has to demonstrate is always mb2(A, BiF). 
6. '5. Applicatiowto conversation, 
How does Ahlsýapply'to utterances seen as attempts to affect plans? 
The central notion is that one can sometimes forget that the other's 
plans and beliefsý and values are concealed in his head, and that 
yours are concealed' in your own, so that both of you have to make 
fallible models of what is inside the other. Rather one can in many 
cases act as if all your important plans and beliefs are as it were 
laid on a table between you, so that you both know what you each 
think. That-' is, the plans etc are mutually known. -Furthermore, what 
each of you says may be able to change what is an the table. If the 
conditions-ýarise "for the change that you make to be mutually known. 
then what is, mutually known will be changed. I claim that what we do 
to our 'plans "in conversation is often like this. and that we often 
have no need to considerýnested belief. 
How does this happen? The idea is that at some Doint in the 
lqý 
discourse, certain of the Darties' plans are already mutually known. 
Then one of'them makes a remark. That remark will change the plans. 
Into what? Well, assuming the remark was rational, it must secure 
some. good. Suppose"one can find an account of how the plans must be 
changed. -if that goodýis, to arise. The speaker must suppose that he 
has made'that change, and that some of his hearer's beliefs etc must 
be different. 
Recognizing, the benefit-'of the change a remark makes to a set of 
plans may involve ascribing. new or altered plans to some of the 
speakers. But the 'methods of recognizing the benefit are standard. 
Everyone who -talks can, I suggest. use them. Anyone who knew the 
initial' plans etc and the remark made will know the resulting plans. 
But-the, plans they were applied to were mutually known to start with. 
And- the remark will be mutually known - all the parties can see that 
the 'others heard it, and know that they must admit they heard it. So 
what everyone believes after the benefit of the remark has been found 
will-be, mutually known too. Consider the exchange: 
I: I want an apple. Shall I get you one? 
You: The'kitchen floor is wet. 
lIve told you, I want, to eat an apple. Certainly I may have a plan 
about how I am going to do this. perhaps involving going to the fruit 
bowl in the kitchen. But, if I do, you knoa nothing about it. 
Nevertheless;, I am able to say things that you both ought to, and 
will, connect to that plan. For instance "Shall I get you one? " You 
will understand that my offer is bound up with my own plan, and you 
will do this although you have no detailed account of what I am going 
to 'do-other than that it ends in my having an apple. What happened 
was that we started with a mutually known plan, that I should get 
myself an apple. ' This was mutually known because I had declared my 
goal, and what^we'state'is mutually known. This goal was a degenerate 
plan; degenerate in'that nothing was known of it except its aim. The 
means' were 'unspecified'. '- Then I say something that can be "hooked 
into" what I have already said only on the assumption that I intend 
to go and-get myself'an apple-, rather than say asking you to go and 
get 'me one; But if this assumption is made, the plan is more fully 
specified, and if we both know about it in its fuller form. we can 
both talk about it like' that. For instance. you say that the kitchen 
floor was''wet-. This carries'the suggestion that I shouldn't walk on 
it'. ", This'only has significance'because"we both know that the plan we 
haveý', had to ascribe to me involves me walking on the kitchen floor. 
We both know the plan that we are talking about, even though it has 
never overtly been described., 
My intuition about what happens in the exchange about wanting an 
appple is this. At'eaCh stage, we say "This has been said. By canons 
of explanation of action that I think we share, I think this suggests 
that' the plan he has in mind I is so-and-so. But since I made this 
deduction, and-all' I used were publicly available facts and common 
canons of explanation, if I came to this conclusion then I can think 
that he 'did too. So the plan I have ascribed to him Is known to us 
both as a rational interpretation of the foregoing discourse". 
Imagine an anthropologist reading the text of a conversation between 
twoý, ýpeople. Assume he knows about the participants' material and 
social culture. He may well be able to understand the purposes of 
each "'utterance. ' Just as You understood the puposes of the utterances 
in'the apple dialogue above. At any moment he would have been able to 
say what plans he had had to ascribe to the speakers on the ground of 
what 'they had so'far said., I suggest that this approach Is open to 
the speakers themselves. Each of them will think of himself and his 
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interlocutor- as a skillful anthropologist. so each of them will 
suppose that the other has come to the same conclusion as himself. So 
each can talk about anything he has deduced, with the expectation 
that the, other, will-understand him. 
6.5.1. A slightly more formal account of how plan changes are 
mutually known 
Slightly more, formally: ., suppose the parties to a 
discourse are 
A, B,... Then what one of them takes to be mutually believed (perhaps 
about the world, perhaps about others), intended and wanted before 
the remark U is 
ýA 
believes .,. &A wants ... &A intends 
&B believes ... &B wants ... &B intends 
Call this "X before U". Suppose that we also have an axiomatized 
theory that tell. us, how peoples' beliefs will change after a remark. 
given-that they will only accept such a change if they can see how it 
benefits the remark's maker. This theory would be the real version of 
the. theory I am trying to outline in this thesis. Call It Theory. 
Then one could use it to infer "X after U". which will be another 
description., of the parties' plans etc after they have found an 
explanation of why the speaker spoke. 
X-before-U & Sp said U& Theory X-after-U 
If one accepts that from A -> B one may infer y(ybA -> ybB) then I 
may say ,Iý. ý tý 
y( yb(X-before-U) & yb(Sp said U) & yb(Theory) -> yb(X-after-U) 
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But this matches the vital step in establishing mutual knowledge, 
with 
Sx <=> yb(X-before-U) & yb(Sp said U) & yb(Theory) F= (X-after-U) 
Do the other conditions also hold? S is a three part conjunction. Do 
the conditions hold of each part? 
X-before-U: we are talking only about the mutually known beliefs etc 
of the parties. From the definition of "mutually known", the other 
conditions must hold of X-before-U. 
Sp said U: Whether the conditions on this are true will be a matter 
of fact that will vary from occasion to occasion. Certainly it will 
follow If it is mutually known that the remark was made, which is the 
usual case. 
Theory: If A believes that we all apply Theory to explain a speaker's 
utterances, and if he believes that is is mutually known that we do 
this, then the other conditions follow. This assumption can be 
defeated. We all have met people who respond to indirect requests 
differently to how we do, and we may not assume that we and they 
mutually know Theory. But I claim that in general we may. 
If this goes argument goes through, I claim it permits me to treat 
all knowledge that participants in conversation have as mutual, as 
long as nothing goes wrong. The actual utterances that the speakers 
made are mutually known in the way that their knowledge of their 
surroundings is mutually known (though strange things can happen if 
they ever disagree about what they said). If the means of recovering 
intention from utterance are mutually known, then the ascribed 
intentions are mutually known. 
2OZ 
What does the "as long-as nothing goes wrong" qualification mean? In 
some cases, an utterance can be connected to an intention in more 
than one way. Then one of two things happens- 
The participant must explicitly keep in mind that it is mutually 
known that one of two plans is being mooted or executed, and each 
subsequent remark must be considered in two lights. Perhaps a later 
remark will kill off one plan if it turns out the it can connect to 
only one plan. For instance 
A is about to go shopping 
B: Do you have enough cash? 
A: (wonders: Is he going to offer to lend me some? Or 
B: Do you have enought to let me have some too? 
A: (thinks: Yes! he wants to borrow some) 
6.6. Joint plans 
Who owns plans? When we talk to each other, the immediate picture one 
has it that you have your plan or plans, and I have mine. We may tell 
each other, about them, we may assist each other with them, but each 
plan will belong to exactly one of us. I am not sure that this is 
always-the best way to look at them. Consider this example: 
A: I want the Sunday newspapers. 
B: I'll get them. 
A: I'll give you some money. 
The plan that should be formed as the result of this exchange 
involves actions by two agents, so it can't belong just to its agent. 
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Nor is its goal something that will please just A or just B. Either B 
wants.. A- to-be, able to read the-, papers. and therefore adopts getting 
the papers as a goal of his own; or perhaps B already wanted to read 
the-paper. and is going to buy the newspaper knowing that both he and 
A will benefit. So it may be hard, to.: say, who a plan belongs to just 
on the. grounds of who wants what it achieves. 
I believe that a better-approach is to suppose that a plan can stand 
in front, of several speakers so that they can operate on it in sight 
of each otherjust as they, could on operate on a car engine standing 
before them in a garage. 
This is probably the right way to view all plans. They do not belong 
to any one In, particular. Rather several plans are mutually known to 
exist,, and what is known about them is not just their structure, but 
also who is expected to perform them or benefit from them. Otherwise, 
the plan that lies., behind A saying 
A: Do you want an apple? 
or B saying. 
B; Do, you want, an apple? - 
are, - going to pose excessive nice questions of who the plan belongs 
to, performed as they will be for another's good. 
Certainly one has to see a plan as joint when one person has revealed 
or,,, discovered a-, need derived from it, which the other both can and 
will assist with. 
zoý 
Chapter 7. Series of actions on plans 
Certain,, series of alterations to mutually known plans count as the 
performance of speech, 'acts; 
it is useful to speakers to be able to 
see such series. 
if they know what another has just, been doing, it may suggest what 
he As doing now., I want to use the offer-request/accept-reject/ 
refuse-comply nexus as an example of this 
once one has discovered that what has been said has a useful 
relation to what has gone before, one needn't go on looking for the 
reason it was said. I want, to use the giving of explanations as an 
example of this 
7.1. Relations between "speech acts" 
Speech acts are actions that we perform by speaking - eg warning, 
threatening, promising, refusing, christening, denouncing. I want to 
claim two things about them. 
--To define some of them, one has to talk about the speakers' and 
hearers' plans and how the utterances that count as that speech act 
affect those plans., 1ý 
2 -ý. Speech acts are not just labels. One can explain the performance 
of speech. acts by saying their speaker is performing a plan of which 
they are part. Sucha plan will have the same form as a plan to act 
in physical world, but, will act on different sorts of thing and 
involve. different actions. The objects acted on in such a plan will 
be other plans. If one refuses to admit that there are such plans, 
ZOS 
then there will be speech acts whose definition one can't give and 
whose use one can't explain. 
I"I, I, IIIZ 'ý ,. 
Furthermore, there are words that describe plans. We use them to tell 
and ask each other about their plans and ours: I mean words like 
"can" and "shall". Just as (some) speech acts are actions on plans, 
these words are (sometimes) predicates over plans. This matters 
because by using them we can alter what is known about our plans, 
perhaps with great effect. 
Let me give two examples. 
I am just coming up to the door of the department where I work. A 
janitor has just left, closing the door after him. He sees me and 
says "Do you have your keys? ". He is offering to open the door for me 
if I do not have them. 
21 come up to my front door where I see my wife is already 
standing. As I get there, she says "Do you have your key? ". She is 
requesting me to open the door for both of us. 
The utterance is the same. The speech act performed is different. The 
difference must lie in the context. Where? 
one account of what a request is, is that it allows Hr to infer a 
want of Sp that Sp cannot himself achieve but which Hr can. That 
definition has to be tidied up. I can express a wish eg to have a 
hundred pounds, that you could fulfill and that I really want, but 
which I do not expect you to fulfill for me. (I might even be 
embarassed if you tried to. ) Sp's request has to be about a want that 
Sp believes that Hr will get for him once Hr knows that Sp wants it. 
I have no criteria for that, though clearly they include the 
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detriment to Hr, the benfit to Sp, and the goodwill of Sp towards Hr. 
(There Is also a difficult social quantity: one person may want to 
accept a disproportionate request so as to build up credit for his 
own later request. ) 
If a request is the revelation of a want. what is an offer? One could 
say it was the revelation by Sp of his ability to do something that 
Hr may want. But again, Sp could reveal that he could lend Hr a 
hundred pounds without that counting as an offer. And where is the 
symmetry between offers and requests? 
The distinctive and unifying features of requests and offers is that 
each make it mutually known that one party contemplates a plan that 
involves actions by one of. them to help the other. In a request, Sp 
makes it mutually known that he contemplates a plan that benefits 
him. which inculdes actions by Hr. In the door example, my wife makes 
it mutually known that she contemplates getting into the house by 
using a plan in which it is me who opens the door. In an offer, Sp 
makes it mutually known that he contemplates a plan that benefits Sp 
which includes action by himself. In the door example, the Janitor 
makes it mutually known 
_that 
he contemplates my getting into the 
department by a plan in which it is he who opens the door. 
A and B have gone shopping together. 
A: I've left my purse behind. 
B: I've got my cheque book. 
There is a request-and-offer feel to this exchange. Why? First, A 
impugns something that might be his own plan - he won't be able to 
pay for the shopping. But'if he. can expect that B will help him with 
what he can't do himself, and if he thinks that B is able to help 
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him, then what he says is a request. He contemplates a plan in which 
B's actions help him. 
A doesn't have to have a specific expectation about how B will help 
him. He doesn't (say) have to hope for B to use a cheque rather than 
a credit card; just So long as'it something B is to do. 
IIýIIý, I 
A has to make what he contemplates mutually known. His attack on his 
own plan succeeds in this. How? Because A and B mutually know that 
another way A could obtain his end is by explicitly asking B to help 
him. They both know that when a plan collapses, one tries to mend it. 
So they mutually know that A must be thinking of mending it. If they 
both know that getting B to help is the best way of mending it, they 
mutually know what A must intend, and can react to that without 
further discussion. 
But if they are so secure in what they know, why does B go on and say 
that he has his cheque-book? Because they both know that they may not 
in fact have duplicated each other's reasoning. 
7.2. Sequences of speech acts 
11 1 -.,. 1, ý1 -1 - 
After a request or an offer, Hr will respond. 
After a request, Hr can COMPLY: 
A: Can you lend me $5? 
B: I'll just get my wallet. 
A: Will you give this to Celia? 
B: Where will I find her? 
z C-1 s 
or, he can, REFUSE: 
A: Can you lend, me $, 5? 
B: I'm afraid I'm broke. 
A: Will you give this to Celia? 
B: I won't be seeing her. 
After an offer, Hr can ACCEPT: 
A-, Wouldyou like some tea? 
B: I'd love some. 
or-he can REJECT: 
A:, Would you like, some tea? 
B: I just had some, thanks. 
liow, can we tell -which,, if any, of these a remark is? I claim that one 
has. to, look at two sorts,. of facts 
- what changes. th. e, remark. makes to mutually known plans 
- when this. change occurs relative to other changes 
That,., is,, something. is a compliance (say) only if 
-, it does certain sorts of things to the parties' plans. 
the parties plans are as they are because of a request. 
In the. compliance cases; B makes it mutually known that he is getting 
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his wallet. This action is explicable as part of his execution of a 
plan to'lend A $5. So he, must intend'executing the plan A requested. 
Similarly withýthe second example. The information B asks for is only 
useful'if he intends'giving whatever-it-is to Celia as A requested. 
In the''refusal cases' what B does is show why he won't perform the 
plan that A requested. In the examples, he says things that would 
make'the'plan"impossible. ' 'ý 
In the acceptance case, B encourages A's contemplated plan by showing 
reasons why'he-should perform it- that B wants it. 
In' the 'rejectioný-case, ' B discourages A's plan by showing that B 
doesn't want-it. ' 1.1 -1 
What is the'generalization? I take it to be this: 
A request by A to B to do X is an action (usually an utterance) that 
makes it'mutually known that A contemplates a plan 
-ý'to'achieve one of Als'own goals, G, 
- part of which is B's doing X, 
- when previously B's doing"X was not known to be part of the plan. 
A compliance and a refusal presuppose an earlier request. 
B'complies with A's request to do X'if B does something that makes it 
mutually known that B contemplates doing X to achieve G. Similarly. B 
refuses, A's 'request to do X if B does something that makes it 
mutually known that B does not contemplate doing X to achieve G. 
offers, ', acceptances and rejections are symmetrical with requests. 
compliances and refusals. 
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An offer by A to B to do X is an action (usually an utterance) that 
makes it-mutually known that, A contemplates a plan 
- to achieve one of B's own goals, G, 
- part. of which, Is A's doing X, 
- when previously A's doing X was not known to be part of the plan. 
Again, an acceptance and a rejection presuppose an earlier offer. 
B accepts A's offer to do X if B does something that makes it 
mutually known that, B contemplates achieving G by a plan that 
includes A's doing X. Similarly, B rejects A's offer to do X if B 
does something -that, makes ýit mutually known that B does not 
contemplate achieving G by a plan that includes A's doing X. 
The example above fit these definitions. But there are some slightly 
odd cases: - 
When -a particular. action Is requested, the requestee may refuse that 
actionibut offer,. another. 
A: Will you give me a ring when you get home? 
B: I'll ring you before I leave work. 
A's goal G is that B get in touch. The requested action X is that B 
ring: when . -he -gets, home. But B declares that he will do something 
else, Y, to wit. ring before he leaves. If as seems reasonable one 
can- deduce" that doing Y involves not doing X, then B's remark is 
properly both a rejection and an offer. 
When A and B have a joint plan, they will have shared goals. But the 
definitions survive. SuPpose A and B are trying to start a car they 
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hope to 'iravel in. Then 
A: I'll borrow some jump leads 
is an offer, and 
A: Will you borrow some jump leads? 
is a request. 
V 
One problem is conventional refusals and compliances. Eg 
A: I've just spent my last farthing. 
B: Tough. - 
A: Can you give me a light? 
B: Sure. 
Clearly these are a refusal and a compliance. But this doesn't come 
bý'deduction from'-an explicit knowledge of what B is going to do. One 
has' to know in advance what "Tough" and "Sure" are used as in these 
contexts. I don't know how such conventions work. 
7.3. "Utterances'that'are explanations 
Consider'soMe examples 
example 2/67 
1 .. ýý--.. -' 
M and W have a guest, Aileen, staying in their flat. Aileen 
'-intends to go out and do some shopping by herself 
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M:, I gave Aileen a key. 
W: Why? Ahal Because of her shopping. 
example-2/78- 
M has-just turned on the immersion heater 
M: -. Ilm ieaving the hot water an for my bath. 
example 2/93 
,, M-and W are just about to start eating dinner 
w:, j don't like to-eat my potato with a teaspoon. 
M: ýTheylre for-the avocado. 
All of these examples feel to me as if they have something in common: 
in,, each of them one of the speakers is explaining something that has 
been done. He says what he says so that with the new information the 
other . ýcan fit what is being explained into a plan that he wouldn't 
otherwise -have known about. Once' he can fit it in, he has an 
explanation of-it, 
I, am suggesting that one can explain some utterances as explanatory. 
One can say "Aha, -he said what he did because what he said explains 
something which it was to his advantage to explain". This leaves me 
with the tasks of answering the questions 
- How do utterances build explanations? 
-Why are explanations worth undertaking? 
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7.3.1. How do utterances'build explanations? 
I don't want to get embroiled in a lot of pure philosphy, so I'll be 
dogmatic about what explanations are. 
Facts are 
_the- 
only sort of. thing that is explained. Objects for 
instance aren't. I claim that you have an explanation of a fact when 
you can see that it follows from what you already accept. 
This is ýIn' generai too strong a claim. For instance, you could say 
that you' had'an exýlanation of a particular revolution if you could 
show 'that' in 80% of cases when a nation was in the state that 
preceded"this reVdlution, a revolution had followed. But if you then 
have an explanation-,, you have it although the explanandum didn't 
necessarily follow from the explanans. 
The cla, im. may also. be too weak. A fact might follow by some tortuous 
chain from axioms that you accept, but you may nevertheless object 
that. 
-the 
leng-th,, and complexity of the chain prevented it from 
counting, as an explanation. Yesterday's weather and gas dynamics 
together 
'entail 
today's rain, but one would hardly say that the 
calculation that showed this was an explanation of the rain. 
So I am wrong about what an explanation is. But on any account. being 
able to show'that the explanandum does follow reasonably simply from 
what you already accept should count as having an explanation. 
7.3.1. -'I. **Tele'ologi'ca'l expla-nation's 
Given the version of explanation I offer above, the explanation of 
any I physical' fact is going to be some deduction of that fact from 
given facts via known physical laws. For instance, . suppose I want to 
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explain why, a can-of,, water is boiling. -To do that, I offer a proof 
which can be,,, sketched- as in the diagram below. I rely on your 
Intuitions to interpret it. It. is an and-tree with the consequence at 
the, top.. -. 
water in can boils 
I 
-------------------------------------- 
water in can can over 100 C 
---------------------------- 
can, on. f ire i-, fire alight 
Each and-step is justifiedýby. -its, being an instance of a law which is 
not written out-explicitly. For instance theýtop step of that proof 
could be, an instance of, the law 
ý, water in vessel boils 
water in vessel vessel over 100 C 
But if I want to explain something, not according to physical laws. 
but teleologically, what must I do? To explain something 
teleologically is to explain it as the result of agents' beliefs and 
desires. To explain it in the same way as physical events are 
explained, one would need laws that axiomatize planned behaviour, and 
facts that describe the agent's beliefs and desires. For instance, an 
explanation of why a person P did some action A might look like this: 
P did action A 
actioncA has effect EP wants E 
On the other hand, one could explain the same action by exhibiting 
the plan of which it was a part, and asserting that that plan was 
being executed by P. The plan would look something like 
E 
I 
does action A- 
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The form of this argument is different to that I Just described for 
explaining physical events. There a-faCt-was true if it occurred at 
the top of a proof tree. Now I want to say that certain things are 
true about';, 'fact (or, an action) if they occur at certain sites in a 
proof tree. - ', 
You can say that any node in a plan is true if the nodes below it are 
all true. You, can say that a-node in a plan is wanted if the node 
above it Is wanted. - In aýcomplete picture of a plan, the top node 
will be wanted, so all the nodes in the plan will be wanted. If you 
believe, that" the plan has been executed, then all the nodes at the 
bottom of 'the"plan-will be true. and so all the nodes In the plan 
will, -be true., If you believe that the plan is being executed, then 
you, will believe 1that %some of the'nodes will be true already, and 
some will be madeýtrue later. If you know that the plan is going to 
be executed, then you know that all the nodes may be made true later. 
For those',, nodes-that are actions rather than facts, "being true" 
amounts to-"having-been executed". 
So to explain the truth or wantedness of a fact. or the performance 
or wantedness of an action, is to proffer a plan that involves that 
fact or value in the right place. Whether the truth is current or 
anticipated depends on the execution status of the plan. 
To give an explanation of an action (say) is to give a plan which 
I 
explains that action. But to give a plan, it isn't necessary to 
exhibit it in its entirety. One merely has to make it accessible. 
just making the goal known may be enough, if Hr can guess what plan 
the agent will make to get that goal. For instance, 
A: I'm going to Bauermeister's <a bookseller>. I want a 
Spanish dictionary. 
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7.3.1.2. Explaining omission and explaining commission 
All that Vve just said applies to explaining why something is the 
case or was done. But equally one may want to explain why something 
wasn't done or wanted. For Instance, 
A: Why didn't you come to the seminar yesterday? 
B: I had to go to see my supervisor. 
Just as someone explains the occurrence of some event to you by 
showing that there is a plan that explains it which you didn't know 
about, he can explain' its absence by showing that the plan that 
contained- it and which you thought was going to be executed in fact 
won't be. In the example above, A thought B had a plan roughly like 
this: 
B hears lecturer 
I 
---------------------------------- 
lecturer talks B at lecture room 
But B says that he has a different plan. This other plan was such 
that the preconditions it needed gave the lecture-going plan bad 
side-effects. And because the lecture-going plan is now known to have 
bad side-effects, A can no longer be surprised that B didn't pursue 
it. The omission of the action is explained by the abandonment of the 
plan. 
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B sees supervisor 
------------------------------- 
B at supervisor's room 
- ------------------------- 
B hears lecturer B at supervisor's room 
------------------------ ------------------------------ 
lecturer talks B at lecture room lecture room =/= 
supervisor's room 
Giving explanations is a matter of affecting the picture that someone 
has of someone else's plans. The diagram below summarizes the 
relation between the type of explanation and the change made. 
known plan of agent, as it is: 
before remark after remark 
--------------------------------------------- 
Explaining contains doesn't contain 
comission explanandum explanandum 
--------------------------------------------- 
Explaining -doesn't contain contains 
omission explanandum explanandum 
--------------------------------------------- 
7.3.1.3. 'Explaining, howl, versus 'explaining why' 
One doesn't need to construct a brand new plan around the thing to be 
explained in order to give an explanation. Anything that is capable 
of changing our picture of people's plans may do. All that has to 
happen is that the explanandum, not formerly known to be part of a 
plan, ends up as part of a plan. 
This shows up in the contrast I'm going to make between explanations 
of how something is done with explanations of why it was done at all. 
Consider the examples: 
example Spanner-1 
A: I want. a spanner. I'm clearing the U-bend. 
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example Spanner-2 
A-is known to be clearing a U-bend. - and has been seen trying to 
get the nut off by hand 
, A: I, wantýa spanner. The nut is stuck. 
In Spanner-1, A gives an explanation for his want by revealing a plan 
that he wasn't, previously known to have. His want forms part of It. 
In Spanner-2, his utterance kills off one plan (to undo the nut with 
his-fingers) 'by- showing that'it won't work. One can only undo nuts 
that aren't, stuck-that way. He will do it instead with a spanner. He 
doesn't say this,,, but'if you look round to see how he will do it, you 
will light-, on" the plan of him doingýit with a spanner. Hence his 
want. ' 
In cases' like these one is offering reasons for choosing between 
different means to one end. Any sort of reason can be offered. one 
can -give reasons for dropping one alternative. It may have bad side- 
effects' 
A: I'm going by car. It's pouring with rain. 
Or be unsound: 
A -I'll make white bread. I'm out of wholemeal flour. 
One can'equally give reasons for adopting the alternative because of 
Its-own merits. It could have good side-effects: 
A: I bought these at Fraser's. There was a sale. 
zlq 
Or because it is sound. , In this case, _these 
seems to be a suggestion 
that the altenatives wern't sound. Perhaps to defend a choice of 
means one has to show that no other alternative was as good. If you 
think that someone is defending his choice of means in this way, but 
you can't see him, explicitly disparaging the alternative, you will 
presumably accept that he thinks he could disparage it if he wanted. 
So in 
A: I, bought,, this, at the, Indian shop. 
where A's choice lay between buying whatever it was at the Indian 
shop, or somewhere else, you will expect him to be able say what was 
wrong with buying it somewhere else. Perhaps everywhere else was 
shut, in which case the alternative to what he did would have been 
unsound. 
7,3.2. What sort of things are, explained? 
If one is going to try and explain an utterance as explanatory, one 
needs to say what, it. js explaining. Choosing the candidates is a bit 
more complex than it may initally seem. 
7.3.2.1. Explaining, statements 
I 
Many-of the things that one wants to explain teleologically are 
actions. one sort of action is what one could call action out-in-the- 
world: picking up and putting down, coming and going. To explain this 
one reveals aa plan of which the action is part, and which will 
presumably- be intended, to achieve some out-in-the-world benefit - 
having-something or doing something. 
Utterances are actions, and are themselves candidates for 
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explanation. But look at these examples: 
example SX-1 
1, -IIII-I,.. A: There's not much money in your account. I don't want you to 
become overdrawn 
example SX-2 . 
A: There's not much left in your account. This month's pay cheque 
hasn't been paid in 
example. SX-3 
A: There's not much leftAn your account. I've just added up what 
you've paid out last month. 
In all of these, the second sentence is offering an explanation 
germane to the first. sentence, but in different ways. 
-, In SX-1 one interpretation, of what A says-is, that he Is explaining 
the reasons for his saying ýhe, first sentence by means of the fact 
asserted in -the. second., Als, first : sentence,, if construed as a 
warning,, should be explained as. part of his plan to get B to abandon 
a plan that would lead to B ending up overdrawn. A does this by 
, showing that he does have such a plan. He must have it because of the 
goal that he announces he has: -"I don't want you to become 
-overdrawn"_ 
- In SX-2 A Is explaining is the fact asserted in his first sentence, 
of someone not having much money in his account, by another fact 
which from which it follows. 
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- In SX-3 A is explaining, not the fact, but the fact that he knows 
th6 fact. He has mentioned an action which Is Involveds In a plan 
somethinglike this. 
A knows B is overdrawn- 
------------------------------------------------- 
A knows current size B's account is overdrawn 
of B's account 
I 
_7 ------------------------------- 7 -------------- 
A knows B's outgoings A knows size of B's account 
adds B's cheques up 
Similarly, one can ' explain one Is ignorance of a' fact. Asking a 
question Is usually grounds for thinking that the asker doesn't know 
the answer. and explanation may be offered for that fact. 
On a railwayý'siation platform 
A: 'Did you'get the announcement? I couldn'. t hear it for the noise. 
7.3.2.2. Explaining requests 
Questions are the companion of statements. They should be explicable 
too. I'll start by talking about explaining them, and then suggest 
.1, "11, .", J "' ,I that it 'is requests rather than questions that we should see as the 
companion. Questions areýafter-all a particqlar class of requests. 
Questions show some of th Ie same ambijuity about what exactly Is to be 
explained that statements do, but it is not quite the same. If they 
were the same, the parallel would look like this. 
222. 
,. statement ., question 
---------------- 7 ----- 7 -------------------- 
thing to why did he say F? why did he ask F? 
be explained -------------- 7 ------------------------------------ why is F true? why is F wanted? 
------------------------------------------------ 
why does he know F? why does he not know F? 
------------------------------------------- 
But there are problems with this., -If one asks 
"F? ". it is not true 
that- one, wants F. What one wants, is to know whether F. So the second 
line , 
is funny. Then again, ' why 
does one ask a question? Because one 
has a reason for knowing something, but one doesn't know it. But then 
the_ second , of these 
is both a component of the reason in the first 
line, and also the whole of the third line. If Instead I draw a 
parallel between statement and, request, the table looks like this. 
statement request 
----------------------- i -------------------------- thing to why did he say F? why did he request F? 
be explained --- ' ---------------------------------------- why is F true? why is F wanted? 
--- ------------------------------------------- 
why does he know F? 
----------------------------------------------- 
Are there two distinct,, cases? Yes. Contrast the two examples: 
A: Could you give some people a lift over here? I ask you because 
you've got the largest car. 
A: Could you give some people a lift over here? We need them to 
complete our octet. 
only in the second is a reason given for wanting the people to come 
over at all. 
It is still true that asking a question can lead to an explanation 
being given for the asker not knowing the answer. But that this can 
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happen can be extracted as a theorem in this setup. A question is a 
request to tell something, say G. Being told G is only profitable if 
you want to'know G, and you don't know G. So to most people who ask a 
question, you can ascribe a desire to know G. And then that desire is 
available as a thing to be explained. 
In fact, something'"similar may be true for all requests. One only 
requests-X if one is actively seeking X. One only actively seeks X if 
it both something you want and if (one knows) that it is false. So 
any requests suggests that both -X, and knowledge of -X, are 
available for explanation. 
If you view a statement as a revelation of what Sp believes, and a 
request as a revelation of what he actively seeks, then the proper 
analogy will be this. 
statement request 
----------------------------------------------- 
thing to why did'he say F? why did he request F? 
be explained ----------------------------- 
why is F true? why is F valued? 
why is -F true? 
----------------------------------------------- 
why does he know F? why does he know -F? 
----------------------------------------------- 
7.3.2.3. A degenerate explanation of requests 
I've drawn a distinction between the fact of requesting X. and the 
fact' of wanting X. But because of what requests are. the fact that 
they were made can also easily be explained in rather the same way 
that one would explain the fact of wanting X. Suppose that I offer 
you rules' rather"like this: 
Hr does X <-, Sp requests Hr to do X& Hr helps Sp 
X <- Person does X 
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Then any plan that explains the action requested will also be able to 
explain the fact of the request. If the action X is explained as 





Sp requests Hr to do X Hr helps Sp 
But this is not the only sort of explanation available. 
7.3.3. Why explain? 
Why should Sp give explanations? I suggest there are four sorts of 
benefit he can get. One stems from the fact that just giving an 
explanation maybe worth doing; there is a social pressure to do so. 
The others, from the fact that after Sp has given an explanation, Hr 
has a fuller and more up-to-date version of SpIs plan before him. As 
a result, 
- Sp may have made himself more cogent 
- Sp may let Hr know better what Sp is about to do 
- sp may be able to forestall wrong interpretations of what he is 
doing 
7.3.3.1. Sp may have discharged social obligations to explain himself 
it is rude to leave your companions in too much doubt about what you 
are doing. 
2 
(Fro, n a story) A man and a woman have just murdered their 
employer 
Woman: Now lets go to the office. 
Man: Why to the office? 
Woman: That's the nearest place we can get a typewriter with 
a carbon ribbon 
Neither the reader nor the man can guess why a typewriter is wanted. 
I hope you agree that woman seems rude. Part of the woman's rudeness 
is due to her having refused a request for information. Any refusal 
may be rude. But part of it is because she leaves her accomplice in 
the dark about her intentions, when he has a social right to know 
about them. I can only speculate why this social pressure exists. A 
possible evolutionary reason would be this. Any group of agents who 
usually co-operate are going to do better if they keep each other up 
to date on what they intend, since if they do, each of them can both 
keep out of his companions' way, and advise them on problems with 
their intentions that they haven't yet seen. If you're among friends, 
gratuitous frankness may pay. In any case not to be told what other 
people are doing can be-very annoying, and the specific remedy may be 
to*explain what you are doing. 
Here is another example. 
A and B have just landed at Linate airport for the first 
time. Neither is sure where to go. They are now standing 
waiting for a bus. Suddenly A walks away 
A: I'm just groing to put this <apple core> in a bin. 
.11- 
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A is of course, explaining the action , 
that he is doing. He has 
outlined his plan, and the action that B can observe fits into it. If 
he hadn't, B might have explained,. ýit by supposing that A was 
wandering off on some private travelling scheme that may separate 
them. This would alarm B. It is in order to prevent that that A says 
what he is, really doing. 
7.3.3.2., Sp may have made himself, more cogent 
7.3.3.2.1. Cogency, of value', 
Suppose I make a request of,. you.. If your have the sort of 
relationship with me, that lets, me, make requests. you will probably 
feel warmly enough, towards me to carry it out, for no better reason 
that that I ask. But if. you're Just doing it because I ask, there 
will be no reason why you should feel any particular sense of urgency 
about it. You., only,, feel a request is urgent when you've got a reason 
for thinking, it is. Some requests show their urgency on their face. 
For instance, "Get this dog off me". Others are taken to be urgent 
because they are only likely to be made in a serious situation. For 
instance, "Ring, the doctor". 
But if, you do want me. to jump to it, You're going to have to make it 
obvious that the request matters. How can you do this? You have a 
choice. - 
- You can, label your request as urgent, and expect me to trust you 
about that. For instance, you can say "Lend me a quid. It's urgent! " 
or . 
"Please be. absolutely sure not to forget the eggs". I won't say 
more about this option. 
- you can demonstrate that You reqdest is urgent, because complying 
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with it ý procures some especially good goal, or not complying causes 
some ýparticularly bad problem. The way you 
do that is to let me see 
what course of action (which may be plan of yours) the result of my 
action-is going to assist. 
For instance, you say "Will you post this letter for me? ". I agree. 
and put it in my pocket. and as like as not forget it for a couple of 
days., If however you. say "Will you post this letter for me? It's my 
parking .. 
fine and. if I don't pay, it, I1,11 be summonsed", you explain 
the substance of your request by showing how it is embedded in a plan 
like this.. 
. .11 
Sp summonsed for non payment of fine 
-, Sp pays fine before, time T 
----------------------------- 
Sp pays fine before time T 
I 
Hr posts fine before time T 
Indeed, just saying "Will you post this? It's my parking fine" would 
be enough to allow the reconstructioin of thii plan. What matters is 
that, the anti-goal, being summonsed, is now clearly seen as Ithe 
effect of non-compliance, and the importance of getting the letter 
off is correspondingly, enhanced. 
(A minor point. I have been using "urgent" as ambiguous betwqeen 
,. "urgent" in -the sense that the opportunity for doing something must 
be seized, rapidly.. and, "important", meaning that the goal or anti- 
goal is something that you care about very much. But revealing a goal 
that is either of these will have the same effect. ) 
t 
7,3.3.2.2. Cogency of fact 
Just as Sp, may'wantýto increase the likelihood of Hr becoming really 
interested. in, fulfilling SpIs expressed wants, so may he feel he has 
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to strengthen the chance of Hr believing his expressed beliefs. Again 
fie'-has two'ways'of'doing this. 
0 
- He can label his remark as especilly sincere and persuasive - "You 
must believe me, I'm telling you the truth". 
- He can demonstrate its truth by showing the grounds he has for 
believing, it.. One can make, a dist'inction between giving, evidence that 
something is or was true, by. showing that it occurs in an executed 
plan, and showing that it will be true, because it occurs as an 
effect of a plan yet to be executed. 
Here is an example of a plan explaining a fact by means of an 
executed plan. 
A: You'll find the book on the hall table. I left it there 




And one of a future fact. 
A: 
"I 
won't. be home when you get in. I'm going to a CND meeting. 
In each case, A is involving his main remark in a plan of which he 
must, since he is the agent, have special knowledge. Since what he 
says is goodevidence for what he himself does or will do, It must be 
equally good evidence for any part of what he does. 
An explanation of how, a, fact came to be known may also increase the 
cogency of a statement. For instance: 
A: Some of our slates need replacing. I was up in the attic 
yesterday. 
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The executed plan behind this is something like 
A knows (slates need replacing) 
I 
--------------------------------------------- 
A looks at slates slates need replacing 
7 ---- --------------------- 
A turns gaze upwards A in attic 
Note I that if the example had been "The ballcock is broken. I looked 
In the tank. " then one could object that one didn't have to consider 
A's plans. One might just say that there was a direct inference, 
about A's authority on the matter of broken ballcocks, like this 
A is authoritative on whether (the ballcock is broken) 
I Alooks in the'tank 
This is a rule one could justify by considerations of plumbing and 
vision. But'in the slates example, does one want a rule like 
A is authoritative on whether (the slates need replacing) 
ý'A, was in the-attic 
No. It would'be'true'only If, if A looked up while in the attic, then 
he would see the slates. That is not a condition of the rule. And the 
idea of a rule like 
A is"authoritative on whether (the slates need replacing) 
A smoked out wasps 
to explain-aý-example'llke 
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A: Somle of the slates need replacing. I was smoking out the wasps 
yesterday. 
is laughable. On the other hand, this (rather abbreviated) plan with 
its side-effect would explain the connection. 
A knows' (slat7es' need replacing) ', 
I- wasps in attic 
---------------------------- 7 ------------- 
A looks at slates slates need replacing 
--------------------------------- ------------------------ 
A turns gaze upwards A in attic A lights sulphur 
7.3.3.3. Sp may let Hr know better what Sp is about to do 
All the usual reasons for Sp letting Hr know what Sp is doing may 
apply - unspoken., communication of fact and value, giving opportunity 
for criticism and comment. and so on. 
7.3.3.4. Sp may be_., able to forestall wrong interpretations of what he 
is doing 
Sometimes one can offer, an explanation of an action, not just to cure 
the alarm caused by the person observing you not knowing what you are 
doing, but to get rid of some specific plan that they wrongly think 
you are'following. For"instance 
exaýpleV17- ," I- 
M usually tries to'listen to the IOpm news. The radio is in 
the kitchen-'He walks out of the sitting room where he and W 
have been'sitting 
- W: It's 9pm-, not lOpm. 
23) 
I'm going to-get some-tea. 
What, happened? M left. W guessed that he had this plan 
M hear news 
I 
-------------------------------------------- 
M by radio radio on time is 10pm 
------------------------------------ 
c--radio in kitchen M in kitchen 
I 
M goes to kitchen 
W, who seeks to help M, tells him that a precondition of this plan, 
that it be 10pm, is false, and so his plan is unsound. M rejects the 
warning by telling her that in fact he has a different plan, and 
isn't injured by what she has told him. He does this by revealing 
that his plan (in outline) is 
M drink tea 
--------------- 
M have tea 
----------------------- 
M make tea 
M in kitchen 
M go to kitchen 
Why should M have made this specific rejection of W's advice? Could 
he, not just have ignored It? A possible reason for being explicit 
about-the*rejection is this. Criticism of your plans by your friends 
is' useful. Theyýknow, this. But if they offer you criticism which you 
reject -without''-reason, they will come to think that you don't value 
it, and may eventually stop giving it to you. To prevent them giving 
up, one feels an urge to show why one doesn't accept the particular 
advice they have offered, without denigrating their advice In 
general. Indeed. giving reasons for one's rejection is not in fact 
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getting good advice and then explaining why you don't use it, but 
instead it is showing that it isn't advice, and that your plan Isn't 
the shape that their advice presumes it is. 
Here is another, s1lightly more complex, example. 
example 5/22 
m is tying up the neck ofa rubbish bag which lines the dust 
bin, which is usually done the day before the bag is put out 
for the dustmen 
W: Is it rubbish day, tomorrow? 
M: No. The bag is full. 
W's question can be interpreted In several ways; as a rhetorical 
question to dissuade M from a mistaken activity; as an attempt to get 
an explanation of what he is doing; as a question about the day of 
the week., prompted by what she has just seen M do. But In any case 
MIS second sentence., is telling her that she is on the wrong lines. He 
Is, not, tying up the bag so, that he can put it out without the rubbish 
blowing about, but-because it is full and a new one must be put in 
the dust bin. 
The plan that W at first contemplates M having is the plan below. She 
believes M is attempting to prevent an unpleasant possible side- 
effect of a- particular plan. "Rubbish scattered" Is bad. "Rubbish 




rubbish taken away rubbish rubbish bag rubbish bag 
out of bin untied knocked over 
I ----------- 
-------- ------ rubbish bag 
dustmen come rubbish on pavement untied 




M proffers as an alternative explanation an identical effort to avoid 
a bad side-effect-, but it would arise from a different plan. 
empty bag in bin rubbish scattered 
--------------------- -------------------------------------- 
put'bag bin empty rubbish rubbish bag rubbish bag 
in bin out of bin untied knocked over 
I ----------- 
take rubbish bag rubbish bav, 
out of bin untied 
I 
tie up rubbish bag 
7.3.4. Sequence of explanatory utterances and explanands 
In most of the examples so far, when the explanandum has been an 
utterance, the explanandum has come first, followed by some other 
information that lets one build the explanation. But things don't 
have to happen like that. 
A: I'm going to Bauermeister's <a bookseller>. I want a 
Spanish dictionary. 
could have occurred as 
A: I want a Spanish dictionary. I'm going to Bauermeister's 
<a bookseller>. 
in which case the second sentence is not intuitively an explanation. 
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but rather a description of a means that will be pursued. Similarly. 
A: Some of the slates need replacing. I was smoking out the 
wasps yesterday. 
could have been produced as 
A: I was smok Ing out the wasps yesterday. Some of the slates 
need replacing. 
My intuition is that you can suppose that these reflect different 
intentions. The first is probably said by someone who is interested 
in getting consent to his suggestion that something ought to be done 
about the slates. The second could have come from someone who while 
describing what he did yesterday was more or less idly struck by a 
thought that something would have to be done about the slates; but it 
could also have come from an avid slatemender who wanted to lay out 
the strength of his evidence first. 
The flow of thought of the man who reflects about what he saw in the 
attic is not for me. I only attempt to explain purposive speech. 
Taken as purposive speech, it seems to me that the order of the 
sentences produced by the slatemender doesn't matter. What he was 
after was not explanation as an end in itself, but in order to give 
his important remark the added cogency of being seen to have been 
verified by what he had done. His remarks add up to the same thing in 
both cases. 
There may well be a reason that he could give for choosing one form 
over the other, but I believe it would have to in terms of, for 
example, presenting facts in the order that made an inference easier. 
not in terms of inducing in his hearer one inference rather than 
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another. It would be a decision made on grounds of rhetoric rather 
than logic. I expect'it would be rational an such grounds, but I have 
no idea what the criteria in that region would be. 
If, this is so, one may have to wait over several-sentences before one 
is able' to see their intended relation to each other. But as my 
examples show, I have only looked at exchanges of a very few 
sentences, and'can say very little about longer passages. 
7.4. Conclusion 
Some discourse events are constituted by changes in the plans that a 
planner is 'known to have. I have given examples. Either to Identify 
or to' respond to them, one is going to have to keep a model of what 
the plans of the other parties to the discourse are. This is made 
easier 'if-such plans do not have to be attached to particular people 
but-can*be taken as global to the discourse, in the way suggested in 
the previous chapter. 
'236 
Chapýer 8. Attempts at processes 
, his- chapter is a sketch of two processes that could detect the 
changes., and the point of the changes, being attempted by the maker 
of an utterance. 
The first approach was to ask, Is there a fixed case analysis. in the 
form of a flow-chart of questions, that one can follow to find the 
purpose of a remark? 1-Understanding 
an utterance is finding a path 
through the analysis COMDatible with the utterance and the currently 
extant plans. I show some such flow-charts. For simple cases they are 
appealing. but in general they fail: the purposes of utterances are 
too various. 
'The second 
uses chains of inferences built from rules whose 
antece. dents, are purposely not checked. If the chains that can be 
built starting from the utterance and an extant plan run to a common 
"interesting" fact. it may be wise to see if these chain can be made 
into proofs. If they can, a wise planner will make certain changes to 
his plans. These changes may be credible purposes of the utterance. 
This approach is I suspect the correct one. However it runs into 
practical problems of search control. 
Though these approaches are both rejected. they are only means of 
realizing the theory. Neither failure impugns the theory itself. 
8.1., A speaker's remarks can affect his own plan 
What follows invokes the notion of what A says altering his own plan. 
This sound. s,, a little odd. In fact whatever A has planned to do 
remains the same whatever he says. however. what matters here to A 
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and his' interlocutor are the plans they mutually believe themselves 
to have. A: is caDable of altering this by what he says; for instance. 
he 'does ''so if he reveals a previously private intention: or if he 
asserts some fact not previously mutually known but which makes some 
plan he is believed to intend impossible. 
The image I had in mind while trying to form these ideas was this: A 
and B are sitting at a table jointly doing something such as carving 
some sculptures. They also each have their own private sculptures out 
of each others' sight. The joint sculptures are supposed to be like 
their private sculptures. but at each moment the public sculpture may 
be merely a partial or even a wrong version of the private ones. They 
can chisel at the joint sculpture or at their own, but not at each 
other's. The joint sculpture is the mutually known plans, and can be 
affected by what each of them allows it to b, e deduced that his prvate 
plan (or sculpture) looks like. If A (say) alters the public 
sculpture and then says that his private sculpture looks like the new 
one, then what he is doine in analogous to what I have described as 
"A altering his own plan by what he says". 
8.2. Is a fixed flow-chart of questions possible? 
once I had realized that the alterations a speaker revealed in his 
own plan might in themselves have the effect of an utterance, I 
wanted to see how they worked. I argued like this. If these unspoýen 
utý terances are really like ordinary utterances, then they should have 
the' same range of effects as ordinary utterances, and so whatever 
mechanism was used for understanding direct remarks should be more or 
less applicable to unspoken ones. 
Furthermore. what a speaker says can only effect two classes of plan: 
his own and his hearer's. There is (usually) no one else listening. 
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And if It affects his own. so as to give rise to an unspoken remark. 
that, unspoken _remark 
can only be expected to matter to his hearer's 
plans. To see, this, consider what would happen if, this weren't true. 
The. idea I's that an unspoken remark that a person generated 
by 
offerýing a contrast between twolversions of a plan he has feeds back 
to affect, another. plan hý is, known. to have. 
Sp says F 
F alters his plan. P. 1, to P2 
PI, when contrasted with P2 reveals, that H 
H alters another, of his plans Q1 to Q2 
Q1 when contrasted with Q2 reveals that J 
,J 
has some, useful effect on Hr's plans 
But why should Sp go about communicating J this way? Surely it would 
always-be, to his advantage to leave out one stage and just say H 
explicitly'ý This argument may not be very compelling: it seems to be 
-terance. since one could ask "Why an. 
-argument 
against any unspoken ut 
didn't So say what he said with one indirection with none at all? ". 
On the other hand, it. may be the case that even though one 
indirection works. two indirections may be too complex for Sp to be 
able to be confident that he would get his message across. And I have 
come across no example that seem to need double indirection. 
It seemed 
'to 
me then that what I could do was draw a net. and label 
the arcs with events that could occur during the chain of events that 
led, from an utterance to its having its having intended effect. If 
this net were, exhaustive, and if one could at each arc test to see 
whether the event it was labelled with could have occurred, then one 
could, search. throughout. the net. If one came out, it would mean that 
there was a course of events that led to a benefit for Sp. and which 
might b. e. the purpose of his remark. 
z3q 
The net would be made of several parts that would be repeated in more 
than- one place. --Such parts would 
be tests to see whethet some 
particular remark could alter a particular plan; to see what 
information contrasting two versions of a plan ýrevealed: and to see 
whether" people tended to help, each orher-and would therefore benefit 
from the bits of information being passed round. 
Let me start with statements. What sequences of events ought to be 
recognized in the - net? First, of all. some statement has to be made 
before anVthing can happen at all. 
A statement. - I thought. can then do one of two things to a plan. It 
can -describe the plan; or it can'alter it, by stating that the world 
is different from how the plan takes it to be. There are two people 
who may have plans involved in the exchange; the Sp and the Hr. So 
the effect of, '. a statement must fall into one of the cells in t1he 
grid: 
alter plan describe plan 
Sp 
Hr 
. No- action of Sp can filIthe cell of "describing HrIs plan". because 
he, doesn't know-what it is. (I know he can purport to do this; "You 
want me, to stay in the rain so that I die and You will become master 
of Headlong 'Hall! But you shan't, you shan't". But this cannot 
actually be description of the hr's plan. At most it is description 
of what Sp takes it to be. ) The other cells can be filled. 
The simplest operation and the most obvious sort of benefit this can 
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procure is the altruistic one of advising the hearer. This falls in 
the cell of altering Hr's plan. However. this is only any good to Sp 
if he wants to help Hr. 
This leaves the cells where Sp is describing or altering his own 
plan. Both of these will have their effect through Sp showing that 
his plan is different to-how 
"it 
was thought to be, so that new 
information arises from contrasting them. 
As far as describing his own plan goes. it seemed that there were two 
ways this"could be'done-. -" 
- Sp can more or less explicitly describe his plan. He can say "I'm 
going next door to borrow a cup of sugar". 
- Sp can just reveal his need, which may be enough evidence to let Hr 
guess what plan he will pursue to that end. He can say "I want a 
pint", and leave Hr to infer that he will go to the pub to get it. 
sp can alter his own plan in just the way that he can alter someone 
else's. But he can also say something with the intention, not of 
altering a plan that he is known to have, but of being credited with 
a previously unknown plan which must be imputed to him before his 
remark makes sense. For instance, a man announces he has no money. If 
you want to assume that this alters his own plan, but you don't know 
what plan he has, you have to assume he has some plan that it coes 
alter. In this case, a plan to buy something would meet the bill. 
This I call "forced ascription". because one is forced to ascribe a 
plan to the Sp. When this has occurred, the contrast of no plan and 
the revealed plan may affect Hr. 
But after either of these, it still has to be shown that the 
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information derived -by contrasting plans has an effect that Sp finds 
useful. Two sorts of information can emerge from the contrast: 
- Information about 
'ýhat will happen. about fact. This may make Hr 
change his plans. This will only please Sp if Sp wants to help Hr. 
- Information about what Sp wants, about value. This will only have 
any effect on Hr's plan if Hr wants to help Sp. Otherwise Hr wil. "'L 
just ignore Sp's wants. 
In the light of that, here is the net I devised: 
q-2- 
A makes a statement 
statement statement statement 
reveals describes alters 
A's need A's plan A's plan 
---------------- 
----------------- 
A's plan is A's plan is 
i revealed kenlarged 
----------------- - 
---------------------------------- 
A helps BB helps A 
contrast of A's contrast of A's 
1 plans plans reveals 
i reveals fact I value 
---------------------------------- 
B's plan is altered 
0 
What can one do along similar lines for questions? 
A helps B 
statement was 





A question is ostensibly asked because the asker wants to know the 
answer. Presumably if one can find the point of the answer, that was 
why the question was asked. So perhaps what one ought to do is look 
at the effects of the answer, and see how that might benefit the 
asker. 
t 
Rather than talking about Sp and Hr. which leads to confusion. talk 
about two people A and B. A asks the question. The net will start 
with B saying something in reply to A. 
The grid of possible oDerations is the same. except that it should be 
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labelled with the namesýof, the speakers, thus 
alter, plan describe plan 
A 
B 
The cell that can't be filled is B describing A's plan. 
The simplest benefit that can arise is for the answer to the question 
to affect A's plan, as when A asks if the last'bus has gone. What A 
wants is the effect of the answer on his own plan. That is a sequence 
of events comparable to what happens when Sp makes a statement 
altruistically advising Hr. 
Comparable to a statement where Sp describes his own plan to give Hr 
information would be A asking Ba question about B's plan, in order 
to extract information from it. A question asking B about his plan 
("What are you doing with that cup? ") or about his goals ("Do you 
want a cup of tea? ") will do this. If B answers, what he says will be 
a description of his plan. A can perhaps derive information from the 
contrast of the plan he thought B had, with what he now thinks B has. 
But then, just as before, this information has to be proved to be 
beneficial. If it is fact, it is good if it alters A's plan in any 
way,, since -it brings it into better accord with reality. If it is 
value, it only benefits A if A tends to help B, and is therefore glad 
to learn of services he can do. 
Comparable to Sp saying something that forces Hr to ascribe a new 
plan to SP is the case of A asking something to which the answer will 
alter, not a plan he is known to have. but a previously unknown plan. 
Then the contrast of no plan and the revealed plan may affect B. As 
t far as guessing which plan is to be ascribed. any method that works 
when fed a statement that Sp made to Hr will also work when fed an 
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answer that that B may make to A. Of course the answer may be "yes" 
or "no", so two cases may have to be tried. But I stress that. in 
either case, the mechanism would still be working from a statement. 
even though a statement that hasn't yet been made. The information 
derived from the contrast will benefit A if it is fact and It helps B 
when A tends to help B, or if it is value and affects B because B 
tends to help A. 
, 
The net for questions then looks like this: 
0 
B makes a statement 
in reply to A's question 
---------------------------------------------- 
statement- statement statement 
reveals i describes alters 
B's need B's plan A's plan 
---------------- 




A helps BB helps A 
I contrast of contrast of 
B's plans B's plans 
I reveals fact I reveals value 
--------------- 7- 
A's plan is altered 
0 
A helps B 
co. -. trast of 
A's plans 
reveals fact 
A helps A 
(always true) 
statement was 









' B's plan is altered 
0 
T ihese nets look very similar. They can be made even more similar if 
one notices that the first can be unfolded, that two identical paths 




A makes a statement 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
statement statement statement A helps B 
reveals I describes alters 
A's need A's plan A's plan 
statement was 
---------------- a statement of fact 
----------------- 
!t,, -i-, II, - 





A helps BIB helps A 
i contrast of' i contrast of 
A's plans ; A's plans 
reveals fact' i reveals value 






A helps BB helps A 
contrast of contrast of A's 
A's plans plans reveals 
reveals fact value 
----------------- 
I A's plan is altered 
0 
This cries out for some sort of unification. The nets are the same 
shape. and the only differences are in who does what. Perhaps one can 
label the net, with a constant set of roles, so that the all one has 
to do to get the statement and question versions of the net is to 
alter who the roles are filled by. What would these roles be? 
There'seem to be two axes of difference between the participants. One 
axis is about direction of flow of assertion. There is always an 
utterer and a receiver of the remark that matters, that is. the 
remark that has an effect on the participants plans. The remark that 
matters is the statement in the case of the statement. and the reply 
in the case of a question. 
2ý4 
The other axis is about who causes the exchange. The person who 
causes the exchange is the one whose motive must be examined. In a 
statement, the causer is the maker of the statement. In a question 
and answer exchange, the causer is the person who asks the question. 
I'll call the person who isn't the causer, the other. 
In a statement, this happens: 
A: (makes statement) 
In a question and answer, this happens: 
A: (asks question) 
B: (makes reply) 






What does the net look like with constant roles? (I've abb. -eviited 
the top left hand corner. ) 
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utt helps, Rec helps 
Rec Utt 
contrast of I contrast of 
utt's plans Utt's plans 
reveals fact reveals value 
---------------- 
Ree's plan is altered 
----------------- 
Causer helps Other helps 
Other i Causer 
contrast of 1 contrast of 
I Causer's plans! Causer's plans 
reveals fact reveals value 
----------------- 
Other's plan is altered 
I abandoned this approach because it seemed too artificial and too 
constricting. In particular, there is no obvious place in it where 
machinery to recognize offers, refusals, etc can be inserted. 
8.3. Looking for the point of an utterance using chains of Inference 
My next attempt was to try and understand an utterance by looking for 
some beneficial effect it had on some extant plan, updating the plan. 
and repeating the process for the next utterance. In slightly more 
detail, 
- The system believes that there is a set of plans that each of the 
speakers is either contemplating or executing, and that what these 
plans are is mutually known. The sytem knows that it may have Very 
imperfect knowledge about the plans. Some of them may be wholly 
2ý3 
unknown. But whatever the state of knowledge, it is believed to be 
mutually known. It is possible, that, the parties actually have private 
beliefs and intentions as well, which may,, differ from what is 
mutually known. This will occur during attempted deception. But I am 
going to ignore that. 
A speaker makes an utterance.. The system has to see how this Is 
beneficial. This Involves 
seeing the effect of the utterapce on the plan 
seeing that it Is beneficial 
- Once the system has, discovered the effect an the plan, it can 
suppose that the. change is mutually known. Why? Because the initial 
plans were ex hypothesi mutually known; all the speakers are assuMed 
to apply the same mutually, known recognition process; If this 
Involves postulating that a plan has been changed, then the changed 
plans must be mutually known too. 
- Now the whole process can be repeated with the new plans. 
Seeing "the 4ffeci'andieeing that is beneficial each have their own 
complexities. 
Remember that the system knows that it may not have a complete 
picture of the other persons' plans. It is possible that the 
utterance should be intended to have an effect on one of the unknown 
parts of,, the plan. To detect this. the system will first have to 
guess,, the unknown parts of the plan. Having to do this won't be 
uncommon. 
A:,, I'm_gol, ng to get some milk. 
B: The shop Is shut. 
zq-q 
All that A reveals of his plan is its (presumably final) goal. B's 
response can only be understood if one imagines him having made a 
guess at the means that he thinks A will employ. 
The same thing happens when the bit of the plan that is unknown is 
above rather thanýbelow what is known. In 
A: I'll drop in at the bookshop. 
B: I don't think your order will have come in yet. 
B must -first have guessed at the purpose of A's plan, and then 
attacked the new bit. 
How can the system guess at the unknown bits? My approach assumed 










.w Suppose that the plan attributed to some speaker is 
---- -------- ----- 
and the utterance that someone makes is "U". The system can search 
forward from U using the rules it knows until it finds a possible 
conclusion that would affect the plan by contradicting one of its 
preconditions. The action of "searching forwards from a sentence S'# 
is just finding a rule of which S is an antecedent, finding the 
consequent C, and then perhaps repeating the procedure with C. Or it 
can "searching backwards". which is the obvious coý. -. p-'e. ment. For 







and string them together so that It could conclude -Q. But -Q denies 








where marks the contradiction. 
If the system. is to, suppose that this is the way the utterance was 
meant to bear on the plan, then it will also have to suppose that the 
speaker can bel. ileve W1 and W2. 
The other point is that it will have to record both the initial plan 
and the supposed attack on it. since that attack will itself be open 
to attack later, as in 
ý il 
A: I'm going to the shop. 
B: It's shut. 
A: It'was open wrien I went past it a minute ago. 
At the end- of this exchange. the complex plan will somethina like 
this: ý- 
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A buys ... from shop I 
---------------------- 
shop open ........ 
B's remark - shop open 
A's rejoinder shoo open 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
A believes shop open A authoritative about "shop open" 
---------------------- 
A observed "shop open" 
I never worried about extracting such a proof from A's rejoinder -I 
would have pretended that A had said "A observed "shop open" " and 
tried to get the system to work forward from there. 
Seeing a remark as an attack on an unstated goal of a plan needs 
forward branching, not just from the utterance but from the plan too. 
In the bookshop exaMDle above, all that A reveals of his plan is 
something like 
A goes to bookshop 
If the system searches forward from this, and from the negation of 
the utterance. it may come to the same conclusion, postulating a plan 
like this: 
A has book 
--------------------------------------------------- 
A at bookshop A buys book book at bookshop 
A goes to bookshop - book at bookshop 
In this, what is mutually known of the plan has increased. if the 
system is going to use this as an explanation of what B said, then it 
is going to have to make this committment about what it thinks A's 
goal is. That is right. It lets one guess at what is happening in an 
exchange such as 
29a 
A: I'll drop in at the books. hop. 
B: I don't think your order will have come in yet. 
A: No. I wanted to get a pad of paper. 
Looking, for remarks to have this sort of relevance, attacks on the 
soundness of a plan, is, it seems, in theory trivial. Suppose P is 
some node at the fringe of a known plan, and U is the utterance. The 
system must look for possible inferences so as to produce a proof 




or in this shape, where it is guessed that if P is a precondition, it 
is becauseAtAogether with other facts. such as X. are collectively 
the, antecedents of some rule used in the plan: 
----------------- 
Anýutterance need not impugn the antecedents of a proof tree to alter 
it, -It may support it. For instance, it may be mutally known that one 








This does not mean that eg C is true. Perhaps it is known that it 







Discovering this needs search forward from U and backward from the 
known plan. 
If an utterance's supporting or contradicting a precondition of a 
mutually known plan can affect the merit of the plan, what other 
relations between an utterance and a plan can be important? Can one 
decide between which sentences one should search for links? Is there 
any principle in it? 
There is, and a simple one. It has to do with the ways of affecting 
the merit of'a plan--described in chapter 4. A plan has an effect if 
it makes sound (or unsound) an initially unsound (or sound) proof 
tree whose tip is either good or bad. The general relation between a 
plan and an effect is as in Search/I. This, and the following 
diagrams. are drawn in accordance with the appendix. The triangles 
are proof trees, and the overlap represents some node In the plan 
which is also a fringe node of the effect. The ordinary case. where 
the tip of the plan is valued and is the goal of the plan is the 
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the general case. 
as in Search/2. For brevity I'll consider only 
f 
Given a statement of fact U and a plan, U may add an effect if all 
the preconditions of the proof tree that is the effect except U are 
already true. as in Search/3. Similarly it may remove an effect if 
all the preconditions in the effect are already true and if they 
include -U; as in Search/4: or more generally, if U entails the 
contradiction of a preconditon of the effect, as in search/S. 
This suggests what search must be done if one suspects that an effect 
is being added. From U one must search forward until one comes to a 
valued sentence that is not already proved, as in Search/6- The 
dashed line represents a series of inferences such as 
----- 
A 





where the truth of A, G are at first irrelevant. 
Then one tries to find a similar link between a node in the plan and 
the valued sentence; as in Search/7. Now the dashed lines may give 
you the skeleton of an effect proof tree: something such as 









If one can hypothesize that Sp, the utterer of U believes L, G. and 
that he can believe that Hr can believe them 4. *oo, then one can 
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of this depends on being able to agree that adding the effect 
benefits Sp. 
Looking for the removal of an effect is similar. one tries to find a 
link as in Search/8. or even as a two stage process as in Search/9, 
which is needed to cover an exchange such as 
A: I'm going to the beach. 
B: There's some sun tan oil in my bag. 
That is an attempt to point out the possibility of removing a bad 
effect from a plan as suggested in Search/10. 
A statement of value has to be treated differently. but the principle 
is the same. A proof tree is only an effect if its tip is valued. 
Someone's statement of value can change what is known to be valued. 
suppose Sp says "I want V". This will add an effect to a plan if one 
can find a link from the plan as in Search/11, and can accept the 
proof tree that the link suggests. Similarly "I don't want V" (taking 
it to mean *-(I want V)". not "I want -V" ) will remove the effect in 
Search/12. 
questions about fact or value, and commands, can be treated 
analogously if one assumes that It is the response to them that may 
affect a plan. For t-he question "Is U true? " one should try to link 
either U or -U to a plan In the way Just described; both U and -U 
because either answer may be the important one. Similarly for the 
question "DO you want VV . One should try to see what both "I want V" 
and "I don't want V" do to the plan. For the command "Do F! " one 
should try to link both F and -F to the plan - again, either 
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Sometimes,, Indeed quite often, an utterance will be made when there 
is no mutually known plan - as forinstance when a stranger asks you 
"Do you know the time? ". The essential thing is still to link the 
utterance via a link that may grow into a proof tree to a valued tip. 
Then if necessary one can hypothesize a plan. In the "Do you know the 
time? " example, one can hypothesize as in Search/13. This can be 
expanded very reasonably into one of the cases where. the plan and the 
effect wholly overlap. 
Sometimes though one has to guess the plan too, as in 
A: Do you mind if I turn off the fire? 
which can only be seen as a question relevant to the badness of an 
effect if one hypothesizes an action that might cause the effect, as 
in Search/14. The effect is the minimal proof tree of a single 
sentence. 
The problem of course with this sort of branching search is 
controlling it. What II have said describes what is to be done 
(roughly, but formally it is too trivial to expand). But if the 
utterance U is an antecedent of many rules, the search will explode. 
Since my interest was trying to show how trivial processes could do 
interesting work, I always cheated. and tested examples where the 
rules that could be used in the search were more or less exactly 
those that I knew would be needed. 
Nevertheless, this approach is probably the right one. It will, if it 
succ_eeds., 
'find 
only real effects, and if it ran for ever it would 
find 
. 
all. effects. (There is an analogy with resolution theorem 
proving. ) The heuristic that would probably be the most sensible to 
apply_would be breadth-first searching. The utterance and all the 
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nodes in the plan would be the intial frontier of such a search. All 
sentences such that 'they were a conclusion of a rule of which some 
antecedent was In the current frontier would be the next frontier - 
and so on until'the frontiers touched. Searches for contradiction can 
be made in an obviously similar way. Another heuristic is intuitively 
more appealing but more speculative. - When the conversation turns on 
macintoshes, 'the goal-of keeping dry is likely to motivate remarks. 
If one could make even a rough stab at proposing the valued sentences 
that might be the tips of effects, just on the grounds of the sort of 
things that had been mentioned, one would have three anchor points to 
attempt to chain between (plan, 'utterance, and also likely valued 
ientences), not-just'two. ' That should constrain search considerably. 
A"candidate method would be the demons of Charniak (1972.1976). A 
demon is an inference rule which is only used in an attempt to make 
an inference once 'some of its antecedents have been already been 
established in the text being analysed. Other antecedents are then 
looked-for explicitly. Not all such Inference rules are available all 
the time. They must have been loaded by a "base routine", a process 
sensitive to the topics in a text. Which topics are known to be 
present depends on earlier inferences or explicit references. 
The application to finding plan interactions would be that actions or 
states --present in' a' plan tree would count as references to some 
topic. ' The topic's presence would lead to the loading of demon rules 
of the form "If person P's plan contains act A. then it is possible 
that- F will occur". The detection of act A in a plan would fire the 
rule. Then ýa 'fact G would only be eligible for consideration as a 
valued tip in" an interaction if "It is possible that G will occur" 
was'currently true'. 
3.4. The status of theory and program 
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Allen's ideas are supported by the existence ofl a working program, 
whereas mine are not. Does this support one position against the 
other? There are two standard reasons for writing a program in AI 
research; the first is to demonstrate to other people that a 
superficially attractive theory does what it is claimed to do, The 
second is to help the researcher form his ideas to see where they are 
wrong. 
Though there is no final program, there have been at least six 
programs of various degrees of wrongness that have been thrown away. 
They have been useful In two ways: in pointing out flaws, as above; 
and in making sure that case analyses were complete and that 
symmetries were caught. 
For instance, at one stage I wrote code to look for the reasons that 
one might say "I want X", "I want -X" and "Do you want X? ". This set 
of three cases suggested the hypothesis that they were three of the 
four cells of a two-by-two grid. The last cell would be "Do you want 
-X? ". I couldn't think of any example of an utterance of this sort 
until I heard someone say "Do you mind if I turn the (electric] fire 
off? ". 
The question "Do you want XV seemed to ask about the goal of an as 
yet unmade plan by the questioner for the answerer's benefit. The 
question "Do you mind if -X? " seemed to ask about the badness of some 
state about to be brought about by some made plan of the 
questioner's. But once these had been seen as symmetric cases, it 
seemed sensible to try and unify the code that would look for such 
connections. In each case this involved finding an action by the 
questioner which might have X or -X as a remote effect. To find such 
art action might involve ascribing to the que. stioner a plan that he 
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contemplated but had perhaps not yet resolved on. 
It was already apparent that ascribing to a speaker a plan involved 
ascribing to, him certain beliefs and values, and that doing this was 
the, mechanism of indirect communication. The same code would extract 
such beliefs and-values from that ascription of any plan. This fact 
suggested trying; to-see the effects of all utterances arising during 
a, common stage, of processing, where a plan would be ascribed to the 
speaker and, then examined for what it entailed about his beliefs and 
desires. This idea was rejected, but it was not worthless. It was 
suggested by the desirablity of fusing blocks of code. 
It would -be silly to underplay the importance of having a working 
program, especially when, ý because of the difficulty of controlling 
search-, -many of the 'problems in AI are not "Can this inference be 
made? " but "Can this inference be made in practice? ". Only working 
programs can demonstrate the latter. But even a program that never 
works can be a good way of finding out what It ought to do if It did. 
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Conclusion 
To collect the conclusions of this thesis in detail would be to 
rehearse the introduction. But the, major, the central. conclusion is 
that there are features of-discourse which, if they are to be 
explained, require one to consider utterances as planned actions; and 
the sort of. -changes- that those actions which are utterances bring 
about-'are changes in other-peoples' plans. 
There were four main arguments for this: 
- There are general reasons why one might think that communication 
between independent agents,, could not employ utterances that were 
compulsory mind-changers, but would'have to proceed by recognition of 
attempted plan, alteration. 
--Speakers 'such as ourselves produce intuitively coherent exchanges 
in which -the%- coherence can be interpreted as the reasonable 
expectation-that an utterance would produce beneficial changes in 
other peoples' plans, either for selfish or altruistic reasons. What 
the affected plan was could have been made clear by the previous 
discourse . 
' There are discourse events which can be described by (for example) 
"is an acceptance". "is a refusal". "is an explanation". It seems 
that the grounds on which these terms can be applied must refer to 
changes in the interlocutors' plans and knowledge about plans. 
- Not all of the information given by from an utterance follows from 
its literal meaning: some of it can only be recovered if one looks at 
the change that the utterance compels in what must be assumed about 
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the speaker's plans. The speaker may employ this in Indirect 
communication., 
To, support such a claim,, one must propose in some detail a model of 
what-, plans are, how they are vulnerable to new facts and values. and 
what sorts of changes in people's plans are beneficial for the 
speaker. I,, gave a consciously simple but general account of plans 
which assimilated them, to proofs. Changes in plans could then be 
achieved by, the sort of changes that would make a proof valid or 
invalid. 
-Besides., 
this, plans, involve a. notion of the value of their 
effects, and I related effects to the value of the tip. and the 
validity of the body, of, the proof tree that constitutes the effect. 
A second piece of detail needed is recursive belief. Any account of 
how people attempt, to modify each others' plans must involve an 
account of how they represent each others' plans. I argued that in 
most cases this could be done in an unexpectedly simple way; people 
need pay attention only to the plans that they took to be mutually 
believed. Fully general recursive belief was not needed, since 
discourse typically fits what were demonstrated to be the conditions 
when mutual belief suffices. 
Lastly, I sketched how such a theory could be made computational. 
Those sketches were not satisfactory, but that is a separate issue 
from-the merits of the theory. 
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Appendix: Abbreviating proof trees 
Much of this thesis is about how proof trees can Interact. It will be 
convenient to have a graphic way of illustrating this. 
A proof tree is roughly a tree in which each node is a proposition 
which is true if either it is at the fringe of the tree, or if all 
its daughter nodes are true. An entire proof tree such as Abbrev/1 
can be abbreviated as any of Abbrev/2a-d. That is, the whole tree Is 
drawn as a 'triangle. Particular nodes in the tree can be made 
explicit. If such an explicit node is a plan goal. It must be at the 
apex of a triangle; if it is a precondition, it must be at the base: 
if it is an intermediate state or act it must be on a side. A node 
that occurs in two trees can be drawn in both as long as it occurs In 
the right place in both. Thus the overlapping trees in Abbrev/3 can 
be abbreviated as Abbrev/4. If two nodes in different trees are the 
same except for opposite sign, that can be emphasized b*y a line drawn 
between them. So Abbrev/5 can be drawn as Abbrev/6. A tree, parts of 
which are not specified, so that the question of how some nodes are 
to be proved is left open, such as Abbrev/7. can be drawn as a 
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